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 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
FIRM FOUNDATIONS: REBUILDING THE EARLY MODERN STATE IN LIMA, 
PERU AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE OF 1687 
by 
Judith M. Mansilla 
Florida International University, 2016 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Bianca Premo, Major Professor 
One early October morning in 1687, the ground under the large Spanish colonial 
city of Lima, Peru rumbled. If longstanding historiographical portraits of Spanish 
government as inefficient and weak were true, the earthquake that was about to shatter 
Lima should have devastated it beyond repair. The study of the aftermath of this natural 
disaster reveals that behind the landscape of destruction, the pillars of the colonial state in 
Lima not only held up but also permitted its rapid recovery after the event. As part of a 
more recent historiographical trend that reappraises the Spanish decline during the 
seventeenth century, my dissertation reevaluates the performance of colonial 
administration in Lima, the capital of the Viceroyalty of Peru. It focuses on deliberate 
 x 
 changes carried out during the 1680s, when the metropolis implemented a series of fiscal 
and administrative reforms, whose effects were interrupted but not destroyed by the 
challenge posed by the earthquake of 1687.   
The use of extensive contemporary archival sources, both official and private, 
provides a multifaceted vista on the performance of royal agents and colonial subjects 
responding to the earthquake. A close reading of these sources unveils the rebuilding of 
the state in various facets: government attempts to impose authority and bring order to the 
chaos; the patrimonial logic of rules that colonial administrators faced when trying to 
implement rebuilding projects; colonial subjects’ expectations of royal agents and each 
other; negotiations among authorities and ordinary people over the terms of rebuilding 
the city; and the importance of inhabitants’ understandings of justice, founded in law and 
custom, to carrying out city reconstruction. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
One early October morning in 1687, the ground under the large Spanish colonial 
city of Lima, Peru rumbled. If longstanding historiographical portraits of Spanish 
government as inefficient and weak were true, the earthquake that was about to crash into 
Lima should have devastated it beyond repair. The study of the aftermath of this natural 
disaster reveals the rapid response of the colonial administration in coping with the needs 
of the people, and the active participation of both Lima’s residents and royal officers in 
the reconstruction of the city. Behind the landscape of destruction, the pillars of the 
colonial state in Lima not only withstood the destruction produced by the quake but also 
permitted its rapid recovery. 
This outcome contrasts with the traditional image of weakness and incapacity to 
rule that scholars conventionally have painted in studies of Hapsburg Spain. The study of 
seventeenth-century Spanish Hapsburg government, specifically, possesses a long 
tradition of economic, political, and, in the last two centuries, historical writings 
influenced by the “Black Legend.” Though it originated in the sixteenth century, the 
Black Legend-- a set of negative and pejorative portrayals of the Spanish people, 
institutions, and activities-- still pervades historical representations of Spain and its 
 1 
 empire. In particular, in the seventeenth century the Black Legend served to support 
contemporary critics of Spain who emphasized its imperial downfall. Philosophers, 
politicians, economists and, much later, historians continued to propagate the idea that 
Spain’s governance of its territories was riddled with ineptitude, decadence, and lack of 
control mechanisms.  
As part of a more recent historiographical trend that reappraises the Spanish 
decline during the seventeenth century, my dissertation reevaluates the performance of 
Spanish colonial administration in Lima, the capital of the viceroyalty of Peru. It focuses 
on deliberate changes carried out during the 1680s. During this decade, the metropolis 
implemented a series of fiscal and administrative reforms, whose effects were interrupted 
by a strong natural event, the Earthquake of 1687.  A comprehensive study of the 
administration of the Viceroy Duke of Palata, whose tenure spanned most of this decade, 
is essential to understanding these changes because he promoted and carried out 
innovative crown policies, as well as handling the material, political, and social effects of 
the quake.  
The main elements of the study cover the post-disaster period in Lima, especially 
royal officers’ response to the increasing demands of a population in crisis. Using social, 
 2 
 cultural, political, economic, legal, and environmental historical approaches, this work 
reevaluates the interplay between institutions and people as they rebuilt Lima and, in this 
process, reconstituted an early modern state. The creative measures and approaches 
implemented during the reconstruction period reveal the effectiveness of Spanish rule in 
imposing a widespread and common legal framework used by colonial subjects.  
The proactive and expedient response of the colonial administration in Lima, 
facing one of the most damaging natural disasters that hit the city and indeed the empire, 
demonstrates its capacity of crisis management. The period of reconstruction brought 
about a series of challenges for the royal agents who attempted to implement various 
rebuilding projects. Secular officials successfully managed to work around a depleted 
royal treasury and the political opposition of the main religious authorities in order to 
rebuild the city and its administration. Their success in carrying out these projects further 
undermines the depiction of imperial Spain as deficient in authority and control.  
Through the examination of complex sets of practices and rules that governed the 
interactions between colonial administrators and subjects, the post-quake reconstruction 
period also reveals the everyday creation of an early modern state. In order to rebuild 
property destroyed by the quake, a highly diverse colonial population adopted, adapted, 
 3 
 and reproduced the forms and mechanism of the Spanish legal system, an ambit of social 
and political life that has long been framed as central to state formation.  
The final part of this study examines the flexibility and creativity of Spanish 
colonial administration in the New World. A close review of a royal audit of Lima’s 
treasury and its administrators, well underway prior to the earthquake, demonstrates how 
the crown maintained mechanisms to control and bring greater fiscal order to Lima, as 
well as to enhance the performance of royal administrators.  The secular government’s 
response to the Earthquake of 1678 was no mere anomaly; instead, it encapsulated and 
indeed galvanized a process of reform and fortification of the royal state already in 
process. Ultimately, this examination, and the dissertation as a whole, demonstrates how 
a state—for so long deemed inefficient and weak-- could be strong enough to withstand 
the turmoil of the quake.  
The Black Legend in Spanish History  
The concept of seventeenth-century decline is still ubiquitous among scholars 
writing about Spain and its colonial domains. Traditional studies use this notion to describe 
features of governance such as decentralization, negotiation, consensus and 
 4 
 patrimonialism, which in turn explain Spain’s weakness and its inability to develop into a 
modern state comparable to other European national powers like England and France.1  
This unfavorable portrait is related to the Black Legend, developed by Spain’s 
political rivals to attack the missionary Catholic character of the Spanish colonization and 
the excesses committed in name of God.2 Nonetheless, it later served to support Spain’s 
own discourses of political and economic backwardness.3 In the early seventeenth century, 
Spanish Hapsburg royal advisers known as arbitristas, who critiqued and suggested 
solutions to the king’s problems, were the first to use the term “decline” to describe the 
period of economic and political downturn Spain was entering.4 They criticized bad 
1 Schmidt-Nowara, Christopher and John M. Nieto-Phillips, Interpreting Spanish Colonialism: Empire, 
Nations and Legends (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005), 9. 
 
2 William s. Maltby, The Black Legend in England: The development of anti-Spanish sentiment, 1558 – 
1660. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1971), 135, 136; Joseph Sanchez, The Spanish Black Legend: 
Origins of Anti-Hispanic stereotypes (Albuquerque: National Park Service, Spanish Colonial Research 
Center, 1990), 4-8. 
 
3 Jeremy Adelman, “Introduction: The Problem of Persistence in Latin American History,” in Colonial 
Legacies: The Problem of Persistence in Latin America History, edited by Jeremy Adelman (New York: 
Routledge, 1999), 3, 4. 
 
4 Helen Rawlings, The Debate on the Decline of Spain (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), 
31, 34. 
 5 
                                                     
 government and economic decay, calling for mercantilist and political changes in order to 
reverse Spain to its previous political and economic grandeur.  
After dynastic change in Spain in the early 1700s from Hapsburg to Bourbon rule, 
ministers of the new royal house and other European intellectuals used the notion of decline 
to refer to Spain’s ostensibly retrograde condition in comparison to other European powers. 
These writers and policymakers recognized that the idea of Hapsburg decadence originated 
from intolerant and ignorant characteristics attributed to Spain by the “Black Legend.”5 
Yet the concept of decline did not disappear. This was because in order to address these 
deficiencies, Bourbon ministers attempted to implement a series of enlightened reforms 
based on a combination of foreign examples and traditional Spanish ideas.6 These 
politicians deliberately used the concept of Hapsburg decline to justify their reforms, and, 
similar to foreign politicians, had a political interest in exaggerating the contrast between 
the Hapsburgs and the new governing dynasty.7 
5 Ibid, 50. 
 
6 Gabriele Paquette, Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform in Spain and its empire (Cambridge: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 31. 
 
7 Jaime Vinces Vives, An Economic History of Spain, translated by Frances M. López – Morillas 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 398, 411; Ruth MacKay, ‘Lazy, Improvident People:’ Myth 
 6 
                                                     
 Up to the beginning of the twentieth century, Spanish and foreign intellectuals used 
the concept of decline to explain Spain’s failure to retain its colonial domains and its 
transformation into a second-class European nation.8 By then, scholars emphasized Spain’s 
lack of a systematized state structure, meaning a lack of central control and weak 
infrastructural power which permitted other European nations to lead the path into 
modernity. Hapsburg Spain was, in contrast to these modern states, a patrimonial state that 
resorted to negotiation and coercion in order to impose control and authority because it 
lacked the institutional means to force its subjects into compliance.  
The professionalization of history, the aperture of the archives in Spain after the 
end of the Franco era, and the ascendancy of the Annales School of social history decades 
later created new tools and approaches to study Spain’s imperial past. With new 
developments in the field, scholars began to recognize that Spain’s crisis had been 
exaggerated; yet, they still agreed that there was a decline during the seventeenth century 
as evidenced by its poor economy, depopulation, and poor administration.9  
and Reality in the Writing of Spanish History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); David Ringrose, 
Spain, Europe, and the ‘Spanish Miracle,’ 1700-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
8 Rawlings, The Debate on the Decline of Spain, 92. 
 
9 Earl Hamilton, “Revisions in Economic History: VIII. The Decline of Spain,” The Economic History 
Review 8, No. 2 (May, 1938), 168-179, associates the economic decline of Spain to the character of its 
 7 
                                                     
 Starting in the 1960s, the debate over the Spanish decline resurfaced in Past and 
Present, a journal that rapidly became a space of intellectual interchange among English-
speaking academics who began to identify various attempts of recovery and reform during 
the last Hapsburg administration.10 Scholars discovered the existence of a general crisis 
throughout Europe during the seventeenth century, and signaled that many of the state 
characteristics which had justified previous authors’ portrayals of Spain as weak and its 
rulers as inept were also present in other regions of Europe.11  
rulers, which he considers were in progressive deterioration in the seventeenth century; War and prices in 
Spain, 1651 – 1800 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947), argues the recovery and progress of the 
country began under the first of the Bourbons, who he considers were more competent rulers than their 
predecessors; Jaime Carrera Pujal, Historia de la Economía Española, vol. 2 (Barcelona: Bosch Casa 
Editorial, 1944), contrasts the image of decadence for the seventeenth-century with that of improvement for 
the next century. On one hand, he depicts the period of Charles II’s regime as a time of decline reflected in 
the inefficacy of the government and economic crisis. On the other hand, he proposes the Bourbon rulers 
began to introduce reforms as soon as the Succession War ended. Vinces Vives, An Economic History of 
Spain, 385, 411, reinforces the idea that the Hapsburg Spain and the Bourbon regime were regimes of 
opposite natures. He argues that the economic recession that took place in the New World by the second 
half of the seventeenth century accentuated the decay Spain experimented in the same century. He argues 
for French influence in Spanish culture, politics, economy, and technology during the Bourbon regime 
contributed to the recovery of Spain from the Hapsburg’s failures. 
 
10 Rawlings, The Debate on the Decline of Spain, 132, 133. 
 
11 John Elliot, “The Decline of Spain,” Past & Present 20 (Nov., 1961), 52-75, states that great part of the 
seventeenth century appears as a time of commercial contraction and demographic stagnation for Europe in 
general, yet differed from region to region. He also predicted that future studies would confirm the 
ineptness of Spain in that period. Geoffrey Parker and Lesley Smith, “Introduction,” in The General Crisis 
 8 
                                                     
 These academics also argued that the Hapsburg administration attempted and 
implemented various reforms that slightly improved the condition of the empire, refroms 
that laid the bases for the vaunted Bourbon Reforms of the next century.12  Historians found 
that even studies of Spain that had been conducted during the early eighteenth century 
underlined the various political and economic reform measures introduced during the last 
Hapsburg ruler, King Charles II. The authors argued that scholarly emphasis on the regime 
of Bourbon King Charles III and his late eighteenth-century policies have obscured the 
multiple attempts of transformation initiated during the last Hapsburg administration and 
continued by the early Bourbon monarchs.13 
of the Seventeenth Century, edited by Geoffrey Parker and Lesley M. Smith (Boston: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1978), 1 -32; Global Crisis. War, Climate Change & Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2013). 
 
12 John Elliot, Imperial Spain, 1492 – 1716 (New York:  New American Library, 1963), explains that 
Castile and other regions began to show signs of recovery by the 1680s. He identifies as the promoters of 
these improvements to the Count of Oropesa, prime minister from 1685 to 1691, whose reforms created the 
precedent for future reformative programs under the Bourbon dynasty. John Lynch, Spain under the 
Habsburgs, vol. 2 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), recognizes Spanish administration and economy began 
to present signs of improvement, between 1680 and 1691, thanks to the labor of the Prime ministers the 
Duke of Medinaceli and the Count of Oropesa. Spain did not pass suddenly from obscurantism to 
enlightenment with the transference of dynasty, but the last Hapsburg administration left the foundation for 
the next dynastic rule. 
 
13 John Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 1700 – 1808 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), explores the transformations 
in Spain and its colonies resulting from the dynastic transference during the eighteenth century. He states 
 9 
                                                     
 By the late twentieth century, scholarly reappraisals of the seventeenth-century 
Spanish crisis discovered that negotiation, decentralization and flexibility were better or 
more appropriate terms to describe the state-society relationship in Hapsburg Spain than 
were “crisis” and “decadence.” Contrary to previous historical analyses, scholars did not 
interpret these characteristics as conveying obsolescence or signs of failure but as vital 
features that permitted the development and permanence of the empire, providing 
opportunities for its inhabitants and administrators alike.14  Studies within this new 
that there was a period of recovery, which started in the 1680s under Hapsburg rule, and lasted until the 
1740s. Adrian Pearce, The Origins of Bourbon Reform in Spanish South America, 1700-1763 (Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 2,11, affirms that the period between the mid-seventeenth century and the 
Enlightenment absolutism heyday of Charles III remained scarcely explored. The Late-Bourbon reforms 
had overshadowed early waves of reform that the administration, both peninsular and colonial, consciously 
promoted in early decades. Luis Ribot, El Arte de Gobernar: Estudios sobre la España de los Austrias 
(Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2006), demonstrates that during the government of Charles II, the last Hapsburg 
king on the Spanish throne, the monarchy attempted and implemented various administrative innovations. 
Allan Kuethe and Lowell Blaisdell, “French influence and the Origins of the Bourbon Colonial 
Reorganization,” Hispanic American Historical Review 71, No. 3 (Aug., 1991): 579-607, affirm that the 
first Bourbon monarchs, Phillip V and Ferdinand VI, did not introduce great innovations in the empire, 
instead they mainly preserved the old system with small repairs. Geoffrey Walker, Spanish Politics and 
Imperial Trade, 1700 – 1789 (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1979), states that the Spanish 
administrators and merchants were effectively conscious of the terrible condition of the mercantile system 
since the late seventeenth century. Attempts of reforms began in 1679, even before the dynastic 
transference.  
 
14 MacKay, “Lazy, Improvident People”, examines the common belief that Spaniards disrespected labor 
and mechanical activities, and viewed workers as vile people. She argues that this notion is distant from 
how contemporaries regarded labor and workers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. She 
 10 
                                                     
 historiographical trend argue that, even when eighteenth-century reformers were behind 
the construction of many of these negative depictions of Hapsburg Spain, scholars’ 
insistence on comparing Spain to other, purportedly “modern” European nations such as 
England and France serves only to reinforce the notion of Spanish decline.15  In other 
words, the political interests of both historical actors and modern historians influenced the 
construction of a biased analyses and critical representation of Hapsburg Spain. 
demonstrates that commoners in Castile considered themselves that they were essential because of their 
work to their community and the common good. She proposes the disrespect for labor and workers was an 
essentially eighteenth-century myth that Bourbon reformers crafted in order to justify the existence of an 
irrational labor force that needed transformation, and modern authors later reinforced as real; Regina Grafe, 
Distant Tyranny: Markets, Power, and Backwardness in Spain, 1650 – 1800 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2012), xvi, argues that even though Spanish subjects were not equal in the old regime, 
they had access to courts and learned to exploit them in their benefit.  
She states that the idea of Spanish distinctiveness is well rooted in the Western historiography since the 
sixteenth century, when Northern European authors underlined with suspiciousness Spain’s ethnic and 
religious heterogeneity. This concept of distinctiveness turned into lack of civilization in the eighteenth 
century when Spain was considered unable to adopt enlightened features.  
 
15 David R. Ringrose, Spain, Europe, and the ‘Spanish miracle,’ 14, 15; and Xavier Gil Pujol, 
“Pensamiento politico español y europeo en la Edad Moderna. Reflexiones sobre su estudio en una época 
post-whig,” in Campo y campesinos en la España Moderna. Culturas Políticas en el Mundo Hispano, 
edited by María José Pérez Álvarez and Alfredo Martín García, (León, Spain: Fundación Española de 
Historia Moderna, 2012), 208, state scholars’ insistence to compare Spain with other North-European 
nations, which fit and support better the teleological history of the West, has underlined the notion of 
Spanish decline. Grafe, Distant Tyranny, x, xi, shows the idea of Spain’s distinctiveness turned into 
uncivilized in the eighteenth century, when it was perceived as unable to adapt to the new enlightened 
ideas. 
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 Despite the progress on the Spanish decline debate, which remains inconclusive, 
scholars realize that the notion of Spanish degeneracy is deeply rooted in people’s historical 
imagination, even among some in the academic realm. While recent historiography is 
beginning to finally uproot the assumption of decline in Hapsburg Spain, we still need to 
better understand not only what Hapsburg Spain was not but also what it was. This 
ultimately entails reviewing the way the Spanish state governed within its historical 
context. 
Early Modern State as Historical Subject 
Like the economy of the Hapsburg empire, scholars have cast doubts on the solidity 
or efficiency of the Spanish American colonial state by comparing it to contemporary 
models of the modern state. In The King’s Living Image, historian Alejandro Cañeque 
presents the state as a problematic concept that many scholars have used indiscriminately, 
without questioning its existence or appropriateness, to describe the apparatus of 
governance Spain implemented in the New World. Analysis of the colonial state has merely 
focused on evaluating if it was “weak” or “strong.”16  Scholars’ insistence on examining 
Spain in the early modern period according to the current definitions of nation-state 
16 Alejandro Cañeque, The King’s Living Image. The Culture and Politics of Viceregal Power in Colonial 
Mexico (New York: Routledge, 2004), 4,5. 
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 formation and market building, which are considered the signal milestones of the current 
Western model of progress, have underlined Spain’s lack of central power and incapacity 
to impose rule as features of weakness.17  
Using these theoretical parameters or models to analyze the colonial state, the 
Spanish political system in the New World looks far from modern. Over a half century ago, 
John Phelan asserted that Spanish colonial bureaucrats had ambiguous objectives and 
conflicting standards regarding the implementation of law. The same body of legal codes 
allowed bureaucrats to postpone or evade the observance of norms issued by the central 
government.18 In the following decades, scholars began to identify other features of the 
Hapsburg system, such as consensus, negotiation, overlapping jurisdictions, and 
patrimonialism, without judging them as indicators of “weakness” or “strength” according 
to an imagined modern metric.  
17 Grafe, Distant Tyranny, x, xi. 
 
18 John Phelan, “Authority and Flexibility in the Spanish Imperial Bureaucracy,” Administrative Science 
Quarterly 5, No. 1 (Jun., 1960), 63, 64. 
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 These studies, for instance, demonstrate that the stability of the government relied 
on consensus among various corporative interests rather than an absolute monarchy.19 
Negotiation permitted the intromission of local elite’s interest in the development and 
implementation of colonial politics, which resulted in a compromise state rather than an 
absolutist one.20 Yet the observation of these features and the functioning of early modern 
governance has revealed the stubbornness of the historical category of “state.” According 
to some historians, the lack of absolute royal power, the existence of overlapping 
jurisdictions, and the constant negotiation between the administration and the colonial 
subjects seem indicate not that we develop more capacious definitions of the “state” but 
instead that no state existed under Hapsburg rule. 
The Rule of the Early Modern States 
But perhaps the “state” lies in the eye of the beholder. French postmodern historian 
Michel Foucault recognized the existence of a different form of rule, or “governmentality,” 
up to the seventeenth century. He defined this kind of government as the proper manner of 
19 Henry Kamen, Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century, 1665 – 1700 (London: Longman, 1980), 17, 23, 
25. 
 
20 John Lynch, “The Institutional Framework of Colonial Spanish America,” Journal of Latin American 
Studies, 24, Quincentenary Supplement: The Colonial and Post Colonial Experience. Five Centuries of 
Spanish and Portuguese America (1992): 74 
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 managing things to lead not so much to benefit the common good but rather to an end 
“convenient” (befitting or appropriate; in Spanish, “conveniente”) for each of the things or 
groups that are to be governed.21 Foucault reveals that there are many ways to conceive 
political rule beyond the parameters of the so-called modern state. Indeed, his reminder is 
a helpful one because it encourages us to view Spain within the broader range of modes of 
governing that existed in early modern Europe.  
When compared to paradigms of early development and modernization derived 
from other European nations, such as France and England, Spain’s political system and 
form of rule seem more similar than different. Describing the process of state-formation in 
England during the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Michael Braddick defines the 
early modern state as a political system whose local officers were part of a territorially, 
centrally coordinated bureaucratic network, backed by a legitimate force that emanated 
from the ruler. Public offices were in and of themselves institutions of the state.  When an 
officeholder occupied a position, he acquired the authority to exercise legitimate force to 
secure compliance from the subjects he ruled. Still, even when royal agents received 
21 Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in The Foucault effect. Studies in Governmentality with two 
lectures by and interview with Michael Foucault edited by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter 
Miller (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 95. 
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 legitimation from the monarch, they were also empowered by social authority. Thus they 
had to live by the standards of their communities as well as those of their superiors.22 
Within this definition of state, the seemingly contradictory performance of many royal 
officers who abstained from implementing royal or top-down laws that they considered 
unsuitable for local conditions make sense. Their legitimacy rested on balancing the 
interests of the king and the subjects. 
In the case of France, William Beik demonstrates that the rise of absolutism was 
not the result of a repressive system that reduced all its subjects under control, attracting 
nobles to the court while imposing greater burdens on the peasantry. He argues that the 
centralization of the political apparatus of Louis XIV became possible because of the 
allegiance of provincial elites to the monarchy’s authority, which resulted from the king’s 
increasing protection of elites’ interests, rather than repression. Provincial elites became 
more willing to cooperate with the central government.23 The government of Louis XIV 
built its strength not by eradicating clientage and venality, understood as the king’s 
22 Michael Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England, c. 1550-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 9.  
 
23 William Beik, Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State power and provincial 
aristocracy in Languedoc (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 31.  
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 inability to control society, but rather through networks of personal and institutional ties 
along lines of authority.24   
These studies show that characteristics such as decentralization, venality, clientage, 
negotiation, and “conveniencia” are not proof of early modern states’ weakness or 
inferiority, yet they had the effect of “demodernizing” seventeenth-century governments. 
England, with its early constitutional forms, and France, with its development of a central 
state, eclipsed Hapsburg Spain’s “non-modern” features and stigmatized its political 
system.  
Recently, historians seeking to show that Hapsburg Spain’s political system was 
not exceptional employ the concepts of “composite” and “polycentric” monarchies to 
describe the seemingly complex Spanish system of governance. British historian John 
Elliot defines “composited monarchies” as a myriad of various territorial or jurisdictional 
units, whose elites maintained legal and self-government privileges through their loyalty 
to the monarch, who maintained patronage to reward and keep such loyalty.25 Even though 
24 Ibid, 13-15. 
 
25 John Elliot, Spain, Europe & the Wider World, 1500-1800 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 
52, 53, explains that these composite monarchies resulted from two possible ways of unification. The 
“accessory” union was when a territory, united to another kingdom or province, became regarded 
juridically as part of such kingdom or province, and its inhabitants adopted the same rights and laws of 
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 it was not unique, the so-called Spanish Hapsburg Empire represented the best example of 
composited monarchies.  This system was practical for its time because it created both 
stability and resilience for the extensive Spanish monarchy, where the diverse legal status 
of its jurisdictional units, the long distances between its colonial provinces and the court, 
and the patrimonial condition of its ruling dynasty made it necessary to resort to 
negotiation, “conveniencia,” and decentralization. 
More recently, building on the concept of “composite” monarchies, some scholars 
propose the concept of “polycentric” monarchies.  They argue that, rather than 
relationships between the center and its periphery, there were various interlinked centers 
that actively participated in the making of politics in early modern societies. This model 
also recognizes the mobility of the political structures, and the need of negotiation, 
clientage, and patrimonialism, which provided solidity and malleability to the multi-
territorial monarchies.26  
those in the kingdom or province’s jurisdiction. The Indies represented the best example of this type of 
union. The second kind of union was that called “aeque principaliter,” which referred to the union of one 
kingdom to another, maintaining its distinctiveness, identity, and laws. The annexation of Aragón, 
Valencia, or Catalonia to Castile is an example of aeque pincipaliter.  
 
26 Pedro Cardim, Tamar Herzog, José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez and Gaetano Sabatini, “Introduction,” Polycentric 
Monarchies: How Did Early Modern Spain and Portugal Achieve a Global Hegemony? edited by Pedro 
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 The Spanish colonies of the New World, called the “Indies,” represented, according 
this model, a center among others within the Spanish “polycentric” monarchy. Even though 
the Indies was legally an “accessory” province to Castile, its extension produced regional 
subdivisions, where Mexico City and Lima were two centers called “viceregal” capitals.27 
Despite their prominent position among other cities in the Indies and their increasing 
contribution to the entire monarchy, they were centers in the periphery. The model of 
“composited” monarchies seems appropriate for understanding their place in the imperial 
structure of Spanish Hapsburg governance because colonial officeholders ultimately 
sought legitimation of their political decisions before the monarch. Nonetheless, they were 
careful that their behavior remained within the limits of what locals considered a good 
royal agent. Otherwise, they could lose authority among colonies subjects and ultimately 
the power the king had bestowed on them. In other words, the political privileges and limits 
Cardim, Tamar Herzog, José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez and Gaetano Sabatini (Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic 
Press, 2012), 3, 4.  
 
27 Rafael García Pérez, “Revisiting the America’s Colonial Status under the Spanish Monarchy,” in New 
Horizons in Spanish Colonial Law: Contributions to Transnational Early Modern Legal History, edited by 
Thomas Duve and Heikki Pihlajamäki (Frankfurt: Max Planck Institute for European Legal History, 2015), 
47, 48. 
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 of the political elite at provincial centers, even those at the viceregal courts, were defined 
by their relationship to the main center and the king’s court. 
The Colonial Spanish State 
The colonial state in the Spanish Indies was patrimonial in nature. The relationship 
between the ruler and his subjects was defined both by law and practice, which were 
sometimes contradictory.28 Authority in the colonial state derived from the ruler’s personal 
and private rights. Even the legitimacy of law and bureaucracy proceeded from the fact 
that they were considered manifestations of the ruler’s personal power.29 Consensus 
between the metropolis and the colonies was built on experience and had permitted the 
permanence of the empire by balancing loyalty to the crown and local interest.30  
Overlapping jurisdictions, patrimonialism, and negotiation between the central 
government and colonial subjects are not, in the end, characteristics of incapacity and 
28  Miguel Costa, “Patronage and Bribery in Sixteenth Century: The Government of Viceroy Conde del 
Villar and the Visita of Licentiate Alonso Fernandez de Bonilla” (PhD Diss., Florida International 
University, 2005), 21, 22. 
 
29 Ibid, 27, explains the traditional political systems is where “society follows an order based on traditional 
authority and obedience to personal authority.” The legal patrimonial state is established by a society based 
on the obedience to a legal system. In the patrimonial state, a sub-category of the traditional order, the ruler 
“organizes his political power over extra-patrimonial areas and political subjects.” 
 
30 Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 351. 
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 failure. They were necessary elements for reaching the goal held by every early modern 
state-- to provide to each part of the political body what was most fitting, or “conveniente,” 
according to their socio-political condition.  
The repetition of practices of negotiation and legitimation, which engaged both 
royal officers and colonial subjects, reveals the existence of a set of patterns that became 
rooted in colonial society. According to Braddick, royal agents obtained social authority 
through legitimating languages or discourses that subjects understood and accepted as 
valid. Even when officers’ actions appeared to oppose to the king’s will, they justified their 
actions by appealing to the legitimating ideas at their disposal, such as the fulfillment of a 
wider range of locals’ expectations, reward for their loyalty, or the maintenance of the 
customary political order. 31 
This set of legitimizing ideas, valid for both the ruler and the ruled, constituted an 
ethos or common framework that gave unity and coherence to the political body, 
regardless of its heterogeneous compositions and particularities. 32  The development of 
this common ethos was not monopolized or solely regulated by the state, although it was 
31 Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England, 7. 
 
32 Phillip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 4, 9. 
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 central to its functioning.  Colonial subjects also regulated and shaped rituals and 
mechanisms of power through performance when using such forms of political power. 
They were able to use institutions and legal mechanisms of the colonial system, yet 
creatively adopted them to build their discourses and tend their particular needs. This was 
a process in which both state agencies and subjects participated.  
I propose that Spanish colonialism was able to establish a common discourse or 
legitimizing framework through the law in the Indies. This dissertation demonstrates the 
existence of this common ethos by analyzing colonial subjects’ adoption and 
reproduction of the diverse Spanish legal system’s forms offered to colonial subjects. 
Even if these subjects did not believe in the power behind these forms of rule, the use and 
appropriation of the colonial state’s symbols, words, and institutions, in everyday 
activities, both affirmed the power of the state and contributed to shape such forms. 
When royal officers designed and implemented administrative innovations, these were 
legitimated according to collective values or consciousness. The heterogeneous colonial 
population’s participation in these rituals and activities did not necessarily demonstrate 
full-scale consent to subordination; rebellion and resistance could still take place. Yet the 
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 everyday participation in the rituals and performances of rule did affirm and shape the 
larger political system of Spanish imperial rule.33   
I argue that the Spanish crown established a state apparatus that was not modern 
but functioned according to the parameters of its time. Within the common framework of 
the patrimonial colonial state, negotiation and compromise were valid and beneficial for 
both rulers and subjects.  They provided flexibility and stability to the colonial system, 
which served to properly provide for each part of the political body. These were no signs 
of the weakness of the colonial state, but instead comprised very foundation of the 
political system.  
This dissertation’s focus on the post-1687 earthquake period demonstrates 
precisely how royal agents’ exercise of power was limited by the common ethos. In the 
aftermath of the disaster, colonial subjects had the opportunity to use and appropriate, 
officially and unofficially, the state’s forms, institutions, and symbols, including the 
culture of contracts and law so essential to Hapsburg rule.  Consequently, the 
performance of bureaucrats and colonial subjects must be analyzed and understood 
33 Derek Sayer, “Everyday forms of State Formation: Some Dissident Remark in “Hegemony,” in Everyday 
forms of State Formation: Revolution and Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico, edited by Gilbert Joseph 
and Daniel Nugent (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 374-376. 
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 within the flexible and negotiable limits the Spanish system implemented. My 
dissertation further shows that, in times of crisis, flexibility, negotiation, and 
“conveniencia” allowed Lima’s people to successfully reconstruct their city and the early 
modern state. 
The Earthquake of 1687 appears in this analysis as a historical actor that tested the 
strength of the colonial state and temporarily halted reforms, but ultimately galvanized 
the process of early modern state formation. The post-disaster period offers various 
episodes that display the success of the colonial state in dealing with the increasing 
demands of a dispossessed population. As it imposed control and implemented 
reconstruction projects in the face of political opposition among the highest members of 
the non-monastic Church and the financial limitations of the royal treasury, the colonial 
state underwent a rapid and concentrated process of reformation. The examination of 
people’s participation in the city’s reconstruction demonstrates the existence of a 
common framework of legal and paralegal forms they validated and used in order to 
repair private property in the post-quake period. 
Methods and Sources 
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 Most of the primary sources employed in this dissertation are official 
documentation from various colonial institutions, such as the city council, royal treasury, 
and ecclesiastical council. These documents provide diverse perspectives on the events 
being analyzed. Official correspondence, descriptive accounts, and even the personal 
letters of colonial authorities offer complementing or contrasting views of multiple 
administrative actors in diverse institutions, both religious and secular. Other kinds of 
official sources, such as notarial and court records, contain information about ordinary 
people’s involvement in rebuilding activities and use of forms and forums of the Spanish 
legal system. Complementing the bulk of primary sources for this dissertation, personal 
letters and accounts offer data about ordinary peoples’ views and participation in such 
reconstruction activities.  
All together, these primary sources provide a multifaceted vista focused on the 
performance of both royal agents and colonial subjects responding to the quake. A close 
reading of the sources unveils the functioning of the colonial state and its attempts to 
impose authority and control; the restrictive rules that colonial administrators faced when 
trying to implement rebuilding projects; colonial subjects’ expectations of royal agents 
and themselves; the negotiation among authorities and ordinary people over the terms of 
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 rebuilding the city; and the diverse social groups’ understandings of justice shaped by 
their own interpretation of law and custom. 
Overview of Chapters 
The story of the earthquake mainly proceeds chronologically, with one exception: 
the last chapter goes back in time to provide an overarching analysis of the economic 
challenges Viceroy Duke of Palata dealt with during his administration and his 
subsequent plans to rebuild Lima. This is a diachronic analysis that examines the impact 
of the earthquake on the series of reforms that both peninsular and colonial authorities 
implemented during the years previous to the natural events, and how colonial subjects 
performed within the parameters set by the colonial system. 
Chapter 1 examines Lima as a principal city within the Spanish empire, a center 
in the periphery, and focuses on the various dimensions of the early modern state in 
Lima. The city’s centrality to Spanish imperialism facilitates an analysis of the interplay 
between both local and imperial administrations facing the quotidian and extraordinary 
demands of a heterogeneous colonial population. The political and economic position of 
Lima within the colonial Spanish territory demanded the constant attention of local and 
royal agents in order to preserve the economic vitality of the city’s neighboring port, 
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 which was the main port of the South Sea. The defensive structures that certain 
administrators built at the port of Callao predictably served to ward off pirate attacks. But 
the walls also unintentionally protected the port against nature. The chapter concludes by 
examining some of the administrative and fiscal reforms that Viceroy Duke of Palata 
developed within an environment of political antagonism, to demonstrate that the Spanish 
monarchy and its royal agents were able to introduce improvements and impose 
authority. 
Chapter 2 evaluates the capacity of crisis management of the colonial 
administration in Lima after the Earthquake of 1687. The great intensity of the quake and 
extensive destruction of the city forced people to abandon their dwellings and look for 
alternative areas to provisionally relocate to. The Viceroy assembled the members of the 
city council in order to take the necessary measures to provide people with basic 
assistance. He also planned, negotiated, and initiated reconstruction projects to rebuild 
the main public building of the city, because it housed the principal branches of 
government and represented the power of the colonial state. The response by the royal 
agents in Lima after the earthquake contradicts dominant models of Spanish imperial 
state incapacity. 
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 The regular and secular clergy of the Catholic Church—long understood as a 
central branch of Spanish colonial governance--- responded differently in the post-
disaster context of Lima, as explored in Chapter 3. This chapter recounts the material and 
spiritual activities of the religious orders, members of the Ecclesiastical Council, and the 
Archbishop of Lima. The religious orders actively provided spiritual assistance as soon as 
the first tremor hit the city. They also organized the rapid reconstruction of their 
monasteries and assisted other religious that were in need. But the members of the 
Ecclesiastical Council and the Archbishop were almost entirely absent and thus unable to 
provide the spiritual services that people needed. The Archbishop left the capital for 
various weeks to recover from injuries he suffered during the quake. The Viceroy took 
his place in the various religious functions that people performed in order to appease 
God’s wrath, considered to be the cause of the intense quake. The Ecclesiastical Council 
and the Archbishop opposed the Viceroy’s plans to reconstruct the cathedral. They were 
mainly concerned with tending to their own material needs rather than providing spiritual 
aid to Lima’s flock, leaving a vacuum that secular authority had to fill. 
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to demonstrate that, beyond top-down efforts, the 
success of state building owes to ordinary legal practices that the colonial population 
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 adopted and adapted in their everyday lives. In order to rebuild their private properties 
and estate holdings, Lima’s population used, even informally, the forms and mechanisms 
the Spanish legal system offered. People and their corporations reached formal 
agreements before the ecclesiastical courts, or they legitimized previously-negotiated 
contracts before notaries. In cases where the value of property or money involved did not 
match the expense involved in going to court, colonial subjects resorted to extralegal 
arrangements, which were not necessarily recorded. Examples of these kinds of unofficial 
resolutions remain in the accounting book of a religious sodality whose administrator had 
the responsibility to repair the damaged properties of the congregation. Ordinary colonial 
people’s practices of negotiation, and use of legal and paralegal forms reveal the success 
of the colonial state in imposing a common framework of rule that withstood the quake, 
and served as a strong foundation down to the lowest levels of society. 
Chapter 5 shows that Spanish colonial administration, as part of a greater imperial 
project, promoted a series of inspections and reforms of the royal treasury of Lima that 
preceded the earthquake in the late seventeenth century. Beginning in 1677, the Crown 
ordered the inspection of royal treasuries of Lima and their administrators.  This visita 
has been overlooked by most historians, resulting in an underestimation of the Hapsburg 
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 state’s control over its royal agents and initiative to promote reforms. When the Duke of 
Palata arrived in 1681, the visita was suspended because of the death of the last inspector. 
The Duke had royal instructions to reactivate the visita, which resulted in the exile of one 
of the administrators of the royal treasury and the reduction of the debt owed to the king. 
The Duke also implemented measures to improve the fiscal system of the entire 
viceroyalty. The Earthquake of 1687 halted the collection activities of the royal 
administrators, who were working diligently after the exile of their old friend. In spite of 
the financial challenges caused by the 1687 earthquake, Lima’s remittances to Spain 
increased between 1685 and 1690 because viceroys had the obligation to send periodical 
remittances of bullion to the peninsula, despite the negative balance of the royal treasury. 
The visita and the Duke of Palata’s reforms provisionally attenuated the critical condition 
of the royal treasury, even as the unexpected natural disaster interrupted them. The 
earthquake ultimately permitted both royal agents and subjects to galvanize the process of 
early modern state formation. If the reforms accentuated the crown’s control and 
authority among the political elite in Lima, the earthquake multiplied the opportunities 
for limeños (or Lima’s inhabitants) to reinforce the crown’s authority through their active 
use of the Spanish legal system.  
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 Ultimately, this dissertation explores the performance of the colonial state in Lima 
by combining various historical approaches. It portrays the Earthquake of 1687 as a 
historical actor that impacted the social, political, and economic structures of the colonial 
capital. The earthquake that hit Lima in 1687 laid bare the literal and metaphorical 
architectural bones of the colonial state, which were strong enough to withstand the 
turmoil and promote the recuperation of the city. The analysis of the post-disaster context 
reveals the colonial administration’s capacity of crisis management as a skill in the art of 
government, as civil administrators provided for what was “conveniente” for colonial 
subjects according to their social standing. The active participation of Lima’s population 
in the activities of reconstruction demonstrates the existence of a common legal 
framework that penetrated various levels of society and served as a crucial foundation for 
the ongoing process of rebuilding the city and the colonial state. 
 
 
 
II. CHAPTER 1. THE EPICENTER OF THE SOUTH SEA: THE CITY OF 
LIMA IN THE LATE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
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 The city of Lima ranked among the main urban centers of the Spanish empire in 
the New World. It became the political, economic, religious, and cultural center of the 
Spanish domains in South America. A large population of diverse backgrounds settled in 
Lima because of the ample opportunities available in the locality. The city rapidly grew in 
size and splendor, which required greater attention from the metropolis. As the capital of 
the viceroyalty of Peru, Lima hosted the headquarters of various administrative, religious, 
and commercial institutions. 
Lima’s political and economic development derived from its geographical location 
in the midsection of coastline along the South Sea. It became the gatekeeper to the riches 
of the Andes and center of the commercial networks in the viceroyalty. Along with these 
diverse advantages, Lima’s setting also had certain inconveniences. It was vulnerable to 
pirates’ attacks that periodically sailed along the viceroyalty’s coast. Among other natural 
events such as droughts, floods, and epidemics, earthquakes hit the city from time to time. 
Since early modern people considered unforeseen events as results of God’s will, the 
reaction to such events was to plea for divine mercy rather than take any kind of preventive 
measures for future occurrences.34 
34 Gideon Sjoberg, “Disasters and Social Change,” in Man and Society in Disaster edited by George W. 
Baker and Dwight W. Chapman (New York: Basic Books, 1962), 363. 
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Image 1: Lima, capital of the Viceroyalty of Peru35  
Historical records describe colonial authorities’ efforts to implement measures to 
defend the city, yet these were more reactive than proactive. Royal representatives and 
subjects were more concerned about the tangible threat from pirate crews than natural 
phenomena, which were typically unforeseen.  Despite the fear and economic threat pirates 
represented, authorities were hesitant to invest in building structures that would represent 
large expenses to the royal treasury. Royal representatives had the obligation to 
 
35 Image made by the author. 
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 periodically send revenues to the metropolis and had to justify any extraordinary 
disbursement of royal treasury’s monies. The subsequent constructions of defense 
structures demonstrate how royal agents responded to the demands from locals, for 
protection against pirates, and from the monarch, for remittance of revenues.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Despite the prominent position of Lima and recurrent pirate incursions, royal 
officers were unable to liberally use the royal treasury’s monies to build defensive 
structures along the coast. They faced the predicament of having to balance the interests of 
the ruler and the locals. Even though Lima provided significant and constant revenues to 
the crown, it never was a priority in the politics of the court in Madrid. While it was an 
important center among the New World colonies, it was still the periphery of the Spanish 
Empire.  
Lima’s position as the center in a periphery is critical to this work because it 
highlights the interplay between imperial and local interests.36 Even though the term 
‘periphery’ has a negative connotation, it describes the remoteness that even viceregal 
36 Anna Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, ‘Between Metropole and Colony. Rethinking a Research 
Agenda,” in Tensions of Empire. Colonial Culture in a Bourgeois World edited by Anna Laura Stoler and 
Frederick Cooper (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 5.  
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 capitals had in the mind of the metropolis’ authorities.37 Both peninsular and colonial 
authorities recognized that distant colonial domains required a certain degree of freedom 
in administrative matters. Certainly, distance permitted some arbitrary practices among 
royal officers, yet they were also obliged to bridge the distance. In order to do so, they 
recorded their decisions and activities, provided accounts of these in constant 
correspondence to the king, and consequently sought royal approval as a means to 
legitimate their behavior. 
The construction of the wall of Lima, specifically, displays how state practices of 
negotiation allowed colonial authorities to rule among the seemingly contradictory 
interests of the monarch and a provincial center. Ultimately, this chapter demonstrates that, 
even when authorities pushed innovative ideas or projects, they had to evaluate their 
implementation according to the conditions of both the locality and the empire.  
The City of the Kings 
Attracted by stories of riches in the Incas’ lands, Francisco Pizarro and his party 
reached the coast of today’s Peru in 1528. After capturing the ruling Inca Atahualpa and 
bringing under control a large part of his domains, the Spanish conqueror decided to found 
37 Sylvia Sellers-Garcia, Distance and Documents at the Spanish Empire’s Periphery (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2014), 15, 16. 
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 a city that would function as capital of a new Spanish kingdom he intended to establish. 
Once he eliminated other possible settlements, Pizarro founded the city of Lima or “City 
of the Kings” in 1535.38   
The new city was established on the southern margin of the Rimac River, a couple 
of miles away from the coast.39 The limits of the city and adjacent farms extended over an 
area formed by the slope of the rivers Rímac, Chillón (on the north), and Lurín (on the 
south).40 The city had a natural port, Callao, that had functioned since pre-Hispanic times. 
In a few years, it became the most important port of the South Sea, as the Pacific Ocean 
was called.41 
38 Raul Porras Barrenechea, Pequeña Antología de Lima. El río, el puente y la alameda (Lima: Universidad 
Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, 1965), 25, states some sources indicate the name of “City of the kings” 
referred to the Spanish kings, and others to the Epiphany day. Juan Günther Doering and Guillermo 
Lohmann Villena, Lima (Madrid: Colecciones MAPFRE, 1992), 54, state that according to the father Cobo, 
the conquerors wanted to honor the Epiphany because in the same days those from the East were in the 
desert looking for Belen, they were in the sands between Pachacamac and Lima, looking for a place for 
their new city. 
 
39 Porras Barrenechea, Pequeña Antología de Lima, 26. 
 
40 Günther & Lohmann, Lima, 15. 
 
41 Reinhard Augustin Burneo, Las Murallas Coloniales de Lima y el Callao (Lima: Editorial Universitaria, 
2012), 44. 
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 The Spanish monarch confirmed the foundation of Lima and its name of “The City 
of the Kings” in 1536. A few days after the foundation of the city, Pizarro established the 
local administration of the city with the appointment of the two first alcaldes ordinarios of 
the city. The increasing preeminence of Lima is reflected by the diverse grants and status 
improvements it received during the following decades: Pope Paul III promoted Lima to 
bishopric in 1541, and archbishopric in 1546; and the Crown elevated it to capital of the 
new viceroyalty of Peru, created in 1542, and issued the royal decree to found the first 
university of the Indies, San Marcos, in 1551.42   
At the time of the foundation of Lima, Pizarro distributed the first plots among the 
30 vecinos, or elite residents, of the city.43 Lima’s layout was similar to a checkerboard. It 
consisted of 117 blocks, each divided in 4 plots.44 Pizarro assigned the plot in front of the 
42 Günther & Lohmann, Lima, 54, 59, 70, 71, 75, 87. 
 
43 John K. Chance, Race and Class in Colonial Oaxaca (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978), 4, 
explains that during the first decades after conquest vecinos were European household heads, who received 
a lot and some land, and even Indian labor (encomiendas). They differed from moradores that had a fixed 
urban residence without land or encomienda grants. In Peru, a royal decree of 1554 allowed any Spaniard 
with a fixed residence to accede to vecino status. Thereafter, merchants, who usually lacked encomiendas, 
could receive such distinction.   
 
44 Porras Barrenechea, Pequeña Antología de Lima, 26. Alejandra Osorio, Inventing Lima: Baroque 
Modernity in Peru’s South Sea Metropolis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 13. 
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 eastern edge of the Plaza Mayor (Main Square) to be the first church, which was built by 
1540. 45  He chose the lot located on the northern edge for his own residence. After his 
death, the Crown seized Pizarro’s properties and his palace became the residence of the 
future rulers of the viceroyalty of Peru.46 The plot Pizarro granted to his brother Hernando 
on the western edge of the plaza became the city council’s building, in 1566.47 
Lima rapidly outgrew the initial 13 blocks in length and 9 blocks in width of its 
foundation.48 The dimensions of the city’s growth are evident by the foundation of multiple 
convents and monasteries, the addition of new plazas and blocks, and the appearance of 
new neighborhoods, such as San Lázaro and El Cercado.49 Lima received a constant flow 
of people from Europe, Africa, Asia, and other parts of the New World. They arrived to 
45 Günther & Lohmann, Lima, 70. Pablo Patrón, Lima Antigua (Lima: Librería e Imprenta Gil, 1935), 3. 
 
46 Porras Barrenechea, Pequeña Antología de Lima, 129. Because Pizarro owed large quantity of pesos to 
the Crown by the time of his death, the monarch order by a royal decree that this property would be 
confiscated for the Crown. 
 
47 Günther & Lohmann, Lima, 82. 
 
48 Osorio, Inventing Lima, 13. 
 
49 Günther & Lohmann, Lima, 121, 122, state the San Lázaro neighborhood was a remembrance of the 
Triana neighborhood in Seville, and the governor García de Castro issued the creation of El Cercado to 
provide an exclusive area for the residence of Indians.  
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 stay either temporarily or permanently. In either case, they injected vitality to the city, 
which became the core of the Spanish viceroyalty in South America.50  
By the mid-seventeenth century, Lima had reached 25 blocks in length and 14 in 
width. There were around 2,500 buildings without taking into account two neighborhoods 
that were outside the area considered the city properly. El Cercado, along the east side of 
the city, was constructed as a “reduction” (something like an urban reservation) of Indians, 
and housed around 200 dwellings. San Lazaro, located at the other side of the Rimac River, 
held 600 homes. It was originally a settlement of Indian fishermen, yet by the end of the 
century, it hosted people from diverse ethnic background as the rest of the city.51 A few 
decades later, in 1687, contemporary witnesses estimated the number of properties 
ascended to 4500, and the population of the city had increased to 50,000 people.52  
 
50 N. David Cook, La Catástrofe demográfica andina. Perú 1520 – 1620 (Lima: Fondo Editorial Pontificia 
Universidad Católica del Perú, 2010), 207. 
 
51 Günther & Lohmann, Lima, 123. 
 
52 Letter from the Duke de la Palata to the King, December 8, 1687. Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid 
(hereafter BNM), MS. 9375; Account of the City Council, by Diego Fernández Montaño, December 4 
1687.  Archivo General de Indias (hereafter AGI), Lima, 87, 1v, 21v, 30v. Other witnesses that declared 
before the City Council’s notary calculated the number of houses in around 5000.  
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 The Plaza Mayor maintained its position as the heart of the city, surrounded by 
political and mercantile buildings. On the northern side, the viceregal palace, formerly the 
home of Pizarro, accommodated the offices of the Real Audiencia, Real Acuerdo, Tribunal 
de Cuentas, Sala del Crimen, and Real Hacienda; the Royal Jail and the Royal Chapel; and 
the viceregal family’s private rooms.53 The Cathedral, the Ecclesiastical Council’s 
building, and the archbishop’s palace shared the block on the eastern side.54 On the western 
edge, behind one of two portals that Viceroy Conde de Nieve (1561-1564) established, was 
the city hall with its jail, chapel, and the courtrooms of the cabildo.55 On the southern side, 
behind the second portal stood, various commercial stores of diverse genres. The adjacent 
streets to the Plaza Mayor and behind the first row of blocks around it had several artisan 
workshops and other diverse stores.  
The same Plaza Mayor functioned as a market, called a Tianguez or “El Gato.”56 
Vendors filled it with mobile stalls (cajones). In the tianguez, Indian vendors usually 
53 Günther & Lohmann, Lima, 123; Porras Barrenechea, Pequeña Antología de Lima, 128; Patrón, Lima 
Antigua, 3. 
 
54 Porras Barrenechea, Pequeña Antología de Lima, 128. 
 
55 Patrón, Lima Antigua, 2. 
 
56 Porras Barrenechea, Pequeña Antología de Lima, 130. 
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 offered a large variety of crops that they brought from their fields.57 Beginning in 1548, 
the city council assigned a place on the northeastern edge of the viceregal palace, called 
the alhóndiga, for the sale of meat and fish.58 Because of this local commerce, the city had 
a constant supply of fresh food products that required city council regulation in order to 
maintain fair prices and weights.  
The presence of the various branches of the political power and the vitality of 
commerce paralleled the religious fervor of the city and its people. By the late 1680s, the 
city had sixty-five religious edifices: the Cathedral being the most important, four parishes, 
twenty convents, eleven monasteries, fifteen beneficence establishments, schools, and 
other similar institutions.59  Although secular priests, meaning priests with parishes, tended 
some of these places, religious orders—monks and missionaries-- oversaw most of them.   
In only a few decades after the conquest, Lima had become the focus of the 
political, economic, and religious life of the viceroyalty of Peru. Its geographical position 
also offered several advantages to its population. Even today, the port of Callao is the most 
57 Patrón, Lima Antigua, 23, 24. 
 
58 Ibid, 25. 
 
59 Account of the City Council, f. 1v.; Patrón, Lima Antigua, 4-7. 
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 important commercial gate to the city and several of the interior provinces. Because the 
Humboldt Sea current runs along most of the Peruvian coast, Lima enjoys a moderate 
weather, neither too hot nor too cold for its latitude.60 Nonetheless, Lima’s location also 
had negative effects. 
Threats to the Political and Economic Epicenter of the Kingdom 
Since Lima was the viceroyalty’s commercial core, seat of the Consulado or 
wholesale merchants’ guild, and headquarters of the Royal Treasury and other branches of 
the Spanish government, it enjoyed an economic and political supremacy that concerned 
upper-class limeños, who collectively dreaded possible rebellious outbreaks from lower 
social groups or attacks from other European powers.  
Excluding the Inca attempt to expel the Spaniards from their lands, when Manco 
Inca sent an army of 50,000 men under the orders of his general Titu Yupangui in 1536, 
Lima did not suffer from recurrent Indian rebellions.61 In 1544, a group of 600 black slaves 
60 John P. Cole, Estudio Geográfico de la gran Lima (Lima: Oficina Nacional de Planeamiento y 
Urbanismo, 1957), III-7; Porras Barrenechea, Pequeña Antología de Lima, 18, states that despite its 
geographical location 150 meters over the sea, 12° 2’ 50” latitude South, and 77° 5’ longitude West, 
Unanue in El Clima de Lima described Lima had “neither excessive heat or intense cold or rainy 
abundant.” 
 
61 Günther & Lohmann, Lima, 68. 
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 rebelled against the abusive treatment by the authorities appointed by Gonzalo Pizarro 
while he abandoned the city to fight Viceroy Blasco Nuñez de Vela.62 Even though none 
of these movements reached their objectives, Lima’s residents kept the memory of such 
events. The idea of possible outbreaks against the political order generated a collective 
fear.63 In the next decades, royal authorities were able to discover and suffocate, before 
their initiation, subsequent subversive plots against the capital.  
Besides its importance in economic and political terms, the capital’s geographical 
location brought another threat to the city. The proximity of Lima to the coast and the lack 
of natural barriers to contain enemy attacks from the seashore became a tangible hazard. 
During the first decades after its foundation, Lima’s authorities hesitated about erecting 
any defense structure to protect the city and the port because they were confident that 
adversary armies would be unable to reach the South Sea waters. The only passage 
available to Spain’s enemy nations to enter the South Sea was the Strait of Magellan, whose 
current and winds were difficult to overcome. 
62 Burneo, Las Murallas Coloniales de Lima y el Callao, 22. 
 
63 Fernando Rosas Moscoso, “El miedo en la historia: lineamientos generales para su estudio,” in El Miedo 
en el Perú, ed. Claudia Rosas .(Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2005), 28. 
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 With the objective of resisting possible rebellious movements, Viceroy Marques de 
Cañete III (1556 - 1561) organized the first militia companies, eight in total, to support the 
regular forces if necessary. The objective of this first military organization in Lima was to 
establish control and defend the city from dissident outbreaks, both native and Spanish, 
against the crown rule. Cañete completed the construction of the Casa Real in Callao, 
which served as storage for the Armada Real’s equipment and supplies.64 He also organized 
the first salaried troops. Yet the burden of these forces on the royal treasury generated 
antipathy among authorities at the peninsula, who pushed for the progressive reduction of 
salaries. Cañete’s main concern was to resist any possible Indian uprisings or conflicts 
between Spanish rival parties rather than fight against any external threat.65   
When privateer Francis Drake reached the Port of Callao in 1579, royal 
administrators realized the vulnerability of Lima.66 It was after this experience that 
64 Burneo, Las Murallas Coloniales de Lima y el Callao, 45, the Casa Real also served as custom house and 
lodging for Armada’s officers and other royal officials. 
 
65 Peter T. Bradley, Spain and the Defense of Peru, 1579 – 1700: Royal Reluctance and Colonial Self-
Reliance (Lexington: Lulu.com, 2009), 8 – 11.  
66 Guillermo Lohmann Villena, Las Defensas Militares de Lima y Callao (Lima: Academia Nacional de la 
Historia del Perú, 1964), 21, 22 states that Viceroy Toledo was able to halt Drake’s landing in front of 
Lima, and the intruder desisted from the attack because he was unaware of the presence of 200,000 pesos in 
the royal treasury. Bradley, Spain and the Defense of Peru, 7,13. 
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 authorities started to discuss the necessity of building defensive structures both in Lima 
and Callao.67 In 1583, after negotiations between the city council and the Real Audiencia, 
the construction of the first turret to protect the port began; yet, works were still in progress 
when an earthquake in 1586 destroyed it.68    
It was the appearance of English corsairs in the South Sea, led by Thomas 
Cavendish the following year, that motivated royal authorities in Lima to reopen the 
discussion about the capital’s security.69 Viceroy Conde de Villadompardo (1584-1589) 
rushed the construction of new turrets to protect the port.70 Despite the evident vulnerability 
of both Lima and its port, the next viceroy, Marques de Cañete V (1590-1596) disregarded 
the construction of protective structures. Even though he finally decided to build a military 
67 Lohmann Villena, Las Defensas Militares de Lima y Callao, 19, affirms that the initial discussion about 
erecting a fort in Lima took place in a cabildo’s meeting, in 1537. Burneo, Las Murallas Coloniales de 
Lima y el Callao, 26, states that even though Drake did not land, he took valuable merchandise from ships 
he intercepted.  
 
68 Bradley, Spain and the Defense of Peru, 18; Burneo, Las Murallas Coloniales de Lima y el Callao, 45. 
 
69 Bradley, Spain and the Defense of Peru, 3, 13, states that Cavendish was the second English navigator in 
circumnavigating the southern passage to the South Sea.  
70 Lohmann Villena, Las Defensas Militares de Lima y Callao, 28, that conscious of the preparations to 
resist his attack, Cavendish headed north discharging his revenge over Paita, which he raided on may 29th, 
1587. 
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 outpost to store artillery and serve as refuge in case of internal or external attacks, Viceroy 
Marques de Cañete and other royal officers continued believing that the military strength 
of the kingdoms relied mainly on mobile elements of defense, such as troops and ships, 
rather than defensive structures such as fortifications. 71 
By the end of the century, pirates sailed across the capital in the South Sea but 
without any attempt of an attack.72 The sense of security among Lima’s authorities and 
residents did not last long because German corsair Joris Van Spilbergen, and his Dutch 
crew appeared in front of the Peruvian coast by the end of 1614. They approached the 
capital in July of 1615 and began to attack the port. Apparently, the defensive structures in 
front the port discouraged Spilbergen and his crew because they suddenly halted the 
assault. The pirates sailed to the north where they attacked more accessible ports, such as 
Paita, which they burned down.73  
71 Ibid, 29. 
 
72 Bradley, Spain and the Defense of Peru, 30-32, this was another Dutch expedition, under the command 
of Olivier van Noort.  
73 Lohmann Villena, Las Defensas Militares de Lima y Callao, 34 – 38; Burneo, Las Murallas Coloniales 
de Lima y el Callao, 33, affirms that the pirates were decided to take the capital, yet Callao’s fortifications 
provided a resistance they have not expected. They abandoned the attempted after shooting only two shots, 
sailing to the north coast where they attacked Huarmey and Guayaquil. This pirate fleet navigated to 
Acapulco and later to Philippines. It finally returned to Holland in 1617. 
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 The constant presence of pirates along the western coast of the kingdom and the 
destruction of ports motivated the colonial authorities to build defense structures to protect 
Lima and Callao from similar attacks. Viceroy Marques de Montesclaros (1607-1615) 
initiated the construction of a defensive platform to protect Callao’s Casas Reales and the 
port. His successor, Principe de Esquilache (1615 – 1621), followed the same defensive 
policy and expanded the work envisaged by Montesclaros.74 He designed a defensive 
system consisting of three bastions arranged along the coast to protect the port.75 
Unfortunately, the Consejo de Indias did not support his project and reproved the Viceroy’s 
initiation of such works without royal permission, diverting sources from the royal treasury 
to such defensive projects.76 Nonetheless, Esquilache’s efforts became evident few years 
74 According to Burneo, Las Murallas Coloniales de Lima y el Callao, 46, the Principe de Esquilache’s 
defensive fortifications consisted of a series of trenches and parapets along the coast in front of Callao. 
Bradley, Spain and the Defense of Peru, 41, 56, argues that Esquilache realized the serious danger the 
enemies entailed because he personally suffered a long delayed in Panama, and land journey from Manta 
(Ecuador) to Lima, to avoid falling into pirates’ hands. 
 
75 Lohmann Villena, Las Defensas Militares de Lima y Callao, 39 – 42; Burneo, Las Murallas Coloniales 
de Lima y el Callao, 46, the three turrets were: Santa María, northern to the port on the Rimac River’s 
mouth; San Francisco, on the middle of the port’s harbor; and Santa Ana, on the farthest extreme of the 
harbor. 
 
76 Lohmann Villena, Las Defensas Militares de Lima y Callao, 43 – 45; Bradley, Spain and the Defense of 
Peru, 44. 
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 later when the protective system he implemented withstood a long and strong attack against 
the port of Callao. 
It was the well-informed and armed fleet of Dutch Jacques Clarck L’Hermite that 
tested Esquilache’s defensive structure. The enemies besieged Callao for several months.77 
The illness and ensuing death of the leader and many crewmen, and the unsuccessful 
attacks to other ports of the viceroyalty depleted the Dutch’s enthusiasm who finally 
abandoned the enterprise.78 As soon as he received the news of L’Hermite’s approach, 
Viceroy Marques de Guadalcázar (1622-1629) initiated the works of a complex of military 
battlements in Callao. Both Lima’s authorities and residents shared the expenses of theses 
constructions.79 The exigencies of the time demanded such combined financial efforts. 
77 Burneo, Las Murallas Coloniales de Lima y el Callao, 34, states Callao’ besiege lasted four months 
between May and August 1624. 
 
78Lohmann Villena, Las Defensas Militares de Lima y Callao, 56 -68. 
79 Bradley, Spain and the Defense of Peru, 70, 71, mentions that Guadalcázar added three more turrets to 
the two remaining ones that Esquilache ordered to build. The marquis also added a castle, San Felipe de los 
Pozuelos, on the eastern shoreline of La Punta. With all these fortification, this viceroy erected the first 
integrated defensive system in the coast; Lohmann Villena, Las Defensas Militares de Lima y Callao, 66. 
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Image 3: Fortifications under (A) Principe de Esquilache and (B) Marquis of 
Guadalcazar.80 
L’Hermite’s long and organized attack on the viceroyalty’s capital also concerned 
peninsular authorities because it paralyzed commerce, halted the remittance of revenue, 
and destroyed several ships.81 The Council of Indies initially approved the organization of 
a fleet to defend the South Sea. Yet these initiatives rapidly faded. Despite the tangible 
effects that the pirate’s attack produced on the viceroyalty’s coastal towns and port, the 
peninsular authorities hesitated to spend royal revenues to build protective structures, not 
80 Guillermo Lohmann Villena, “Murallas y Fortificaciones del Perú Durante el Virreinato,” in Atlas 
Histórico y Geográfico del Perú: Descubrimiento, Conquista y Virreinato, edited by Carlos Milla Batres, 
tomo 2 (Lima: Editorial Milla Batres S.A., 1996), 182. 
 
81 Bradley, Spain and the Defense of Peru, 42-43. 
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 even to protect Lima, which was the headquarters of the viceroyalty’s royal treasury. It 
would take more than a decade to reopen discussions about Lima and Callao’s defensive 
constructions in the Consejo de Indias.  
For colonial subjects, especially those living along the coast of the viceroyalty, the 
threat of the pirates was clear and evident. News of the destruction of various ports along 
the South Sea circulated rapidly, accentuating the fear against such tangible dangers of 
latent attacks.82 For this reason, Lima’s population consistently supported the initiatives to 
build defensive buildings that some rulers or the city council proposed. They even 
demanded from these authorities the construction of these defenses. When Viceroy 
Marques de Mancera arrived in Callao in 1639, he was determined to reinforce the 
viceroyalty’s capital and main port’s defenses.83 The news of pirate attacks against the 
ports of Valdivia and Portobello at the beginning of 1640 accentuated the necessity of 
82 Ramiro Flores, “El enemigo frente a las costas. Temores y reacciones a la amenaza pirata, 1570-1720,” 
El Miedo en el Perú. Siglos XVI al XX edited by Claudia Rosas (Lima: Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia 
Universidad Católica del Perú, 2005), explains that the pirates generated fear among Spanish colonial 
subjects who viewed them as foreigners and heretics that could both establish political alliances with 
traitors of the king and introduce profane practices among the local population. 
 
83 Ibid, 80, affirms that the new Dutch post on northeast Brazil concerned Mancera. 
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 reinforcing the security of the port. Mancera gathered Lima’s main royal officers to plan 
the construction of a wall around Callao, without burdening the royal treasury.84 
 
Image 4: Marquis of Mancera85 
 Royal representatives’ initiatives to build defensive structures to protect the capital 
were frequently obstructed by the responsibility to protect the king’s treasury. The Council 
of Indies had reprimanded Viceroy Principe of Esquilache for using funds from the royal 
treasury for building defensive structures without requesting previous authorization. 
84 Toledo y Leiva, Manuel de. “Memoria de Gobierno,” in Memorias de los Virreyes del Perú. Marques de 
Mancera y Conde de Salvatierra (Lima: Imprenta del Estado, 1899), 45, Mancera recounts there were 
various meetings with both military and civil authorities of the city to discuss and determine the better 
means to defray the construction and maintenance of the wall. 
 
85 Juan Antonio de Lavalle, Domingo de Vivero, and Evaristo San Cristóbal. Galería de Retratos de los 
Gobernadores y Virreyes del Perú (1532-1824) (Lima: Librería Clásica y Científica, 1891), n.p. 
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 Viceroy Mancera’s predecessor, Marquis of Chinchón, built four batteries to protect the 
interior side of the port, which was vulnerable to incursions from land. Chinchón planned 
the construction of additional parapets of stone to complement the defense of the 
batteries.86 Yet he had to desist from this project because he considered it unaffordable.87  
In order to build the wall around Callao, Mancera had to negotiate carefully with 
the main authorities in the city the means to afford the building expenses without using 
royal funds. The construction project of this wall relied mainly on new taxes and the 
compulsory free labor of blacks in the capital. After extensive deliberation, the royal 
officers established new duties on meat and sugar, products of basic consumption whose 
distribution were supervised by the city council. They also allocated to the building project 
12,000 pesos the meat supplier offered to pay annually for the right to sell his product. The 
royal agents also ordered that one out of ten blacks in the city would take turns providing 
their labor.88 The building activities began at the end of 1640 and lasted six years.  
86 Bradley, Spain and the Defense of Peru, 1579 – 1700, 75, describes that Viceroy Chinchón built such 4 
batteries which cost 60,000 pesos in 1631. The additional defense structures would increase the expenses to 
100,000 pesos. For that reason, the Viceroy decided to stall this project. 
 
87 Victor Álvarez Ponce, “El Mar y las Políticas Preventivas en el Perú Virreinal: Impacto, Control y 
Vulnerabilidad ante los Tsunamis (1647-1751)” (MA Thesis: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 
2014), 28. 
88 Toledo y Leiva, “Memoria de Gobierno,”45. 
 53 
                                                     
  
Image 5: Fortifications made by (C) Count of Chinchón, and (D) Count of 
Mancera.89 
In order to avoid the criticism received by Esquilache, Mancera convinced 
peninsular authorities that the construction of this wall would reduce rather than increase 
royal treasury expenses. Mancera justified his decision to initiate the project by clarifying 
to his superiors that additional taxes and economic obligations would provide enough 
revenue to pay for the building and maintenance of the entire project. He also explained 
that the new defensive structure would require only a half of the current number of troops 
allocated to the port, which would represent a reduction of 100,000 pesos in annual 
salaries.90  
 
89 Lohmann Villena, “Murallas y Fortificaciones del Perú Durante el Virreinato,” 182.  
90 Ibid, 45; Bradley, Spain and the Defense of Peru, 85.  
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 On the other hand, political struggles in the metropolis also increased the urgency 
of the construction. The rebellion of Portugal, initiated in 1640, exacerbated fears of the 
subjects loyal to the Spanish monarch. They were afraid that the rebels, concentrated in 
Brazil, would provide support to the Dutch pirates that constantly circumnavigated the 
coast of the Peruvian viceroyalty. Royal officers were concerned that the union of Dutch 
and Portuguese enemies would attack the scarcely populated cities of Buenos Aires, 
Tucumán, and Paraguay, from where they could reach the mining centers of Alto Perú.91 
The erected wall converted Callao into a fortified commercial port-city, yet it left 
out the Indian village of the Pitipiti, which remained exposed to the ferocity of the pirates 
and the sea.92 The construction of this wall amounted to 876,000 pesos, which did not 
include labor force costs in order to reduce expenses, because Mancera forced slaves and 
condemned prisoners to work for free. He also obligated merchant vessels to freely 
 
91 Lohmann Villena, Las Defensas Militares de Lima y Callao, 94. 
92 Burneo, Las Murallas Coloniales de Lima y el Callao, 43, 53, refers the Pitit-Piti natives lived in the 
coast of La Punta y Chuquito before Hispanic presence. Their main settlement was located north to the 
Spanish port, next to a small creek called Callao. Because they were the main suppliers of maritime 
products to the capital, the Spaniards permitted the Piti-Piti to continue their traditional activities and 
organizational structure. Unprotected by the Callao’s wall, the tsunami of 1687 destroyed this native village 
completely. 
 
 55 
                                                     
 transport the stones available in the islands across the capital to the construction site. 93 
Unfortunately, the final product was overshadowed by the large debt the construction left 
for the royal treasury, and subsequent rulers continued neglect of maintaining and repairing 
the defenses.94 
As the incursions of pirates in the South Sea decreased during the following 
decades, the fear of tangible enemies, such as Drake and L’Hermite, waned. The military 
significance of the Callao’s wall and the other fortifications turned into economic burdens 
on the royal treasury. Subsequent rulers complained about the expense of repairing the 
defensive structures from time to time.95 During the following decades, there was not a 
serious discussion about improving the capital’s defenses. The fortification of Lima in the 
1680s resulted once again from potential threats.  
In the late 1660s, two Indian rebellions and a new wave of pirate attacks in the 
South Sea reopened the debate on the construction of the city wall in a Junta de Guerra. 
From these meetings emerged the project that would materialize in the construction of the 
93 Bradley, Spain and the Defense of Peru, 85. 
 
94 Ibid, 87, when Mancera left the post of viceroy, expected taxes and levies experienced a shortage which 
resulted in an unpaid balance of 247, 504 pesos out of the 867,000 pesos paid by the royal treasury. 
95 Lohmann Villena, Las Defensas Militares de Lima y Callao, 126-130. 
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 city wall of Lima. The construction project by Jesuit Juan Raymond Coninck attracted the 
interest of Lima’s authorities, who referred the plans and designs to the Council of Indies 
for consultation.96 Unfortunately, the pirate threat faded again and the peninsular 
authorities tabled the project, which they did not consider an immediate necessity. 
 The progressive addition of defensive structures and the construction of the wall to 
protect Callao and Lima kept pace with paralleled periods of imminent and perceptible 
danger over the city. Even if the population of Lima did not directly see the pirates’ fleets 
crossing the South Sea, their presence was real enough. Rumors and official news rapidly 
reached and circulated through the capital. Regardless of the extensive distance between 
the metropolis and the capital of the Peruvian viceroyalty, peninsular authorities perceived 
the danger of pirates’ presence when the customary routes of commerce and revenue 
remittances suffered delays.  Nonetheless, as soon as the threat subsided, both authorities 
and ordinary people lost interest in the building of defensive structures, which became an 
economic burden rather than a military advantage. Concerns of tangible and imminent 
threats left people, specifically royal authorities, unprepared against invisible, and 
unpredictable threats that could strike Lima.  
96 Burneo, Las Murallas Coloniales de Lima y el Callao, 110. 
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  Lima, the Land of the Tremors 
The city of Lima is located over a seismic zone, where the Nazca and South 
American tectonic plates merge. This geological confluence is responsible for both the 
physiognomic and seismological configuration of the city and its coast. The movement of 
both plates produced the formation of both Lima’s alluvial fan, which has a drastic change 
in slope in only a few miles, and the maritime placket along the seashore, which generates 
periodical seismic movements.97  For this reason, tremors and earthquakes have constantly 
afflicted Lima.  
The Spanish chronicles offer the first written records of seismic events in the New 
World. These accounts include testimonies about tremors that struck in the decades before 
the arrival of the conquering parties. None of these sources provides a precise date, but 
only an approximate time with brief descriptions of the events. The first seismic event the 
97 Günther & Lohmann, Lima, 18, 19. Lizardo Seiner Lizárraga, Historia de los sismos en el Perú. 
Catálogo: Siglos XV – XVII (Lima: Universidad de Lima Fondo Editorial, 2009), 17, explains that this 
convergence is located over a larger system, the Ring of Fire or Circum-Pacific Belt, of tectonic plates that 
runs along the coasts of the Pacific Ocean. Seiner argues that 80 percent of the telluric events, in the whole 
world, occur from the collision of plates of this system.  
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 Spaniards faced in the Inca territory happened in 1533 as Pizarro and his party advanced 
through the Peruvian coast to the city of Cusco.98 
In the decades that followed, the viceroyalty’s capital and main port suffered from 
quakes and other natural events, such as surges. In the progressive construction of 
defensive structures, the authorities had not considered the protection of Lima and Callao 
from natural events but instead focused on the imminent and tangible threats of pirates.  
Nonetheless, the wall of Callao played a protective role against nature’s forces, which royal 
authorities did not foresee. Even though the construction of this wall was not culminated 
until July of 1647, it protected people and material property when tidal waves hit the port 
in May of that year.  On this occasion, the wall shielded 5 million pesos of merchandise 
stored in the royal warehouses from flooding. In 1651, the wall played the same function, 
safeguarding 3 million pesos of goods.99 Yet, the lack of maintenance works contributed 
to the progressive decay of the wall, as royal authorities began to overlook its defensive 
value against pirates, whose presence in the South Sea became sporadic. Despite the 
98 Seiner Lizárraga, Historia de los sismos en el Perú, 86, refers this telluric event happened in the night 
between January 31 and February 1, 1533, when the Spanish party was in the coast of Chancay.  
99 Lohmann Villena, Las Defensas Militares de Lima y Callao, 122-123. 
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 decreasing military protection it rendered after a few decades, the wall continued providing 
protection to the port against natural events. 
When the pirates returned in 1680, the incumbent viceroy rejected projects of 
additional defensive constructions. Lima’s population reacted with consternation when 
they got the news of English pirates approaching the capital. Despite the popular support 
to build a wall to protect Lima, Archbishop Melchor de Liñan y Cisneros, who also served 
as interim viceroy at that time, dismissed the report that recommended such construction 
and the reinforcement of various ports in the South Sea.100  
 The Archbishop and the Duke 
Among the various royal officers that appear in this dissertation, Don Melchor de 
Liñán y Cisneros and Don Melchor de Navarra y Rocaful, the Duke of Palata, were the 
most powerful authorities in Lima during most of the 1680s. Their careers in the service of 
the Crown were outstanding but not exceptional. They represent bureaucrats who 
developed successful careers and accumulated extensive experience in the imperial 
domains through the diverse posts they occupied. At the same time, they exemplify the 
100 Burneo, Las Murallas Coloniales de Lima y el Callao, 118, the report belonged to the engineer Luis 
Venegas Osorio, Visitador de las Fortificaciones de Tierra Firme y de los Puertos de la Mar del Sur. 
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 frequent clashes, not only between the religious and the secular realms, but also among 
royal agents.  
By the time King Charles II appointed him as archbishop of Lima in 1676, Melchor 
de Liñán y Cisneros had already filled several ecclesiastical posts in both the peninsula and 
the New World.101 Only few months after the new archbishop arrived in Lima in 1678, the 
King named him interim viceroy to replace Count of Castellar. The former viceroy 
abandoned the capital and headed to the northern port-city of Paita, where he was awaiting 
the outcome of the audit process related to his tenure as viceroy.102  
Even though the Archbishop-viceroy had served the Spanish crown since 1661, as 
priest of the Spanish court’s parish of San Salvador and calificador (examiner) of the Holy 
101 Margaret Ellen Crahan, Clerical Immunity in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1684-1692: a study of civil-
ecclesiastical relations (PhD Dissertation, Columbia University, 1967), 179, 180; Manuel de Mendiburu, 
Diccionario Histórico – Biográfico del Perú, vol. 7 (Lima: Enrique Palacios, 1933), 4. 
 
102 José Manuel Valega, El Virreinato del Perú: historia crítica de la época colonial en todos sus aspectos 
(Lima: Cultura Ecléctica, 1939), 78, states that Charles II had deposed Castellar because of some 
accusations the Consulate and Audiencia presented against this viceroy. Margarita Suárez, Desafíos 
Transatlánticos. Mercaderes, banqueros y el estado en el Perú virreinal, 1600 – 1700 (Lima: Fondo 
Editorial Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2001), 374 – 376, also affirms that the merchants of 
Lima were behind the destitution of Castellar, who earned the enmity of the Consulate when he allowed the 
entrance to the city of Asian merchandise that ships from New Spain brought. In his “juicio de residencia” 
the Count resulted absolved from such charges.  
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 Office of the Inquisition, he performed most of his services for the crown in the New 
World. In 1664, Phillip IV appointed him as bishop of Santa Marta (modern Colombia). In 
the following years, he received the posts of Bishop of Popayán in 1666, Archbishop of 
Charcas in 1672, and Archbishop of La Plata in 1674. The King also entrusted Liñán y 
Cisneros with the post of Visitor General of the Kingdom of New Granada, which he 
exercised between 1666 and 1674.103 In order to fulfill the various responsibilities entrusted 
to him by the King, Liñán y Cisneros had to travel across the kingdom visiting many 
provinces and meeting the diverse population of Spanish South America. 104 The 
experience he accumulated during these years of service permitted the Archbishop-viceroy 
to know firsthand the multiple conditions and needs of the Peruvian viceroyalty. This kind 
of mobility was not uncommon among administrators, and permitted royal appointees, who 
had similar trajectories, both to recognize the diverse regions that formed part of the 
Spanish empire and develop specific policies to deal with the particularities of each region. 
103 Mendiburu, Diccionario Histórico – Biográfico del Perú, vol. 7, 4. 
 
104 Crahan, Clerical Immunity in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 180, 181, affirms that Liñán y Cisneros never lead 
the bishopric of Charcas because he received notification of his new appointment to La Plata before he was 
able to take possession of such post. 
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 In 1680, when English pirates advanced again towards the capital, the Archbishop-
viceroy reacted as many of his predecessors had by increasing the number of troops and 
ships rather than erecting defensive constructions.105 Even though peninsular authorities 
had forwarded the project proposed by Jesuit Coninck to build a wall around Lima to the 
Council of Indies in 1673, the recent pirate attacks on Panamá motivated the Council to 
appoint Luis Venegas Osorio to assess the fortifications in Tierra Firme and the South Sea 
in 1680.106 The next year in Lima, Osorio presented his report to the Archbishop-viceroy, 
who dismissed the recommendation to build a fortification along the western coast of the 
viceroyalty and a wall around Lima.107 One of the Archbishop-viceroy’s main arguments 
against Osorio’s report was that the construction of a wall around Lima would require the 
destruction of several properties, which ran along the project’s plans. 108 These properties, 
as most others in the city, provided periodic rents mainly to religious individuals and 
corporations. Even when limeños became concerned because of the close proximity of 
105 Lohmann Villena, Las Defensas Militares de Lima y Callao, 176, refers a group of pirates under the 
orders of Edward Wolmen sailed along the Pacific coast attacking Arica in 1681.  
 
106 Burneo, Las Murallas Coloniales de Lima y el Callao, 118. 
 
107 Bradley, Spain and the Defense of Peru, 162.  
108 Lohmann Villena, Las Defensas Militares de Lima y Callao, 177. 
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 pirates, Liñán y Cisneros ignored their demands to construct a wall to protect the city. He 
maintained a clear tendency to favor the interests of the religious communities rather than 
those of the secular population whom he also governed. The task of building the wall of 
Lima had to wait a few more years until another viceroy made the decision to turn 
Coninck’s project into a reality. 
 For the few years Liñan y Cisneros occupied both roles, as head of church and state, 
he mainly concentrated on reforming the religious orders, and taking advantage of the 
rights over ecclesiastical matters he had as viceroy.109 Overburdened by the responsibilities 
of both positions, the Archbishop-viceroy suggested to the King the appointment of a 
viceroy that would exclusively fulfill his secular duties.110 Though he knew he could not 
handle both positions, he displayed animus toward his predecessor, the Count of Castellar, 
and even greater antipathy toward his successor, Don Melchor de Navarra y Rocafull, Duke 
of Palata.111 The antagonism between the Archbishop and the Duke would intensify in the 
following years.  
109 Crahan, Clerical Immunity in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 74. 
 
110 Enrique Sánchez Pedrote, “Los prelados virreyes,” Anuario de Estudios Americanos 7 (1950), 24. 
111 Mendiburu, Diccionario Histórico – Biográfico del Perú, vol. 7, 10; Crahan, Clerical Immunity in the 
Viceroyalty of Peru, 78, 79, argues that the conflicts between Liñán and Castellar emerged out of the 
permanence of the latter in Paita for the duration of his prolonged juicio de residencia. The presence of 
 64 
                                                     
 In 1654, Navarra y Rocafull, soon to be a duke, began to serve the Spanish crown 
when he was only twenty-eight years old. Because of his exceptional aptitude as a law 
student in Salamanca, he received the posts of adviser to the General Government of 
Aragón in 1654 and Visitor to the Real Audiencia of Barcelona in 1657. He became a 
member of the Council of Naples, the Council of Italy, the Council of War, and the Council 
of State. He served as Supreme Council of Italy prosecutor, Vice-Chancellor of the 
kingdom of Aragón, and member of the Junta de Gobierno (1665-1675) that ruled during 
the minority of King Charles II.112   
In 1662, he became Duke of Palata and Prince of Massa, through his marriage to 
Doña Francisca Toralto de Aragón in Nápoles.113 In 1680, the monarch appointed him 
General Captain and Viceroy of Perú.  After a trip that lasted more than eight months and 
took him through Cartagena and Portobello, the Duke and his retinue arrived in Paita on 
Castellar within the limits of the viceroyalty accentuated his partisans’ opposition to the Archbishop-
viceroy’s administration. 
 
112 Crahan, Clerical Immunity in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 183; Mendiburu, Diccionario Histórico – 
Biográfico del Perú, vol. 8. (Lima: Enrique Palacios, 1933 – 34), 60. 
113 Francisco Fernández de Béthencourt, Historia Genealógica y Heráldica de la Monarquía Española: 
Casa Real y Grandes de España, vol. 3. (Madrid: Establecimiento Tipográfico de Enrique Teodoro, 1901), 
581. 
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 September 13, 1681. When he arrived in Callao the following month, the Archbishop-
viceroy went personally to Callao to welcome him. The new viceroy’s official entrance to 
Lima took place on November 20.114 
Upon his arrival in Lima, the Duke recognized the climate of antagonism created 
by the confrontations between the factions of the Archbishop and Count of Castellar, who 
had recently departed from Peru, after waiting for years for the result of the inspections of 
his administration. The Duke tried to halt these conflicts by choosing ministers unrelated 
to both parties. Nonetheless, the appointment of high court minister Don Joseph del Corral 
Calvo, a Castellar partisan, as his advisor put the Duke under the direct influence of an 
opponent to Liñán y Cisneros.115  
The antagonism between the Archbishop and the Duke placed real constraints on 
the latter’s administration. The Archbishop continuously critiqued the measures the Duke 
attempted to implement, especially those from his own initiative. Yet the Duke was able to 
counteract the Archbishop’s accusations and complaints before the King through the many 
improvements he promoted in the colonial administration during his government. 
114 Valega, El Virreinato del Perú, 80. 
115 Margaret Crahan, “The Administration of Don Melchor de Navarra y Rocafull, Duque de la Palata: 
Viceroy of Peru, 1681–1689,” The Americas 27, no. 4 (April 1971): 392. 
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 The Duke’s Reforms and the Lima Wall 
During the seven years he ruled the Peruvian viceroyalty, the Duke of Palata 
attempted several reforms in different areas of the colonial administration. Some of these 
reforms were his own initiatives while others were instructions from the crown or 
innovations from previous royal representatives. In order to halt the increasing smuggling 
of ore and evasion of the quinto real (tax of 20 percent on mining extraction), the Duke 
proposed that a royal mint be established in Lima. He argued to the crown that this Casa 
de la Moneda would produce the coinage that public and private commercial transactions 
required. After confronting opposition from both Seville and Potosí, which had their own 
coining centers, the Viceroy reached his goal in 1683 when the King issued the order to 
establish a Casa de la Moneda in Lima.116  
The Duke also implemented new measures to improve the production of silver and 
quicksilver. After several meetings, he signed a new contract with Huancavelica miners’ 
representatives, where he committed the crown to supply the necessary native labor 
force.117 The Duke justified the need for this new contract based on the fact that the 
116 Mendiburu, Diccionario Histórico – Biográfico del Perú, vol. 8, 74; Crahan, “The Administration of 
Don Melchor de Navarra y Rocafull,” 376. 
 
117 Crahan, “The Administration of Don Melchor de Navarra y Rocafull,” 398.  
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 previous one, signed in 1645, was not fulfilled by the crown. The old contract stipulated 
the crown should provide 620 Indian laborers so the miners could produce 6,820 quintals 
of quicksilver every year. The royal treasury also owed the miners 600,000 pesos for the 
quicksilver received and some repair expenses, which were responsibility of the crown. 
After a collapse in 1681, the mine required additional repairs that amounted to 200,000 
pesos. The miners agreed to repair the mine if they received 3,000 quintal of mineral in 
exchange for their labor. In order to negotiate the terms of the new contract, the Viceroy 
gathered three royal ministers that had served at Huancavelica to discuss the requests by 
the miners’ representatives. The Viceroy finally granted the miners the quicksilver 
requested, which was valued at 225,000 pesos. He also restituted an old grant from a 
particular to the crown, which would provide 110,000 pesos annually to fund the hospital 
for Indians. In order to reduce laborers’ burden, the Duke stipulated miners would pay 
Indians their entire salary regardless of the quantity of mineral they obtained and cover 
their tributes to the crown. The new contract transferred the repair cost from the royal 
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 treasury to private interests, increased the production of mineral, and sought to improve the 
conditions of Indian laborers.118  
The Duke also restituted the possession of the Descubridora mine, the largest 
mercury mine in the Indies, after negotiating with various creditors, who claimed the crown 
owed them several unpaid Indian laborers’ salaries. Don Diego Tamayo, one of the crown’s 
creditors, went to the court in Madrid to request a Castilian nobility title from the King, the 
corregimiento of Arequipa for four years, and three knighthood habits for his daughters’ 
partners in exchange for 107,000 unpaid Indians’ daily wages. Eventually, the Duke 
reached a settlement with Don Joseph Tamayo, Don Diego Tamayo’s heir and brother, who 
agreed to receive only the corregimiento. To other creditors that claimed similar rights, the 
Duke awarded either a knighthood habit or a corregimiento, in exchange for the concession 
of their claims.119 
 In order to increase the workforce in the mining regions of Huancavelica and 
Potosí, Viceroy Duke of Palata ordered a massive registration of the Indian population that 
118 Melchor de Navarra y Rocafull, “Memoria de Gobierno, 16 de agosto de 1689,” in Los virreyes que han 
gobernado el Perú durante el tiempo del coloniaje español, vol. 2. (Lima: Librería Central de Felipe Bailly, 
1859), 163 -167; Mendiburu, Diccionario Histórico – Biográfico del Perú, vol. 8, 74 – 76.  
119 Navarra y Rocafull “Memoria de Gobierno,” 179 – 181. 
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 began in 1683. Even though this census concluded seven years later, when another viceroy 
was in charge of the viceroyalty, the colonial administration was able to double the number 
of forced native workers, mitayos, in Postosí from 10,427 to 20,829.120 The Duke 
recognized that this census, as well as other innovations he proposed and implemented, 
was necessary to reform the administration and production of the viceroyalty. 
The Duke strongly supported fiscal reforms promoted from the metropolis; yet he 
also introduced his own initiates. He closely supervised the operation of the royal 
administrators in charge of Cajas Reales. He supported the inspection of the royal treasury 
and its administrators that the King had ordered in 1662, and reorganized the activities and 
personnel of Tribunal de Cuentas, with the intention of improving the fiscal performance 
of his administration and obtaining the bullion he periodically had to remit to the crown.121  
The Duke also promoted those initiatives from his predecessors which he 
considered useful. For instance, he encouraged the use of small vessels to transport silver 
to Panama because they were less expensive to the royal treasury than using the royal fleet 
120 Crahan, “The Administration of Don Melchor de Navarra y Rocafull,’ 377; Mendiburu, Diccionario 
Histórico – Biográfico del Perú, vol. 8, 80.  
121 Mendiburu, Diccionario Histórico – Biográfico del Perú, vol. 8, 73. Kenneth Andrien, Crisis and 
decadencia. El Virreinato del Perú en el siglo XVII (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2011), 241, 242. 
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 (armada real). The original purpose of the South Seat royal fleet was to ensure the shipping 
of silver to Panama and shipping of merchandise to the capital. From 1664, in response to 
the decay of silver exportation, royal officers reduced the sailing frequency of the royal 
fleet from every year to every three years. Aware of the excessive cost of construction and 
maintenance of large ships required by the fleet, the Duke resorted to private small vessels 
to meet similar needs instead of the royal fleet, which in the 1680s only sailed two times. 
The Duke encouraged this alternative means of transportation, initiated by his predecessor 
Viceroy Principe de Esquilache, because it transferred the cost of the vessels from the 
crown to private hands.122 Despite economic, political, and environmental difficulties, 
Duke of Palata was able to dispatch five fleets during the seven years of his government 
carrying revenue remittances to the peninsula.123 
One of the most difficult challenges he faced was the presence of pirates in the 
South Sea during great part of his administration. During his journey from Madrid to Lima, 
the Duke passed through Portobello at the beginning of 1681. Pirates Sharps, Wolmen, and 
122 Bradley, Spain and the Defense of Peru, 1579 – 1700, 108, 115. 
123 Memorial ajustado y resumen de lo actuado en la residencia del Señor Virrey Duque de la Palata, 
December 3, 1690. AGI, Lima, 87, f. 11, shows Palata dispatched fleets in 1682, 1685, 1687, 1688, and 
1689. The three years that these ships did not depart responded to the presence of pirate in the South Sea, 
which motivated Lima’s merchants refused to send their capitals to Portobello in the royal fleets.  
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 Warlen had attacked this port the previous year, and the Duke was conscious of the 
potential damage similar attacks could inflict on other ports. When he arrived in Lima, he 
found out that a large part of the population appealed for a wall to protect their city.124Like 
many other rulers that preceded him, the Duke perceived the pirates as a tangible and close 
threat for the capital and its people. Even though Liñán y Cisneros had rejected Osorio’s 
recent report, the Duke was determined to complete Lima’s wall project. The main obstacle 
to build the defensive structure was the precarious condition of the royal treasury, which 
discouraged royal authorities in both the metropolis and the colony from investing in 
infrastructural projects. 
Determined to build the wall around Lima, Palata presented Coninck’s project to 
the King in 1682, attaching his own comments to support it. Among his suggestions, the 
Duke proposed various new means of revenue to support both the construction and 
maintenance of the wall, such as a selling tax on meat, monetary fines on crimes, the rents 
of some encomiendas, one month of the monthly payments of leases and other rental 
contracts, 10 pesos tax for each negro bozal introduced in the city, and the creation of a 
monopoly of sealed paper. The Viceroy and the city counselors also recommended that 
124 Burneo, Las Murallas Coloniales de Lima y el Callao, 119 – 120. 
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 those who could not contribute with money would work without compensation, and that 
farmers would contribute 4 reales for each fanega produced. 125 Some months later, the 
Junta de Guerra in Spain dispatched the plan of Conick to the Duke of Bournonville, 
Viceroy and Captain General of Catalonia, who was an experienced architect in military 
structures. Bournonville recommended some modifications to the plan, but overall did not 
make substantial alterations.126 In 1685, the Junta de Guerra finally accepted the revised 
project. 
Nonetheless, news of a pirate attack under the leadership of French Chevalier de 
Grammont and Dutch Laurence de Graaf to the port of Veracruz reached Lima in 1683, 
reviving anxiety and fear among the population. The commotion generated by this event 
was so great that clerics preached about it in their sermons. Every sermon the Viceroy 
attended referred to fortresses, towers, and walls. He felt everyone was preaching to him 
trying to convince him of the need of a wall.127 Motivated by this conjuncture, the Viceroy 
125 Navarra y Rocafull, “Memoria de Gobierno,” 368. 
 
126 Bradley, Spain and the Defense of Peru, 130 – 132; Burneo, Las Murallas Coloniales de Lima y el 
Callao, 120. 
127 Navarra y Rocafull, “Memoria de Gobierno,” 366; Burneo, Las Murallas Coloniales de Lima y el 
Callao, 121. 
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 summoned the city council on October 23, 1683 to discuss the means to obtain the 700,000 
pesos that Coninck estimated for the completion of his project.128 
The Viceroy and the city council approved several measures and new taxes that, 
although considerable, were deemed necessary to build the wall. In order to obtain 
additional financial support, the Viceroy negotiated with the various corporative groups in 
the city. He offered a personal donation of 50,000 pesos before requesting contributions 
from different corporations of the city. His negotiations were rewarding. The Consulado 
offered to build 3,000 yards of wall. The Ecclesiastical Council, the University of San 
Marcos, and the religious orders of Santo Domingo and La Merced donated 10,000 pesos 
each; and the Society of Jesus promised to build a bastion om the wall.129  
On November 1683, the Duke sent another missive to the King requesting the 
approval of the measures proposed in the meeting with the city council. Without awaiting 
royal authorization, the building activities began the next year. Royal approval, issued in 
1685, arrived in Lima along with Bournonville’s recommendations. The King granted the 
Duke freedom to choose the means to fund the wall, underlining that they would have to 
cover also its maintenance. Among the various new income sources, the Viceroy had 
128 Burneo, Las Murallas Coloniales de Lima y el Callao, 121. 
129 Ibid, 124. 
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 suggested a monopoly on paper bearing the royal seal. Even though the monarch initially 
rejected the idea, he finally agreed because of the benefits it would generate to both the 
administration and the population. The monopoly was a big concession and a great 
administrative innovation. It produced better control on the quantities of official paper 
introduced in the capital and fixed the price of each sheet. The royal treasury would obtain 
a fixed income according to the quantity sold, and people would be able to purchase paper 
at a fixed price the entire year.130 Given the widespread use of this paper for business and 
legal transactions, this was a considerable source of revenue.   
By 1687, the city seemed well–protected against pirate attacks because of the new 
wall. It covered a surface of 14,000 yards with 34 bastions and 5 gates. The structure left 
out the neighborhood of San Lázaro on the other side of the Rimac River, and passed 
through El Cercado by the middle.131 Even though pirates attacked several ports and came 
130 Crahan, “The Administration of Don Melchor de Navarra y Rocafull,” 402, states that the proceeds of 
this monopoly financed naval improvements rather than the wall. Also see Burneo, Las Murallas 
Coloniales de Lima y el Callao, 141. 
 
131 Mendiburu, Diccionario Histórico – Biográfico del Perú, vol. 8, 95; Navarra y Rocafull, “Memoria de 
Gobierno,” 367 – 375, before the estanco the price of each ream of paper varied each year between armada 
and armada. During the first year after the armada, the price of the paper varied between 5 ½ and 6 pesos 
per ream; and increased in the next years reaching up to 12 pesos each ream. The estanco fixed the price to 
7 pesos per ream of sealed paper. 
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 close to Callao, they never attempted an invasion of Lima. The danger the limeños had 
foreseen never arrived; instead, what unexpectedly came was a very destructive earthquake 
on October 20. 
 
 
Image 6: Map of the city of Lima and its fortifications, 1687132 
132 Plano de la Ciudad de Lima y sus fortificaciones, Fray P. Nolasco from the Order of the Merced, 1685. 
AGI, MP-PERU_CHILE, 13. The script on the bottom left corner says “Año 1685 se dio principio a esta 
grande obra que tiene de trece mil varas en treinta y quatro baluartes y sus cortinas y se vio acabada. Año 
1687” 
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 On April of 1687, only 6 months before the destructive earthquake of October, four 
tremors knocked Lima. The common reaction of the population was the multitudinous 
assistance to masses and processions. Nonetheless, people were mainly concentrated on 
the construction of the wall, concerned by the concrete threats of pirates in the South Sea.133 
Despite several reactive displays of concern, Lima’s population never really took stock of 
whether they were prepared to face another quake.  
Conclusion 
As the capital of the Peruvian viceroyalty and one of the most important colonies 
of the Spanish empire, Lima had a central role in the Spanish world. It was both core and 
periphery because it was the heart of a colonial dominion. It became one the main cities of 
the New World with a large and diverse population, both transient and permanent.  As an 
economic and political center, Lima had a constant flow of people and goods from outside 
and inside the viceroyalty. In a few decades, Lima occupied a place of supremacy in the 
region in commercial, administrative, religious, and cultural matters. 
The geographical position of Lima brought some benefits to the city, but it also 
produced some hardships. Located next to the coast, Lima’s port, Callao, permitted 
133 Josephe de Mugaburu and Francisco de Mugaburu, Diario de Lima (1640 – 1694): Crónica de la época 
colonial (Lima: Imprenta C. Vasquez, 1935), 265 -270. 
 77 
                                                     
 commerce to flourish in the city. Wholesale merchants consolidated power through their 
own guild, the Consulado. Pirate fleets, proceeding from Spain’s enemy nations, constantly 
approached Callao and other South Sea ports attracted by the viceroyalty’s riches, which 
were accumulated in the capital before their remittal to the Spanish metropolis.  
Lima’s strategic position was jeopardized by the seismic ground on which it sat. 
Lima suffered from periodical tremors and earthquakes. Nonetheless, the recurrence of 
these natural events had not motivated authorities to develop a policy to deal with them by 
1687. During the colonial period, royal administrators were mainly concerned with more 
palpable threats such as the invasion of pirates. Even when facing these tangible 
circumstances, colonial authorities hesitated to build defensive structure to defend the 
capital and its port, and they were mainly focused on protecting the royal treasury from 
excessive expenses.  
Peninsular authorities entrusted colonial administrators, especially viceroys, the 
duty of dispatching revenues periodically to the metropolis. In order to prevent 
overburdening Lima’s royal treasury, royal officers had to resort to alternative sources for 
economic support. In order to realize their building projects, both viceroys Mancera and 
later the Duke of Palata summoned royal officers under their orders to discuss possible new 
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 means of revenue. Despite the flexibility they exercised in negotiating with colonial 
authorities and corporations, and regardless of the positive outcome of these negotiations, 
the viceroys had to ultimately justify their actions before the monarch. The king, along 
with his Council of Indies ministers, could either legitimize or censure the decisions of his 
colonial representatives. In order to avoid being the object of criticism like Esquilache, 
Mancera justified the wall of Callao project by citing the reduction in military expense to 
safeguard the port and demonstrating that the construction would not burden the royal 
treasury. Similarly, Duke of Palata had to justify his various initiatives such as the contract 
with the Huancavelica miners, the administrative reform of the Tribunal de Cuentas, the 
use of small vessels to transport silver in the South Sea, and finally the construction of the 
Lima wall. 
The pending earthquake would cause great destruction and chaos. Lima’s 
authorities had to face exceptional conditions that they did not expect. Duke of Palata had 
to concentrate his efforts on reconstructing the city rather than promoting reforms. Despite 
great obstacles to the rebuilding projects, the Viceroy realized them with the support of 
local authorities and ordinary people. The analysis of Lima’s reconstruction, within the 
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 larger context of Duke of Palata’s administration, offers an ideal context to observe the 
interplay of imperial rule, local government, and people.   
 
 
III. CHAPTER 2: CAPACITY, CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND COLONIAL 
ADMINISTRATION: THE VICEROY AND THE CITY COUNCIL 
With the construction of Lima’s wall almost complete, Viceroy Duke of La Palata 
saw one of the greatest projects he pursued as head of the viceroyalty of Peru literally built 
before his eyes. The frightening idea of pirates raiding the viceroyalty capital disappeared 
in the horizon over the South Seas once a tangible form of protection firmly stood 
surrounding the city. For many, Lima seemed finally prepared to resist the attack of its 
enemies. But an unexpected attack of nature hit instead.  
 On October 20, 1687, at around four in the morning, a series of telluric movements 
woke up Lima’s residents. People rushed to the street; others were trapped by crumbling 
ceilings and walls. Dust made the night darker, and confusion prevailed everywhere in the 
city.  A few minutes later a tsunami hit and flooded Callao, the principal port of the South 
Sea, inflicting great damage to neighboring Indian villages. The wall of the city-port could 
not contain destructive blast of large tides that destroyed property and took many lives. In 
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 a matter of a few hours, the city of Lima was in ruins, its population dispossessed and 
seeking refuge in nearby open areas. As the head of the central government of Peru, 
Viceroy Don Melchor de Navarra y Rocafull, Duke of Palata, spearheaded the 
reconstruction activities.134 He mobilized and organized other royal officials to maintain 
social control, tend the population’s increasing basic needs, and plan the reconstruction of 
the city. 
 
134 Margaret Crahan “The Administration of Don Melchor de Navarra y Rocafull,” 389-412, points out that 
the greatest problems the Duke must face as viceroy of Peru were the invasion of pirates and the 1687 
earthquake. 
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 Image 7: The Duke of Palata135 
Analyzing how Lima’s colonial government responded in the wake of this 
destructive quake facilitates an evaluation to its capacity of crisis management 
and, consequently, allows us to revise the cast of inefficiency that still pervades studies of 
the Spanish Hapsburg administration. Managing the aftermath of the 1687 quake in Lima 
was beyond the capacity of a single person.  In order to tend to people’s basic needs and to 
safeguard the social order, the Viceroy gathered and led a contingent of royal officials to 
carry out the various tasks that the situation required. The active participation of the 
members of Lima’s city council during the post-disaster period shows that these royal 
officers were able to effectively react under extraordinary circumstances. The vibrant, 
dynamic organizational capacity of the colonial government after the 1687 
earthquake contradicts the pale portrait of an inefficient colonial administration.  
The capacity of the colonial government to deal with this crisis, caused by a natural 
disaster in this case, undermines the notion of Spain’s incapacity to rule. Whether or not 
one accepts the idea that Spain was in a long-term decline, there is scholarly consensus that 
the last two decades of the seventeenth century were tough for the Spanish 
135 Lavalle, Vivero, and San Cristóbal. Galería de Retratos de los Gobernadores y Virreyes del Perú, n.p. 
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 Hapsburgs.136 Although beginning in the 1980s several authors began to recognize that 
attempts to reform the imperial administration dated from the late seventeenth century and 
that many of these initiatives formed the foundation for further reforms during the 
eighteenth century, the idea of a steep drop in Spanish governance in the 1680s and 1690s 
persists.137 This is especially true in studies of the American colonies, which portray the 
colonial administration under Charles II as poor, corrupt, and lacking the means to 
impose the crown’s will on corporate interests, which eventually forced every viceroy to 
compromise with the colonial subjects.138   
136 Lynch, Spain under the Habsburgs; John D. Bergamini, The Spanish Bourbons: The history of a 
tenacious dynasty (New York: Putman, 1974); José Manuel de Bernardo Ares, Luis XIV Rey de España. De 
los imperios plurinacionales a los estados unitarios, 1665-1714 (Madrid: Lustel, 2008). 
 
137 Henry Kamen, “The Decline of Spain: A Historical Myth?” Past & Present, 81 (Nov. 1978), 24-50. 
Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century, 1665 – 1700. London: Longman, 1980; I.A.A. Thompson and 
Bartolomé Yun Casalilla, The Castilian Crisis of the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994); Walker, Geoffrey, Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade, 1700 – 1789 
(Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1979); Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 1700 – 1808; Kuethe and Blaisdell. 
“French influence and the Origins of the Bourbon Colonial Reorganization,” 579-607; Geoffrey Parker, 
“La crisis mundial del siglo XVII: Acontecimientos y ‘paradigma,’” in La crisis de la Monarquía de Felipe 
IV coordinated by Geoffrey Parker (Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 2006), 19-54; and Luis Ribot, El Arte de 
Gobernar.  
 
138 Mark A. Burkholder, D. S. Chandler, From Impotence to Authority: The Spanish Crown and the 
American Audiencias - 1687-1808 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1977) 16; Margarita Suarez, 
Desafíos Transatlánticos, 256. 
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  This chapter evaluates the performance of the colonial government in Lima vis-à-
vis the impact of the natural event.139 Recent studies of natural disasters demonstrate that 
the impact of these natural phenomena on human societies reveals social, economic and 
political patterns that otherwise remain unremarkable or hidden because they are so 
quotidian.140 A natural event is not necessarily a disaster; it becomes a disaster when it 
interacts with human societies’ vulnerability.141  
139 César Caviedes, El Niño in History. Storming through the Ages (Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida, 2001), 32, states that natural disasters have often influenced the course of history because of they 
frequently impact decisions of political and economic order.  
 
140 For the expansion in the study of natural disaster see David Alexander, “The Study of Natural Disasters, 
1977–97: Some Reflections on a Changing Field of Knowledge,” Disasters 21, 4 (Dec 1997), 284 - 304. 
Andrew C. Isenberg, “Introduction: New Directions in Urban Environmental History,” in The Nature of 
Cities, ed. Andrew C. Isenberg (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2006), xi. Allen H. Barton, 
Communities in Disaster. A Sociological Analysis of Collective Stress Situations (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday & Company, 1969). William Kern, “Introduction,” in The Economics of Natural and Unnatural 
Disasters, edited by William Kern (Kalamazoo: W.E Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 2010), 1-
7, 1. Other definitions of disaster offered by economists are Alan L. Sorkin, Economic Aspects of Natural 
Hazards (Lexington: Lexington, 1982); Jack Hirshleifer, Economic Behavior in Adversity (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1987) 
 
141 Richard Stuart Olson and Vicente T. Gawronski, “Disaster as Crisis Triggers for National Critical 
Junctures? The 1976 Guatemala Case,” Latin American Politics and Society 55, 2 (Summer, 2013), 
133,134; Luz María Espinosa Cortés, “Oaxaca: Desastres, Hambre y Epidemias Entre los Pueblos 
‘Criadores’ de Grana Cochinilla, 1760-1781,” in Cuba y México: Desastre, Alimentación y Salud. Siglos 
XVIII-XIX. Estudios de Caso, compiled by Luz María Espinosa Cortés and Enrique Beldarraín Chaple 
(Mexico D.F.: Plaza y Valdés, 2005), 142, states the worsening of a disaster is expressed through famine 
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  Earthquakes in particular are unpredictable geophysical hazards with intense 
magnitude, sudden occurrence, rapid onset, and variable geographical extent.142 This kind 
of natural disaster is prone to become a political crisis when the political system is disrupted 
and unable to tend to the increase in population’s ordinary needs and the appearance of 
more complex demands.143 Despite the material and social impact seismic events have 
produced in human communities across the globe, historians have just recently began to 
recognize and analyze their influence on the development of human societies.144  
and illness. The vulnerability of a specific population is determined by socio-economic, political, religious 
factors, and lack of prevention and mitigation measures of the disaster’s impact. 
 
142Sorkin, Economic Aspects of Natural Hazards, 2 – 4. Richard Stuart Olson, “Towards a Politics of 
Disasters: Losses, Values, Agendas, and Blame,” International Journal of Mass Emergencies and 
Disasters 18 (August 2000): 268, provides a division of five phases for earthquakes: pre-impact, impact, 
response, recovery and reconstruction. The recovery phase is the period when the fulfillment of basic needs 
is the prime objective. The reconstruction phase relates to the indefinite length period (days, weeks, 
months, years) when community rebuilds for a long-term. See also Allen H. Barton, Communities in 
Disaster; and Jack Hirshleifer, Economic Behavior in Adversity, 7. 
 
143 Olson, “Towards a Politics of Disasters,” 267. 
 
144 John C. Burnham, “A Neglected Field: The History of Natural Disasters,” Perspectives 26 (April, 1988), 
22-24; James Penick, Jr., The New Madrid Earthquakes of 1811–1812 (Columbia: University of Missouri 
Press, 1976); Carl Henry Geschwind, California Earthquakes: Science, Risk, and the Politics of Hazard 
Mitigation (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 2001); John Dickie, “The Smell of Disaster: Social Collapse in 
the Aftermath of the Mesina-Regio Calabria Earthquake 1908,” in Disastro! Disasters in Italy Since 1860: 
Culture, Politics, Society, edited by John Dickie, John Foot and Frank M. Snowden (New York: Palgrave, 
2002, 235-255); Judith Chubbs, “Three Earthquakes: Political Response, Reconstruction, and the 
 85 
                                                     
  In Latin America, studies of natural disasters, specifically earthquakes, date back 
to the early twentieth century. Most of these works consist mainly of simple narrations of 
the events surrounding earthquakes in both the colonial and republican periods, 
compilation of contemporary witnesses’ accounts, or catalogs of primary sources.145 They 
contain abundant information for future research, yet most of them cover extensive 
chronological periods that do not allow deep historical analysis.  
Institutions: Belice (1968), Friuli (1976), Campania (1980),” in Disastro! Disasters in Italy Since 1860: 
Culture, Politics, Society, edited by John Dickie, John Foot and Frank M. Snowden (New York: Palgrave, 
2002), 186-233; Philip L. Fradkin, The Great Earthquake and Firestorms of 1906: How San Francisco 
Nearly Destroyed Itself (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Gregory Clancey, Earthquake 
Nation: The Cultural Politics of Japanese Seismicity, 1868 -1930 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2006) 
 
145 Manuel de Odriozola, Terremotos. Colección de las relaciones de los más notables que ha sufrido esta 
capital y que la han arruinado (Lima:Tipografía de Aurelio Alfaro, 1863); José Toribio Polo, Sinopsis de 
temblores y volcanes del Perú, siglos XVI-XIX (Lima:Librería e Imprenta de San Pedro, 1899); Julio Bustos 
Navarrete, Estudio Sismológico de Chile: con los temblores y terremotos producidos en los últimos cuatro 
siglos (Santiago: 1931); Pierre Saint, Observaciones e interpretaciones de los terremotos chilenos 
(Santiago: Universidad de Chile, 1961); Patricio Mans, Los terremotos chilenos, 2 vol. (Santiago: 
Ediciones Quimantú, 1972); Enrique Silgado Ferro, “Historia de los sismos más notables ocurridos en el 
Perú, 1513-1974,” Boletín del Institutio de Geología y Minería, 3 (1978); and Lizardo Siener Lizárraga, 
Estudios de historia medioambiental: Perú, XVI-XX (Lima: Universidad Ricardo Palma, 2002); Historia de 
los sismos en el Perú, and Historia de los sismos en el Perú: catálogo, siglos XVIII-XIX (Lima: 
Universidad de Lima, 2011).   
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  The works of non-Latin American authors have been path-breaking within a 
historiography that has grown in the last two decades.146 For the Peruvian case, most of 
these studies focus on the Earthquake of 1746 in Lima, which is considered the most 
devastating during the colonial period.147 Most authors analyze this natural event and its 
aftermath as providing the momentum that permitted political, social, and cultural 
transformation—the so-called Bourbon Reforms-- in the capital of the Peruvian 
viceroyalty. Pedro Pablo Pérez Mallaína’s and Charles Walker’s studies about the 1746 
146 Virginia García Acosta, Historia y desastres naturales en América Latina (Lima: Red de Estudios 
Sociales en Prevención de Desastres en América Latina, 1996); Susy Sánchez, “Un Cristo Moreno 
conquista Lima: los arquitectos de la fama pública del Señor de los Milagros 1651-1771,” in Etnicidad y 
Discriminación Racial en la Historia, edited by Scarlett O’Phelan, 65-92 (Lima: Fondo Editorial Pontificia 
Universidad Católica del Perú, Instituto Riva-Agüero, Banco Mundial, 2002); “La frágil ciudad de los 
conquistadores. Movimientos sísmicos en Lima,” in Lima XVI, edited by Laura Gutiérrez Arbulú, 457-489 
(Lima: PUCP, 2005); Manuel Fernández Canque, Arica 1868: un tsunami y un terremoto (Santiago: 
Dirección de Bibliotecas, Archivos y Museos, 2007); Alfredo Palacio Roa, “Los terremoto, arquitectos por 
excelencia: Santiago de Chile 1730-1822,” (Master’s Thesis, Universidad de Chile, 2007); “Dominio y 
Catástrofe. Los terremotos en Concepción, Chile: 1550-1751,” Anuario de Estudios Hispanoamericanos, 
69, 2 (2012), 569-600; Jaime Valenzuela, “El terremoto de 1647: Experiencia apocalíptica y 
representaciones religiosas en Santiago Colonial,” Historias urbanas. Homenaje a Armando de Ramón, 
edited by Jaime Valenzuela (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 2007), 27 – 65; Juan 
Carlos Jurado Jurado, “Terremotos, pestes y calamidades. Del Castigo y la misericordia de Dios en la 
Nueva Granada (Siglos XVIII y XIX),” Revista de Historia Iberoamericana,4, 1(2011), 25-49.  
147 Francisco Quiroz Chueca, “Movimientos de tierra y de piso: el terremoto de 1746, la corrupción en el 
Callao y cambios borbónicos,” Investigaciones Sociales-Historia, 3, 4 (1999), 37-50; Susy Sánchez, “La 
ruina de Lima: mito y realidad del terrremoto de 1746 (Master’s Thesis: Pontificia Universidad Católica del 
Perú, 2001); Scarlett O’Phelan Godoy, “La moda francesa y el terrmoto de Lima de 1746,” Boletín del 
Instituto Francés de Estudios Andinos, 36, 1 (2007), 19-38. 
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 earthquake emphasize the absolutist reforms that Viceroy Manso de Velasco attempted in 
order to increase the colonial administration’s control over the Church and society.148 Pérez 
Mallaína focuses on the government’s economic and political interests behind its post-
earthquake measures. Walker furthers this analysis and argues that the Viceroy’s reforms 
were an early manifestation of the Bourbon reforms, which represented a new way of 
ruling. In these accounts, the reforms disrupted traditional and customary relationships 
between the colonial state and the royal subjects. 
 Similar to these contributions, studies on the Earthquake of 1755 in Lisbon 
demonstrate that absolutist state representatives used the crisis conjunctures produced by 
the natural events to introduce enlightened programs. Unlike Viceroy Manso de Velasco 
who had to abandon some of his initiatives and limited the implementation of others, the 
Marquis of Pombal, Secretary of State of Portugal, issued measures to improve the 
148 Pedro Emilio Pérez Mallaína, Retrato de una Ciudad en Crisis. La Sociedad Limeña ante el movimiento 
sísmico de 1746 (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2001); Charles Walker, Shaky 
Colonialism: The 1746 Earthquake-Tsunami in Lima, Peru, and its Long Aftermath (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2008). 
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 economic and political power of the Portuguese king, and also promoted the scientific 
justification of the natural event in order to undermine the power of the Church.149 
 Unlike the studies on these eighteenth-century natural disasters, this dissertation 
examines a trajectory of reform that did not follow but rather framed an earthquake. It 
examines events particularly during the earthquake’s aftermath to evaluate the capacity of 
crisis management displayed by these royal agents. Certainly, it borrows some approaches 
from Pérez Mallaína’s and Walker’s works, such as the treatment of the natural events as 
historical actors that expose the traditional antagonism between state and church. Yet this 
work concentrates on analyzing the nature of the Hapsburg colonial state and the 
foundational pillars that maintained it. Therefore, the Earthquake of 1687 is not the central 
subject of this dissertation, but rather a historical actor that both halted some of the ongoing 
reforms previously initiated, and finally permitted the rebuilding and consolidation of the 
early modern state in Lima. 
149 Mark Molesky, This Gulf of Fire: The Destruction of Lisbon, or Apocalypse in the Age of Science and 
Reason (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2015); José Luis Cardoso, “El Terremoto de Lisboa de 1755 y la 
política de regulación económica del Marqués de Pombal,” Historia y Política, 16 (2006), 209-236; Ana 
Cristina Araújo, “The Lisbon Eathquake of 1755. Public Distress and Political Propaganda,” E-Journal of 
Portuguese History 4, 1 (Summer, 2006), 1-11.   
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  This chapter focuses on the performance by leading royal officers in Lima, 
specifically the Viceroy and the members of the city council, in light of the material, social, 
and political turmoil that the earthquake produced, and the conditions of scarcity and 
disease that its aftermath brought. Ultimately, this chapter proposes that Lima possessed a 
strong and effective early modern government built on compromise and corporate 
cooperation. Until the eighteenth century, the rule of a monarch was not geared toward 
providing for the common good, but to achieve what was most “conveniente” for every 
part of the kingdom.150 Hence, a negotiating system was not inconsistent with this idea of 
government, nor did it denote ineffectiveness or decline.  
The sources used in this chapter are mainly official records such as letter, accounts, 
testimonies, or meeting records. Despite the official character of these documents, it is 
possible to corroborate evidence contrasting one source against another. Testimonies and 
official accounts at times differed. Individuals that produced them, either by writing or 
through their verbal testimonies transcribed by a third party, offered different perspectives 
and information about the same events.  
  
150 Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” 93. 
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  The Terrible Night 
 The Jesuit Fray Joseph de Buendía was placidly sleeping in his chamber at the 
Jesuit School of San Pablo when strong seismic movements forced him to seek refuge 
under the doorframe. Shortly after, his cell neighbor Fray Medina was by his side, 
frightened, and asking for confession. Both of them kneeled, cried, prayed, and absolved 
each other’s faults. They remained heartbroken on their knees, waiting for a tragic end. As 
a last recourse, they raised their hands begging for divine assistance, an the earthquake 
suddenly stopped. 
 After recovering from the initial shock, both Jesuits, along with other members of 
their religious order, left the school in order to offer assistance to those who survived the 
strong quake. As soon as they reached the street, they witnessed a terrible scene of wanton 
destruction and death. The chaos was ubiquitous. Survivors were trying to rescue those 
who remained under the debris or recover the corpses of relatives and friends. The scenario 
was horrible. People were crying and begging for heaven’s mercy but the earth continued 
shaking.151 
151 Joseph de Buendía, “Relación del temblor que arruinó a Lima el 20 de octubre de 1687,” in Terremotos. 
Colección de las relaciones mas notables que ha sufrido esta capital y que la han arruinado, edited by 
Manuel de Odriozola (Lima: Tipografía de A.Alfaro, 1863), 24. 
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 The movement that woke up Fray Buendía was the first of two intense earthquakes 
that hit Lima on October 20. According to various descriptions of this event, the shaking 
started around four in the morning.152 Most of Lima’s residents were sleeping when the 
first tremor started. As people tried to run away, chaos and confusion reigned. Fortunately, 
many were able to escape unscathed though, having the clothes they wore as their only 
remaining possession.153 This first tremor produced the collapse of some structures that 
crushed and trapped many people. Because of the intensity of this quake, people remained 
in the streets quivering in the cold, afraid of returning to their homes. 
As soon as the commotion from this first shock waned, people began to assist the 
wounded and rescue the trapped, just as the Jesuits of the San Pablo School did. Suddenly, 
a second earthquake, more intense than the former one, struck the city again. It destroyed 
those buildings that remained standing after the previous quake. The ecclesiastical 
buildings suffered the greatest damage, and only a few did not completely collapse.154 
152 Letter from the Duke de la Palata to the King, December 8, 1687. BNM, MS. 9375. 
153Relación del Ejemplar Castigo que envió Dios a la ciudad de Lima con los espantosos temblores de 20 de 
octubre de 1687. BNM, VE – 1461/1; Letter of Friar Domingo Alvarez de Toledo, Procurador General de 
Corte of the Order of San Francisco, from Lima, to the General Father of the same order, October 29, 1687. 
BNM MS. 9375, describe this first quake was followed by another strong, yet less intense tremor. Yet most 
accounts just indicated the first quake had a long duration.   
 
154 Luis Sifuentes, “Lima y los desastres sísmicos de 1687 y 1746” Demiurgo, 2 (2004), 111. 
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 The seismic movements also afflicted the port of Callao. A greater tragedy came 
from the sea just a few hours later when a tsunami hit the Peruvian littoral destroying Callao 
and the surrounding towns of fishermen Indians, Pitipiti y Quilcay.155 The power of the 
tsunami reached various port-towns on the coastline, producing inundations in towns such 
as Chancay, on the northern shore, and Pisco, Cañete, and Chincha, on the southern 
shore.156 
 
 
155The town of Pitipiti was located outside the walls of Callao, and Quilcay in Pachacamac, five leagues 
south of the port. 
156 Letter from the Duke de la Palata to the King, December 8, 1687. BNM, MS. 9375. 
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 Image 8: Indian settlements, Pitipiti and Quilcay, destroyed by the earthquake.157 
At sunrise, Lima’s residents realized the magnitude of the material destruction the 
earthquake produced. Almost all their religious buildings had collapsed, and many friars 
and nuns died inside their cloisters. The Chapel of Sagrario, located next to the 
archbishop’s palace, was the only church that remained standing. Yet, it exhibited so many 
cracks that no one dared to enter it.158 The viceregal palace, home of the viceroy and 
headquarter of various branches of government, was completely destroyed. The portals of 
the Plaza Mayor and the City Hall were also in ruins.  
157 Map made by the author. 
158 Account of the City Council, f. 9 v. 
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Image 9: Lima’s main buildings and plazas. 1. Plaza Mayor, 2. Viceregal Palace, 
3. Cathedral, 4. Sagrario Chapel, 5. City Hall, 6. San Agustín Convent, 7. Santo Domingo 
Convent, 8. La Merced Convent, 9. San Francisco Convent, 10. Monserrate Church, 11. 
San Francisco de Paula Hospice, 12. Plaza del Cercado, 13. San Pablo School and 
Society of Jesus Church, 14. Alhóndiga, and 15. Casa de la Moneda.159  
Many private buildings suffered damage, but to a lesser degree than those of the 
Church and the colonial administration. Nonetheless, people refused to return to their 
permanent residences. They feared that the remaining structures could fall down anytime, 
so they looked for alternative places for shelter. They erected temporary dwellings in open 
159 Map made by the author using Rolando Arciga. Plano de Lima donde se ve la ubicación de las puertas 
que tenía la muralla, "La Muralla De La Ciudad De Lima". Blog. Arqueología Colonial, 2012. 
http://arqueologiacolonial.blogspot.com/2012_01_01_archive.html. 
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 spaces, away from the crumbling structures.160 Even religious men and women had to 
abandon their cloisters to find refuge in gardens, plazas, and empty lots.  
The first place limeños occupied was the Plaza Mayor, the political and symbolic 
center of the city. Even the Viceroy and his family had to live there for a few months. Most 
people, both lay and religious, spread throughout the city and its outskirts. Some fortunate 
religious congregations were able to build temporal adobe structures on land within their 
property. For instance, the San Agustín and Santo Domingo friars moved to the gardens of 
their convents. Similarly, the religious of the Convent of Merced relocated within a plot, 
called Belen, which belonged to their order.161 
 Elite residents were also able to find protection in open spaces within their own 
property, which also harbored people from diverse social conditions that sought shelter. 
For instance, outside the southern section of the city wall, in the yard named San Jacinto, 
property of Antonio Jiménez, people built temporary dwellings of different materials such 
as wood, mats, reeds, and straws. They even erected a school for children and two chapels 
that some priests tended. Close to Monserrate Church, on the eastern side of the city, in 
160 Letter of the Duke of the Palata to the King, Lima, December 8, 1987. BNM, MS 9375.  
 
161 Relación del temblor que sucedió en Lima lunes 20 de octubre de 1687; Account of the City Council, f. 
5, 6. 
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 another yard called El Cuero, property of Don Juan de Aliaga, many families constructed 
several chambers and a chapel among the trees. Similarly, people occupied many other 
private gardens, yards, and vacant lots around the city, inside or outside its walls.162  
Lima’s population filled every available space without regard for social division. 
People of both genders arrived at the yard of the San Francisco de Paula Hospice. Because 
the chapel, cells, and rooms belonging to this institution were destroyed, the religious living 
at the hospice moved to the yard. During his inspection of the city, notary Diego Fernández 
Montaño was surprised to find out that religious men were sharing the same space with lay 
people of both genders.163 The royal officer was also astonished to find a majority of 
Spaniard families located at the main square of the Indian town of El Cercado, adjacent to 
Lima.164 The spreading of the population and the mingling of social groups alarmed the 
royal authorities.  
The large amount of debris on the streets and the fetid odor of corpses accentuated 
the rampant disorder. Despite the efforts to rescue people from the rubble, many corpses 
162 Account of the City Council, f. 6v – 7. 
 
163 Ibíd., f. 5 
 
164 Ibíd., f. 8. 
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 remained buried. Some contemporary witnesses recalled that among those rescued from 
the debris, there were some already dead and others alive. A few of the latter were 
unscathed, yet many others had wounds. Those severely injured received spiritual 
assistance rather than medical treatment. Royal authorities calculated the death toll 
between 300 and 400.165 This amount represented a small fraction of the whole population 
of Lima, which ascended to around 32,000 people.166 Regardless of the accuracy of this 
official amount, contemporary witnesses lamented only the loss of influential people, such 
as Don Alvaro Ponce de León, who died suffocated by dust; General Don Juan Ramirez de 
Arellano, his wife Doña Ines de Rivera, and their son Nicolás, who died when a wall from 
their home collapsed on top of them; and oidores Don Diego de la Rocha, Don Alonso del 
Castillo, and Don Diego Portales.167 
165 Letter from the Duke de la Palata to the King, December 8, 1687. BNM, MS. 9375.; Account of the City 
Council, f. 1 
 
166 María Pilar Pérez Cantó, “La Población de Lima en el siglo XVIII,’ Boletín Americanista, 32 (1982), 
384, 390, provides a figure of 34,724 people in Lima by 1700. She bases her estimate on the accounts made 
under the orders of Viceroy Marquis of Salinas in 1600, Viceroy Marquis of Montesclaros in 1613, and 
Viceroy Count of Monclova in 1700.  
167 Memorial Ajustado y Resumen de los actuado en la residencia del Dr. Virrey Duque de la Palata, 
November 3, 1690. AGI, Lima, 87, f. 18; Buendía, Relación del temblor que arruinó a Lima el 20 de 
octubre de 1687; Letter from the Duke de la Palata to the King, December 8, 1687. BNM, MS. 9375, refers 
the amount of deaths among people “de cuenta” ascended only to 6. Letter from the Viceroy to the King, 
May 3, 1688. AGI, Lima, 87. 
 98 
                                                     
  The government met compounding challenges trying to rule and control a 
dispersed and dispossessed population. The new configuration of the city, with so many 
small settlements across the city and its surrounding areas, also altered the ordinary means 
of food distribution. Scarcity and hunger became part of quotidian life in the months 
following the quake. Disease soon struck survivors’ debilitated bodies.  
Describing the general feeling of the population, Dominican priest Fray Domingo 
Alvarez said, “Today [Lima] cries, miserable [in] her ruin, all her greatness and buildings 
obliterated by the soil.”168 The condition of the city was critical. The cleaning, ordering, 
and rebuilding activities demanded arduous and backbreaking labor. The population also 
required basic provisions of food and water in order to survive. All these tasks represented 
a grueling trial for the colonial government. 
 Tending to Temporal Necessities 
As head of the colonial government, Duke of La Palata assumed the responsibility 
of reconstructing and reorganizing the city. He rapidly mobilized the members of the city 
council in order to organize the administration of the city under the new critical 
 
168 Letter of Friar Domingo Alvarez de Toledo, Procurador General de Corte of the Order of San Francisco, 
from Lima, to the General Father of the same order, October 29, 1687. BNM, MS. 9375. 
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 circumstances. He assumed leadership roles in the activities of temporal assistance and 
reconstruction, as well as in religious matters because of the prolonged absence of the 
spiritual shepherd from the city, Archbishop Liñán y Cisneros. In the following months 
after the quake, the dispersal of population and the new precarious living conditions 
generated a favorable setting for the outbreak of diseases, which took a toll greater than the 
earthquake itself. Rather than signs of failure, these circumstances were challenges the 
administration could not avoid and had to overcome. 
During the night of the disastrous event, the Duke and his family abandoned the 
viceregal palace when the first quake hit. Once at the Plaza Mayor, the Viceroy left his 
family and went to assist those trapped under the rubble who were clamoring for help.169 
He was busy digging out the survivors when the second tremor produced the collapse of 
many more buildings. He recalled his greatest fear “was that of the earth I stepped on, 
because it did as sea waves, that I could not stand on, and kneeling, to die, was unable to 
maintain myself on the ground.”170 As soon as this second quake was over, he took the first 
measures to deal with the critical conditions of the city. 
169 Testimony of Pedro Fernández de Valdez, master builder, Account of the City Council, f. 30v. 
170 Letter from the Duke of the Palata to the King, December 8, 1687. BNM, MS 9375, “me parecio el de la 
tierra que pisava pues haziendo olas como el mar no me podia tener en pie y arrodillado, ya para morir, 
tampoco me podia mantener en el suelo.” 
 100 
                                                     
 One of his first decisions was to establish his provisional lodging at the heart of the 
city or Plaza Mayor. The Duke had to accommodate himself and his family in a humble 
cabin erected at the plaza to lodge them. Despite the poor condition of this new dwelling, 
the Duke believed that it provided a strategic and central place to perform his governmental 
duties. The Viceroy recalled he “did not want to stay away from the center of the city 
downtown, as it seemed to me [the viceroy] it would be a huge grief for everyone to see 
their viceroy departing from them; and of much inconvenience any distance for the prompt 
and extraordinary actions with which now it has to be ruled, because there are no courts.”171 
He realized that his behavior would set an example for the population, so he resolved to 
act with strength and determination to instill in others the same confidence. For the Duke, 
the service for the people and the crown came before his personal interests. 
The destruction of the viceregal palace meant that various branches of the royal 
administration lost their traditional space to discuss governing matters. The Real 
Audiencia, Court of Crime, Tribunal of Accounts, and Treasury suspended their meetings 
 
171 Ibid, “no he querido apartarme del centro de la ciudad pareciendome que seria gran desconsuelo para 
todos el ver que se les alejase su virrey, y de mucho embarazo cualquier distancia para los promptos y 
extraordinarios espedientes con que agora se ha de governor, pues no ay tribunales.” 
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 for some months because their members lacked appropriate places to meet.172 In addition, 
many ministers were unable to tend to their administrative duties because they were 
providing for their families’ necessities or recovering from injuries. Two high court judges, 
Don Diego de la Rocha and Don Diego Portales, died in the quake. For this reason, the 
number of ministers available to participate in the Real Acuerdo, or viceroy’s counseling 
body, decreased to three active members.173  
A few months later, after the Viceroy and his family abandoned the makeshift 
rooms they lived in at the Plaza Mayor, the tribunals finally resumed their activities in the 
new available spaces. Nonetheless, the Viceroy did not suspend the tasks of his 
administration, as many branches of the government did, during months of the aftermath. 
He summoned the members of the city council, which continued actively working under 
his orders.  
Studies of this corporative body portray it as an institution more emblematic than 
pragmatic. However, after the quake its members played important roles during the 
recovery and reconstruction period. Scholars criticize the sumptuous expenses of the 
172 Account of the City Council, f. 2. 
 
173 Memorial Ajustado y Resumen de residencia, f. 18; 
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 colonial cabildos to organize ceremonies to celebrate the entrance of a new viceroy and 
important royal events, such as the birth of a prince or  military victories.174  The expenses 
for ceremonial activities account for the shortages of the cabildos’ budgets.175 Nonetheless, 
city councils had many other functions that were more ordinary, such as the provision of 
food, the regulation of prices, and control of social order. The Earthquake of 1687 offers 
the opportunity to closely examine those other regular activities altered during the disaster.   
Two days after the earthquake, the Viceroy held his first official meeting with the 
members of the city council. On this occasion, the counselors and the Duke reviewed the 
city council’s records for the year 1586, when another earthquake hit the city, in order 
to issue the necessary measures to reorganize the city. In this meeting, the Viceroy named 
two provisional alcaldes to assist the two officers that already occupied this post.176 The 
174 Pablo Emilio Pérez-Mallaína, “Le pouvoir de l'etat les forces de la nature: la reconstruction de Lima 
apres le tremblement de terre de 1687,” in De Séville a Lima, edited by Alain Musset and Pablo Pérez 
Mallaína (Paris: Université de Paris X – Nanterre, Laboratoire de Géographie Urbaine, 1997), 171-174. 
 
175 Peter Bakewell, A History of Latin America (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 123. 
176 Jay Kinsbruner, The Colonial Spanish-American City. Urban Life in the Age of Atlantic Capitalism 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 34; John Preston Moore, The Cabildo in Peru under the 
Hapsburgs: A Study in the Origins and Power of the Town Council in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1530 – 1700 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1954), 145. Actas del Cabildo de Lima, Libro 31, Archivo Histórico de la 
Municipalidad Metropolitana de Lima (hereafter AHMML), f. 157v-158. The number of alcaldes 
ordinarios in the city council was traditionally two. The Viceroy duplicated the number as a measure to 
expedite the traditional activities of these officers.  
 103 
                                                     
 purpose of this measure was to improve the city council’s efforts to distribute food and 
control the social order, which became difficult because of the dispersion of people 
throughout and beyond the city.  
For royal administrators, the chaos and disorder converted the city in a propitious 
place for robbery or other illicit practices of lower groups. Except for two instances, which 
occurred outside the city, sources remain silent about criminal activity in Lima. 177 Without 
denying that the conditions of the city offered good possibilities for illicit behavior, 
authorities’ negative perception of the lower groups, especially of non-whites , drove their 
interest to accentuate social control and security in the city. 
The Viceroy was also concerned that crumbling building structures might 
unexpectedly collapse on top of pedestrians. In the following days, the Duke appointed 
177 Request by Vizente de la Rocha before the Ecclesiastical Court, Archivo General de la Nación (hereafter 
AGN), Tribunal Eclesiástico, Censuras, L.3, D.245, F.1., s/f. De la Rocha had a storage in Callao, where he 
stored various merchandise. During the quake, the property collapsed killing the guardian. De la Rocha 
declared that some of the merchandise, along with his accounting book, were stolen. For that reason, he 
requested the Vicario General to issue some censuras (admonishments) to obtain information about the 
stolen goods. Letter from Francisco de Colmenares, treasurer of the royal treasury, to Visitor Juan de 
Peñalosa, May 8, 1688. AGI, Lima,289. Treasurer Colmenares informed Visitor Peñalosa that some jars of 
quicksilver were stolen from the royal warehouse at the port of Chincha. The guardian of the storage 
followed the trail left by the quicksilver and arrested a black man accused by the port butcher. He also 
stated that a few days later the guardian priest of Santo Domingo brought two jars of quicksilver to the 
royal warehouse that he received in confession.  
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 seven commissioners (comisarios) to assess the damage of the buildings located on the 
principal streets. These officers had to explore the entire city, along with a construction 
master (alarife), to identify the structures that were prone to collapse, so that, according to 
the Viceroy’s orders, they could be demolished. He realized the gravity of the damage these 
buildings could generate if they finally collapsed. 
Colonial administrators tried to control the inflation of wages and building supplies, 
which would have increased because of the urgencies of reconstructing property.  The 
Duke fixed the salary of construction masters and laborers (alarifes, barretones, and 
peones) to limit the increasing wages these workers began to request.178 The Viceroy 
attempted to control these wages because they would overburden private owners and 
tenants, who had to assume the unexpected expenses of reconstructing their properties.179 
The different measures implemented by Duke during the earthquake’s aftermath show he 
aimed to govern in a balanced way. 
178 Ibid, 154, the Viceroy established the following wages: alarifes, 3 pesos; barreteros, 1 peso; and peones, 
6 reales; 176, the counselors also set the compensation of bricklayers at 14 pesos, and adobe-layers at 10 
pesos per day. Adobe-makers would earn 12 pesos per thousand adobes. 
 
179 Actas del Cabildo de Lima, 157r. – 159 r. 
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 In the following months, the city council followed the same policy of fixing the 
prices of certain construction materials: the cahíz of cal at 12 pesos, a thousand bricks at 
22 pesos, a thousand large adobe blocks at 34 pesos, and a thousand small ones at 32 pesos. 
Counselors ordered this measure because these products became essential and of great 
demand during the period of reconstruction. If someone was caught reselling construction 
materials, the council would confiscate them, assigning two-thirds of the product towards 
the rebuilding of the city hall and the remaining to compensate the informer who alerted 
the body of the illegal sales. 180 
The city council also ruled that those laborers who demanded excessive salaries 
would be condemned to work for one month without compensation on the reconstruction 
of the City Hall building and its jail.181 In addition, counselors prohibited natives from 
being put to work on reconstruction activities because they were more useful working their 
land than in the city.182 This concern about maintaining Indians in the fields responded to 
the necessity of supplying enough food for Lima’s people.  
180 Ibid, f. 175 v. 
 
181 Ibid, f. 171.  
 
182 Ibid, f. 183 v. 
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 The provision of food was among the customary duties of the city council, yet it 
became a priority after the earthquake in order to battle the waves of disease and hunger 
that spread very quickly.183 The precarious condition of the temporary dwellings exposed 
people to the nocturnal cold and the diurnal heat, creating a propitious environment for the 
eruption of diseases.184 Just a few days after the quake, the city council reported outbreaks 
of “sudden diseases” among the population.185 The following months of late spring and 
summer brought more discomfort, and hunger accentuated the weather’s harshness.186  
Counselors were afraid of food shortages. One of their main concerns was to 
procure the supply of lamb and beef. They ordered the providers to secure enough of these 
products. They also agreed to closely supervise the activities of the suppliers, register their 
herds and fields, and fine them if they failed to offer enough meat.187 The provision of 
bread and water had also diminished because the earthquake had buried all the bakeries 
183 Moore, The Cabildo in Peru under the Hapsburgs, 170. 
 
184 Letter from the Duke de la Palata to the King, December 8, 1987. BNM, MS. 9375. 
 
185 Actas del Cabildo de Lima, f. 158. 
 
186 Relación del Temblor que sucedió en Lima lunes 20 de octubre de 1687. BNM, MS. 18760/36 
 
187 Actas del Cabildo de Lima, f. 155. 
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 and inundated the ditches of the city.188 For that reason, the city council instructed the 
alcalde ordinario Don Diego de Manrique to request testimony from all bakers in the city. 
Manrique had to inquire if they had any wheat in their possession, what quantities, and how 
they obtained it.189 The purpose of this investigation was to uncover possible suppliers that 
might be selling overpriced wheat. 
 The counselors were also concerned that the shortage of food and the disruption of 
common methods of supply would increase the price of the most sought-after food 
products. The dispersion of people throughout the city also obstructed the activities of food 
distribution. In addition to controlling the provision of basic food products, such as meat, 
wheat, and tallow,190 the royal officers fixed some prices. For instance, they established 
the price of fat at 5 pesos per arroba, tallow at 5 pesos 4 reales, and wheat at 4 pesos 4 
reales.191  
188 Relación del Ejemplar Castigo que envió Dios. 
189 Actas del Cabildo de Lima, 154 v – 155. 
 
190 Ibid, 158 v – 159, 161 v. 
 
191Ibid, 156v, 170, 178 v, 185v; a few months later, the city counselors noticed the increase of construction 
workers’ salaries and materials’ price. Therefore, they commissioned Don Alonso Laso de la Vega the 
enforcement of the orders and the application of fines previously issued to limit such excesses.  
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 This increased concern to protect Lima’s food provisions became evident in the 
counselors’ close supervision of the transactions of goods and services. The constant 
inspection of suppliers’ pens, cattle, and products resulted in prosecutions and fines. The 
first of these incidents involved the lamb supplier, Alonso Sánchez de Bustamante. In 1685, 
the city council had contracted Bustamante to provide meat for six years. In exchange, 
Bustamante offered to pay 80,000 pesos to obtain this exclusive right. The royal officers 
assigned this money to fund the construction of the city wall.192 Three months later, after 
the quake, the counselors noticed the amount and quality of meat that Bustamante was 
selling had declined. After a rapid investigation, they confirmed that Bustamante was 
offering poor-quality meat, “bad and thin.”193 The council’s members punished this 
supplier with the reduction of his selling price. Additionally, in order to increase the 
provision of meat, the counselors allowed any person to sell meat at a higher price than 
192 Mendiburu, Diccionario Histórico – Biográfico del Perú, vol. 8, 94; Melchor de Navarra y Rocafull, 
“Memoria de Gobierno,” 383.  
 
193Actas del Cabildo, f. 176v – 177v. The alcalde ordinario, Don Rodrigo de Mendoza Ladrón de Guevara, 
and a regidor, Don Diego Manrique de Lara, went to the fields where Bustamante kept the cattle to find out 
if there were the necessary herds to provide enough meat for the city. Additionally, the Real Acuerdo 
penalized Bustamante with a fine of 6,000 pesos. For that reason, the council did not impose on him 
another fine. 
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 permitted to Bustamante.194 They cut into the exclusive concession of Bustamante trying 
to both compensate the consumers and penalize the lamb supplier. The cabildo also 
punished the supplier of fat, Captain Roque Falcón, with 4,000 pesos for distributing very 
liquid fat, and levied a fine of 1,000 pesos on beef provider, Pedro Pasqual del Valle, for 
selling poor quality meat.195 
Despite the measures to provide enough food for Lima’s residents, the summer 
months took their toll. In March, a plague of typhus fever (tabardillo) and tertian fever 
(tercianas) ravaged the city.196 The physicians calculated that around 14,000 people got 
sick with “fevers and sudden pains”, and approximately 2,600 had died.197 The 
disorganized dispersion of the people and the short number of physicians hindered the 
194 Ibid, 178v. The council limited the sale price of the supplier’s meat to 2 ½ pesos the quarter of a sheep; 
other individuals could sell meat at 3 pesos the same quantity of meat. 
 
195 Ibid, f. 178 – 179. Falcón was unable to continue providing tallow in the quantity and quality the city 
council demanded. Only two weeks later he requested authorization to limit the sale of tallow to only one 
pound per family, and to leave his obligation as official supplier at the end of his term; 180, Pasqual del 
Valle appealed the fine, yet the council rejected his petition arguing he had not complied with most of the 
clauses of the contract where he received the monopoly to sell beef. 
 
196 Ibid, f. 186. 
 
197 Account of the City Council, f. 3v. Tabardillo was the common name for typhus. Tercianas were fevers, 
symptomatic of malaria, which appeared every three days.  
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 provision of medical attention to the sick.198 In fact, the death toll from the plague was 
higher than the estimated 400 casualties from the quake. Even though the administration 
took measures to tend the population’s need, the combination of scarcity and poor living 
conditions undermined people’s resistance to disease. 
Nevertheless, it is evident the counselors improved the performance of their duties. 
The Viceroy’s close supervision tightened the operation of the city council. The Duke was 
able to organize his subalterns to tend the increasing needs of the population. The cabildo’s 
increased control and surveillance of food suppliers demonstrated that its members had the 
capacity to at least try to deal with critical conditions. Royal officers took steps to quickly 
organize and develop means to deal with the critical conditions of the city. Together, the 
Viceroy and other royal officers established measures oriented to provide appropriate 
solutions to the demands created during the chaotic post– disaster period. 
 Spanish Empire’s Bureaucracy 
The dynamic interplay of imperial and local government became apparent in the 
joint response by the Viceroy and the city council to the earthquake. To examine the 
dynamics of imperial rule, it is necessary to set the metropolis and the colony on the same 
198 Letter from the Viceroy to the King, April 21 1688. AGI Lima, 87, indicates four physicians died in the 
quake, and three got sick. 
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 analytical ground, and observe the interconnection and reciprocal processes of shaping 
ideas, knowledge, and practices in the post-disaster period. These interactions—made 
visible after the Earthquake of 1687-- reveal the logic behind early modern government. 
In the months following the quake, the Viceroy and the city council implemented 
various measures and issued new rules targeted to provide the “right thing”—government 
services or recognition-- to each part of the society. This “right thing” was far from a 
common good for the entire society. For early modern rulers, the art of government 
consisted of providing what was most appropriate, according to social standing, to each 
part of society.199 The Duke attempted to provide each group he ruled (proprietors, 
laborers, food supplies, royal officers, etc.) the most appropriate provisions. The city 
council understood and followed suit, and applied the logic of early modern governance 
through the rules it created and the penalties it imposed during the reconstruction period. 
The performance of the Viceroy during the aftermath of the earthquake reflects the 
practices of imperial rule in a Spanish colony. The Duke de la Palata was the representative 
of the Spanish king and, consequently, embodied the legitimacy of the imperial 
government in its colonies. At the same time, he was part of a growing bureaucracy that 
199 Foucault, “Governmentality,” 95 
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 the Spanish crown instituted with the purpose of improving the administration of both the 
metropolis and the colonies.  
The expansiveness of the Spanish empire meant various and different kinds of 
natural disasters afflicted diverse parts or kingdoms. Some disasters, such as disease or 
famine, were common in pre-modern times, regardless of the geographic area. Others 
natural events such as hurricanes and earthquakes affected only specific areas. 
Nevertheless, during the seventeenth century in Europe, the “little Ice Age” had produced 
lower-than-average temperatures during the previous century, resulting in weak harvests.  
The constant wars that spread throughout Europe accentuated scarcity and made people 
prone to contact a disease. Climate change also produced an increasing telluric activity 
around the “ring of fire” in the Pacific Ocean. 200 
During the government of Charles II, a prolonged wave of disasters such as bad 
harvests, food shortage, and epidemics affected Castile from 1677 to 1686. Epidemics of 
fever and flu (catarro) started in 1672, and became a plague in 1676, with several outbreaks 
until 1682. Another epidemic hit immediately and lasted until 1685. 201 Terrible harvests 
200 Geoffrey Parker, Global Crisis. War, 3-76. The “ring of fire” is a string around the edges of the Pacific 
Ocean, with large seismic activity.  
 
201 Henry Kamen, Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century, 1665 – 1700 (London: Longman, 1980), 46 – 54. 
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 of 1665-68, and 1677-83 aggravated the situation.202 Floods in 1680 and 1681, and 
droughts in 1682 and 1683, produced a food shortages, causing famine in the entire 
peninsula.203 Earthquakes hit several other parts of the empire: the province of Cumaná in 
Santo Domingo, during the night of May 4, 1684, the provinces of Riobamba, Tacunga, 
Ambato, and Patata in Ecuador, on June 20, 1698.204 In Europe, the city of Naples and the 
Calabria region also suffered a terrible earthquake on June 5, 1688.  
News of the different disasters reached the metropolis, where royal administrators 
began to develop a certain familiarity with them and issued measures accordingly.205  The 
expansiveness of the empire promoted the dissemination of such knowledge. In the various 
years that the Duke occupied high administrative posts in the metropolis, Castile had 
suffered a prolonged wave of disasters. It is possible that during the years he served the 
Spanish crown in the Old World, the Duke of Palata developed the knowledge and capacity 
202 Parker, Global Crisis, 286. 
 
203 Henry Kamen, Spain, 1469 – 1714. A Society of Conflict (London: Pearson, 2005), 283; Kamen, Spain 
in the Later Seventeenth Century, 46 – 54. States a prolonged wave of disasters such as bad harvests, food 
shortage and epidemics affected the Castilians from 1677 until 1686. 
 
204AGI, Santo Domingo, 188, R. 2, N. 25; AGI, Diversos – Colecciones, 27, N. 58. 
 
205 AGI, Codices, L. 752, imagen 141. In 1673, the Council of Indies provided limosnas and mercedes to 
reconstruct the temples and Fortresses of Santo Domingo, which devastated by an earthquake. 
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 to deal with critical conditions.206 Compounded with a strong leadership personality, he 
seemed a perfect public servant to deal with the 1687 Lima disaster. 
As mentioned above, witnesses recalled the Duke personally participated in the 
rescue of people trapped under the debris. He rapidly made strategic decisions, such as 
when he preferred to occupy a reed cottage in the Plaza Mayor, from where he could 
supervise the administration of the city, rather than move to a better accommodation 
outside of Lima. He gathered the city counselors and took the measures necessary to tend 
to the most needy. Father Buendía recounted the Duke gave alms from his own money to 
the people.207 Another witness praised the devotion of the Viceroy, who led various 
processions with the purpose of mitigating God’s wrath.208 Most of the contemporary 
206 Noble David Cook and Alexandra Parma Cook, The plague files: crisis management in sixteenth-
century Seville (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2009); Charles Walker, “Shaking the 
Unstable empire: The Lima, Quito, and Arequipa Earthquakes, 1746, 1783, 1797,” in Dreadful visitations: 
confronting natural catastrophe in the age of Enlightenment, edited by Alessa Johns (New York: 
Routledge, 1999), 113 – 144; Stephen Tobriner, “Safety and Reconstruction of Noto after the Sicilian 
Earthquake of 1693 – the eighteenth Century Context,” Dreadful Visitations, 49 – 77; and Sherry Johnson, 
“The St. Augustine Hurricane of 1811: Disaster and the Question of Political Unrest on the Florida 
Frontier,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 84, No. 1, Special H-Florida Issue: Florida History from 
Transnational Perspectives (Summer, 2005), 28-56, offer diverse examples of royal officers that provided 
effective measures of relief in pre – modern times.   
 
207 Relación del temblor que arruinó a Lima el 20 de octubre de 1687, 29. 
 
208 Relación del Ejemplar Castigo que envió Dios a la ciudad de Lima. 
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 sources mentioned the active performance of the Viceroy during the months after the quake 
in both political and religious matters.  
He was emblematic of the Spanish empire: experience in natural disasters and a 
moving bureaucracy. The Lima Earthquake of 1687, along with other disasters that hit the 
Spanish empire, may have instilled in state officials a new awareness about calamities and 
their effects. Even though officials did not develop a universal, systemic imperial policy to 
deal with disasters until the end of the seventeenth century, its bureaucrats had learned to 
design and implement particular responses according to local circumstances.  
Among the most challenging local circumstances the Duke faced in the earthquake’s 
aftermath was rebuilding the administrative buildings with the paltry funds in the royal 
treasury. Indeed, the treasury was in precarious condition as the crumbling architectural 
structures of the city. 
The Reconstruction Projects of the Colonial Administration 
The earthquake heavily damaged various buildings that were visual representations 
of royal power, such as the viceregal palace and the city hall. The Viceroy was conscious 
that the royal treasury would have to fund the reconstruction of these former entirely but 
he expected to find other sources to repair the latter. He knew the precarious condition of 
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 the royal treasury represented a financial challenge for his rebuilding projects. Nonetheless, 
he was determined to make them happen.  
Urbanism played a crucial element in providing power to the ruling elites. The 
geography of Spanish American cities embodied the heterogeneous and hierarchical nature 
of the colonial societies and their governmental system.209 The crown delineated the 
guidelines for the foundation of the city and the distribution of its blocks. The growth of 
Lima brought about many transformations to its architecture, both secular and religious. A 
few decades after its foundation, stable and permanent houses replaced the provisional and 
experimental ones the conquerors had built. Limeños began to build two-story residences 
since the 1570s. They mainly used lime, bricks and stones to build façades, columns, and 
foundations, and employed adobe to fill the interior walls. Starting in the 1620s, wood 
became the most demanded product used in the upper-stories because of its flexibility and 
resistance to tremors. Quincha (mud-covered framework of wood or reed) and reed were 
also other original and flexible materials that builders used in their projects.210 
209 Ernesto Capello, City at the Center of the World. Space, History, and Modernity in Quito (Pittsburg: 
University of Pittsburg Press, 2011), 6. 
 
210 Antonio San Cristóbal, La Casa Virreinal Limeña de 1570 a 1687, tomo 1 (Lima: Fondo Editorial del 
Congreso del Perú, 2003), 97. 
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 The frequency of telluric movements in Lima also affected the construction patterns 
of religious structures. Religious buildings followed new architectonic plans and vaults as 
they required repairs or reconstruction. By 1660s, plaster and wood began to replace bricks, 
stones, and limes in the constructions of vaults and arches because they were more flexible 
and resistant. It was until after the Earthquake of 1687 that quincha, wood, and plaster 
became more popular among construction masters because domes made with these 
materials had resisted the intensity of the natural event.211 
The original design of the city followed a symbolic order where every element had 
its specific place, and the plaza functioned as a theater from where the political system 
displayed authority through both administrative and religious buildings.212 The appearance 
of public buildings had the purpose to manifest the power of the government.213In Lima, 
as in other cities, royal power was concentrated on the Plaza Mayor, which represented the 
211 Antonio San Cristóbal, Arquitectura de Lima en la Segunda Mitad del Siglo XVII (Lima: Fondo 
Editorial de la Universidad de San Martín, 2010), 225, 226. 
 
212 Alvaro Félix Bolaños, “A Place to Live, a Place to think, and a Place to Die: Sixteenth Century Frontier 
Cities, Plazas, and ‘Relaciones’ in Spanish America,” in Mapping Colonial Spanish America. Places and 
Commonplaces of Identity, Culture, and Experience, edited by Santa Arias and Mariselle Meléndez. 
(London: Associated University Presses, 2002), 285. 
 
213 Kinsbruner, The Colonial Spanish-American City, 49, 50.  
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 core of urban social, political, and cultural life.214 Because of the symbolic power of 
buildings, ruling groups elaborated imposing constructions. Both the viceregal palace and 
the city council had two-stories, two interior patios, and several chambers that functioned 
as dependencies of diverse governmental branches. Stones and bricks were the main 
materials utilized in both buildings for the foundation, ground level columns, and façades. 
Wood was mainly used for second story corridors and balconies.215 Unfortunately, the 
expenses of carrying out the reconstruction of these public buildings were extremely 
burdensome on the royal treasury.216 
 Despite the various financial responsibilities of the royal treasury, the colonial 
administration’s primary duty was to remit bullion to the peninsula in order to support the 
king’s diverse enterprises. The Duke understood that the King prioritized royal revenue 
above rebuilding. He recalled in his memoir, “Even though in defense and safety of the 
life, honor, and wealth of such good vassals His Majesty would employ all his treasures 
with great joy, I cannot offer them in present times, because the troubles of the Monarchy 
214 Osorio, Inventing Lima, 152. 
 
215 Jorge Bernales Ballesteros, Lima. La Ciudad y Sus Monumentos (Sevilla: Consejo Superior de 
Investigaciones Científicas, Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1972),126, 193, 194. 
 
216Navarra y Rocaful, “Memoria de Gobierno,” 18. 
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 in the closest parts to the heart [the peninsula], need all the aid and assistance of his royal 
treasury, without diverting them to another part (Lima).”217 He underlined that such 
troubles at the court were more important than providing financial relief to Lima’s loyal 
subjects.  
Despite the significant role Lima played in the crown’s imperial structure as a 
commercial, fiscal, and administrative center of South Spanish America, peninsular 
authorities perceived the immediate material needs of the colonial subjects as distant.218 
The Duke, a peninsular bureaucrat in the New World, was aware that the King and his main 
ministers understood the metropolis’ economic needs were a priority.  Therefore, he had to 
fulfill the double task of reconstructing Lima and sending funds to the peninsula. 
The destruction of all the public buildings in the city represented exorbitant 
expenses for the royal treasury, which was in a chronic deficit. The Duke realized that the 
royal treasury would be unable to defray the costs to repair and reconstruct all the buildings. 
Yet, when he took on this project, he resorted to various mechanisms to reduce costs or 
217 Ibid, 367. 
 
218 Sellers-García, Distance and Documents at the Spanish Empire’s Periphery, 15, explains that even 
colonial centers remained distant from the perspective of the metropolis. These centers, as the large city-
ports across Spanish America, had the main function of generating the wealth the metropolis required. 
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 obtain alternative funds.  In order to rebuild the viceregal palace, the Duke summoned an 
emergency meeting, a “junta extraordinaria de tribunales,” where he presented his projects 
of reconstruction to the high-ranking royal officers of the colonial administration.219 When 
asked by the civil authorities, bricklayer Manuel of Escobar recommended the demolition 
of the viceregal palace’s second level in order to spare some undamaged parts of the first 
floor and convert it into a new building.220 The Viceroy argued that the cost of constructing 
this one-floor palace would be considerably less than repairing the entire building.221 Since 
the new palace would have only one story, as opposed to the two levels in the previous 
palace, the Viceroy’s project would significantly reduce the useful space in the new palace.  
The viceregal family, the royal tribunals, and other dependencies would have to 
share the one-floor structure. Nonetheless, the Duke successfully persuaded the junta 
members to approve his project.222 The works on the new viceregal palace began 
219 Patricia Marks, Deconstructing Legitimacy: viceroys, merchants, and the military in late colonial Peru. 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007). 
 
220Account of the City Council, f. 21v.; Relación del Ejemplar Castigo que envió Dios a la ciudad de Lima 
con los espantosos temblores de 20 de octubre de 1687. BNM, VE – 1461/1.  
 
221 Account of the City Council, f 18v-31v. provides the testimony of four bricklayers that estimated the 
reconstruction of the palace between 80,000 to 100,000 pesos. 
222Letter from the Duke de la Palata to the King, December 8, 1987. BNM, MS. 9375. 
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 immediately, and the first rooms were ready four months later. Aware that the 
reconstruction activities had started around the city, and many proprietors or tenants 
returned to their residences or found alternative places to move to, the Duke decided to 
take advantage of this event to clear the Plaza Mayor, which was still occupied by temporal 
dwellings. He ordered those that were still living in the plaza to return to their homes or 
find another place to relocate to. 223 As the rebuilding of private property began, there was 
also an increased demand to rent because rental contracts became beneficial for tenants 
who were willing to repair damaged buildings.224 Once the Duke and his family moved 
back to their palace, tribunals resumed their activities because the royal administrators were 
able to meet in the rooms vacated by the viceregal family in the Plaza Mayor.  
The city hall was another building of important symbolic power for the colonial 
administration, and it required major repairs. The Viceroy wanted to find alternative 
sources for reconstructing this building in order to reduce the cost the royal treasury would 
223Mendiburu, Diccionario Histórico – Biográfico del Perú, vol. 8, 103; Account of the City Council, f. 18 
v.  
 
224 Archivo Arzobispal de Lima (hereafter AAL), Santa Clara, XIX:6. On February 13, 1688, the abbess 
requested license from the Vicario General to rent some houses that were damaged by the quake because 
“there were some people that want to purchase (in censo) some of them [the houses]” covering their 
repairs. 
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 have to cover. Various construction masters appraised the costs of clearing the debris and 
repairing the city hall and provided quotes that ascended to 40,000 pesos.225 Unfortunately, 
the city council had no funds to pay for the reconstruction of its headquarters.  
This institution had long faced serious economic troubles. Before the quake, at the 
beginning of his administration, the Duke discovered the council’s longstanding debt and 
that it often resorted to taking loans from the Caja de Indios, a treasury established 
exclusively for native subjects in the viceroyalty.226 The debt this administrative body had 
accrued reached 42,000 pesos. The Duke realized that the cabildo could hardly pay back 
such debt if its treasury remained in a negative balance. Therefore, he channeled new 
income sources to the city council, which was able to increase its budget 
by 8,000 pesos. With the Duke’s reforms, the city council managed a surplus, which was 
sufficient to repay the Caja de Indios.  
Unfortunately, the earthquake brought down the Duke’s recovery plan for the city 
council’s treasury. In addition to its headquarters, the cabildo suffered material losses 
225 Account of the City Council, f. 19, 22, 27 v., 32. 
 
226 Pérez Mallaína, Retrato de una Ciudad en Crisis, 206, defines the Caja de Censos de Indios as a fund 
derived  from a tribute on Indian labor. The money collected was invested in censos whose revenue would 
benefit the same Indians. 
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 amounting to 36,000 pesos on its propios (municipal properties).227 Facing the unexpected 
costs of repairing all these properties, the counselors asked the Viceroy to grant them some 
lands in Callao, Carabayllo and Chuquitanta as propios.228  
The counselors argued that these common land (ejidos) included pastures that the 
city had possessed since its foundation, or they had plots never assigned previously to any 
institution or individual. Therefore, no third party would be affected if the Viceroy acceded 
to their request.229 In order to push forward their request, the members of the cabildo 
appointed commissioners to assess the amount of income these properties could generate 
according to the quantity of land, houses, and wood available. 230 
227 Moore, The Cabildo in Peru under the Hapsburgs, 155, explains that the propios were rights and 
properties that the king or his representative conceded to the city council as a corporation to cover its 
maintenance and functioning.  
 
228 Memorial del Cabildo de Lima al Virrey Duque de la Palata, Mayo, 23, 1688. AGI, Lima, 87. 
 
229 Ibid.  
 
230 Actas del Cabildo de la Ciudad de Lima, f. 158 – 158v. 
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Image 10: Location of lands requested as propios by the city council231  
The Viceroy saw this initiative of the counselors as beneficial to the royal treasury, 
the city council, and the population. In a letter to the King, he justified his decision to grant 
the city council’s petition. He explained that the royal treasury would not have to directly 
cover the repairs of the city council’s properties; the city council could rebuild its properties 
and repay its multiple debts with the rental proceeds. Lima’s residents would benefit from 
the new tenants’ livestock or agricultural production.232  
231 Map made by the author. 
232 Letter from the Viceroy to the King, June 20, 1688. AGI, Lima 87, the Viceroy requested from the King 
a final confirmation of this grant. There was a pending sentence from 1664 that conferred part of those 
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 The poor condition of the royal treasury motivated the Viceroy to implement such 
measures. The city council not only assisted with the implementation, but also with the 
development of projects to provide funding. Local authorities, whose lives and interests 
were rooted in their own cities, were probably more prone to cooperate with the 
administrators of the central government when it benefitted the city. 233 As long as they 
perceived the administration of the viceroy as fair and “conveniente”, they supported his 
measures and projects.  
The members of the city council also responded positively to the Duke’s order to 
promptly rebuild the city jail. In a letter to the council, the Viceroy urged its members to 
quickly tend to the jail because the order and security of the city depended on securely 
guarding prisoners. The counselors assigned the proceeds from the 
penalties imposed on the suppliers of fat and beef to the jail reconstruction.234 In other 
lands as royal property. During the auction of the lands, Don Pedro Garcia Vaquero appealed the process 
arguing that it involved litigious properties. For that reason, the Duke requested the King to confirm the 
concession of those lands. 
 
233 Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England, 16, argues that the success or failure of office 
holders depended on their responses to diverse demands. 
 
234 Actas del Cabildo de Lima, f. 178 – 179. 
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 words, social order was funded by disorder: the city jail was rebuilt with the the fines 
charged to meat and tallow suppliers for distributing poor quality products, construction 
workers who demanded excessive salaries, and the sellers of overpriced construction 
materials.235  
The rapid negotiations to restore the rent from the alhóndiga, or granary, also 
display the council’s interest in restoring its sources of income. The earthquake had 
drastically damaged the building of this granary, which belonged to the city. Because of 
the excessive cost of rebuilding, tenant Don Juan de Soto, knight of the order of Alcántara, 
requested permission from the council to relinquish the leasing contract (called a censo) he 
held. He also paid 400 pesos as compensation for prematurely ending the contract. The 
counselors decided to accept de Soto’s request in order to lease the granary to a new tenant 
who might be willing to cover the reconstruction of the property.236 
Therefore, the city council was not an administrative body that blindly obeyed the 
viceroy’s orders. Its members actively contributed to both develop and implement 
measures and plans of reconstruction. As the next chapters will reveal, this distinguished 
235 Ibid, f. 170v – 173v. 
 
236 Ibid., f. 163v-166v. 
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 them from royal officers of the Real Audiencia, the Tribunal de Cuentas, and other 
administrative branches. City counselors worked from the start of the reconstruction 
process along the Viceroy.  
Conclusion 
The Spanish colonial administration’s capacity for crisis management was both 
effective and pre-modern. The Viceroy, as representative of the king, fulfilled his 
responsibilities in a commendable manner. Amidst the widespread chaos and destruction 
of Lima, he was a tenacious figure that brought comfort to the dispossessed population of 
city. Even though his capacities were not exceptional, he displayed remarkable leadership 
and organizational faculties. He adopted diverse measures to effectively deal with the 
growing demands of the city. Along with other royal officers, he pioneered an effective 
response to the disaster. 
Providing for people’s material needs and the reconstruction of the city’s buildings 
was an enormous undertaking that surpassed the capabilities of any one individual. The 
Viceroy played a leading role; yet, the large scope of his plans was possible through the 
active participation of the members of the city council. Rather than retiring to their homes 
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 to rest from the earthquake’s fury, the counselors gathered with the Viceroy to design the 
various measures to manage the crisis faced by the city.  
Altogether, the royal administrators developed different strategies to respond to the 
crisis in the short and long term. The new conditions of the city, such as the dispersion of 
people throughout the city, limited the distribution of food, medical assistance, and control 
of social order. Nonetheless, the administration of the city was able to reorganize its 
activities in order to increase the supervision of food provision and the number of officials 
in charge of controlling order in the city.  
The poor condition of the royal treasury created severe limitations on potential 
reconstruction projects. The royal officers chose the least expensive alternatives, such as 
the reconstruction of the new one-story viceregal palace. The Viceroy and counselors also 
developed new strategies to increase the number of funding sources, such as fines on food 
distributors and construction laborers. The city council also negotiated with the Viceroy 
new usufruct rights over its holdings to increase its budget. The Viceroy agreed because he 
understood that this institution needed the income and would relieve the burden on the 
royal treasury.  
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 It is evident that the Viceroy implemented diverse measures to tend the different 
needs of Lima’s residents after the earthquake. When the Viceroy awarded the city council 
the land in Callao, Carabayllo and Chuquitanta, he conceded the grant hoping it would 
provide the necessary means for the cabildo to both cover its expenses and repay its debt 
to the Caja de Indios. At the same time, the royal treasury would benefit from this measure 
because the council would not request additional assistance from the overloaded treasury 
after receiving the new grant. When the counselors imposed penalties on rogue food 
suppliers, their pursuit targeted a triple goal: punish the offenders, compensating 
consumers, and provide the economic means to build the city jail.   
Overall, the colonial administration of Lima was able to cope with the crisis context 
that the Earthquake of 1687 produced. Royal officers adapted to the critical circumstances 
and dealt with the new configurations of dwellings, shortage of food, and predictable scams 
that some residents attempted to pull off during the chaos. With rapid organization and 
effective measures, the royal administrators were able to manage the effects of the 
earthquake. Far from incompetent, the measures of the Duke and the city council 
demonstrated a creative capacity to tend to people’s basic needs and initiate the 
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 reconstruction of the city. Decisions were carefully crafted to provide what was most 
“conveniente” or balanced for each sector of the colonial society.  
During the months following the quake, the reconstruction of the city involved not 
only royal agents but also other people in positions of leadership. Nonetheless, not all of 
them were as enthusiastic about participating in the rebuilding activities as were the 
Viceroy and city council. Even though the Church was an important component of the 
colonial enterprise, its complexity became evident in the aftermath of the earthquake. The 
secular clergy, unlike the religious orders in the city, resisted the reconstruction projects of 
the colonial administrators. 
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IV. CHAPTER 3: A SEEMINGLY STRONG SURFACE: INTERNAL 
DIVISIONS AND INTRICACIES OF THE COLONIAL CHURCH 
Even when both secular and regular clergymen shared common spiritual objectives 
and functions, the constitution of both religious branches in the New World and their 
relationship to the crown influenced their temporal and spiritual activities.  The earthquake 
unveiled the intricate nature of the Church’s constitution, functions, and interests, which 
were not always oriented to serve the needs of the spiritual herd of Lima.  
The composition of the colonial church resulted from a contradictory and parallel 
process of development of both the secular and the regular clergy in the New World. After 
the conquest, the Pope granted the Spanish kings a series of cumulative rights in exchange 
of evangelizing the lands recently discovered.  In 1501, he conceded to the Spanish royalty 
the tithes collected in the Indies. In 1508, the monarchs obtained the right to present the 
candidates for ecclesiastical posts in the New World to the Pope. In 1543, the Pontiff gave 
 132 
 the Spanish kings permission to establish ecclesiastical jurisdictions.237 Because of these 
rights, which constituted what was called “Royal Patronage,” the Spanish crown built a 
large ecclesiastical structure of various new jurisdictions within the newly conquered lands. 
In contrast to the royal rights that shaped the secular clergy in Spanish America, 
the papal bull Omnímoda of 1522 granted broader privileges to the religious orders. It 
specifically conceded to them the ability to administer sacraments and gave them 
jurisdiction over canon law, which secular clergy traditionally exercised, in areas with no 
diocesan presence.238 In the following decades, regular clerics began to arrive in the New 
World in great numbers, and took a leading position in the evangelization of indigenous 
people, and the foundation of churches and convents. Even though the bull granted such 
rights only in case of absence of the secular clergy, friars resisted giving up these 
prerogatives, claiming they possessed superior capacity and morality to tend to the 
237 Lyle McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World: 1492 – 1700 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1984), 194, 195; Eric Deeds, “Church History, Institutions and Archives,” Guide to Documentary Sources 
for Andean Studies, 1530 – 1900, edited by Joanne Pillsbury, vol. 1(Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 2008), 164; Moore, The Cabildo in Peru under the Hapsburgs, 209. 
238 Mark Burkholder, Spaniards in the Colonial Empire: Creoles vs. Peninsulars? (Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2013), 29.   
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 Indians’ spiritual needs.239 The clashes between the secular and the regular clergies 
would vex the crown’s attempts to impose strong control on the church’s activities.  
The regular clergy developed a strong presence in the viceroyalty’s interior 
provinces, where Indians represented a large percentage of the population. Nonetheless, 
as capital of the viceroyalty, Lima concentrated an extensive religious population, both 
female and male, who occupied the low and high-ranking positions in the various clerical 
hierarchies. The Cathedral, the archbishopric palace, and other principal convents and 
monasteries of the religious orders made Lima a concretely religious city. 
There were sixty-five religious buildings in the city by the time the quake hit Lima, 
as mentioned in chapter 2. Located in front of the Plaza Mayor, a few steps from the 
viceregal palace, the Cathedral and the adjacent archbishopric palace reflected the close 
ties between the crown’s government and the secular church. There were also the parishes 
of San Sebastian, Santa Ana, San Marcelo, and De los Huerfanos (The Orphans).240  The 
largest religious orders of San Agustín, Santo Domingo, San Francisco, La Merced, and 
Compañía de Jesús had built twenty convents. These regular clerics also took care of two 
239 Lyle McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World, 195, 196; Burkholder, Spaniards in the Colonial 
Empire, 30. 
240 Doering & Lohmann, Lima, 95, states that San Lazaro parish existed since 1626, yet it was out of the 
limits of the city, in the San Lazaro neighborhood.  
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 hospices, eleven hospitals, an orphanage, and a lay seclusion house. They also administered 
the chapels of the university, the Inquisition, three schools, and other chapels in the city. 
There were sixteen institutions for females: eleven of them were monasteries of nuns, such 
as Santa Clara and Concepción, and 5 beatarios (lay spiritual houses).241 
As representative of the Spanish Crown’s right of Royal Patronage, the Viceroy 
attempted to extend some of his pre-earthquake reforms to the Church. Upon his arrival in 
Lima, one of his first priorities was to limit the excesses that some priests committed, 
specifically against the Indians. The Viceroy issued a viceregal decree on February 20, 
1684, that entrusted royal officers to inform ecclesiastical superiors of any misdeeds by 
priests and friars. His measures to bring the religious under control produced a strong and 
widespread reaction from members in all levels of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, who 
understood the decree as a threat to their ecclesiastical immunity.242  The numerous 
convents and the religious presence in Lima gave an outward appearance of unity and 
strength.  Despite the unified image both the secular and regular clergies portrayed 
241 Account of the City Council, by Diego Fernández Montaño, f. 1v. 
 
242 Margaret Ellen Crahan, “Clerical Immunity in the Viceroyalty of Peru,” 102 – 103. 
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 defending its ecclesiastical privileges, their performances during the earthquake’s 
aftermath contrasted.  
Both private and official accounts report that the religious building structures 
suffered great destruction with the quakes of October 20, 1687.243 These records help us 
reconstruct the response, in the short- and long-term, by the city’s religious hierarchies. 
Even though most of them are official records, they were produced by different institutions, 
both civil and religious, and offer diverse perspectives and interpretations about similar 
events or practices. Contrasting these varied documents, it is possible to obtain a reliable 
account of the performance of both branches of the Spanish church. 
After the quake hit Lima, both secular and regular clergy suffered destruction of 
their properties. Some of their members died, while the survivors endured precarious living 
conditions. On one hand, religious orders rapidly engaged in diverse activities of spiritual 
relief, and organized to rebuild their estates and reactivate the revenue of their rents. On 
the other hand, the secular clergy hesitated to fulfill their spiritual activities until building 
a temporal chapel appropriate for their functions, and refused to economically support the 
243 Account of the City Council, f. 9 v; Relación del Ejemplar Castigo que envió Dios a la ciudad de Lima 
con los espantosos temblores de 20 de octubre de 1687. BNM, VE – 1461/1. 
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 reconstruction of religious property arguing this task corresponded to the king, as patron 
of the Church in the New World. 
The contrasting performance of both clergies influenced the perception of the royal 
authorities, who received collaboration from the religious orders in organizing repentance 
activities, while secular ministers became stubborn opponents to the government’s 
reconstruction projects. Secular prelates’ refusal to economically support the rebuilding of 
the Cathedral required negotiation, legal arguments, and the final intervention of the Pope. 
Even when the viceroy was unable to bargain with the members of the ecclesiastical 
council, he had the legal mechanisms to compel them to obey the orders of the royal 
government. 
Spiritual Relief: Where Was the Archbishop? 
After the first tremor hit the capital that terrible night, those who were able to escape 
from their homes fled to the various churches throughout the city, seeking refuge and 
spiritual relief. Since early modern people considered natural disasters, and especially 
earthquakes, as manifestation of God’s wrath, the ordinary reaction when catastrophic 
experiences occurred was to look desperately for spiritual comfort.244 They believed that 
244Palacios Roa, Alfredo. “La Sensibilidad religiosa frente a las catástrofes naturales (1563 – 1730)” in 
Historia de la Iglesia en Chile: En los caminos de la conquista espiritual, vol. 1 edited by Rodrigo Moreno 
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 natural disasters were warnings or punishment of an angry God for multiple sins. Limeños 
thus expected the clerics to provide spiritual assistance to the bereaved souls, receiving and 
absolving their sins. Further, they attributed catastrophe to divine power and believed they 
could do little themselves to alter the course of events except in the spiritual realm.245 They 
offered public demonstration of repentance for their sins and attended processions, public 
sermons, and masses that were accompanied with laments, cries, and self-inflicted 
punishments.246 In Lima, some of these exercises of repentance became so extreme that the 
Jeria, directed by Marcial Sánchez Gaete, coordinated by Marco León León (Santiago: Editorial 
Universitaria, 2009), 345-367. 
245 According to Jussi Hanska, Strategies of Sanity and Survival. Religious Responses to Natural Disasters 
in the Middle Ages, Studia Fennica Historica 2 (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2002), 128, in pre – 
modern times, natural disasters were explained not only by God’s wrath, but also scientifically. 
Nonetheless, even the latter included elements of God’s intervention.  
 
246 This conception about natural hazards was evident in several interpretations made by the contemporaries 
in which natural disasters were only merciful warnings of God who was going to send his final punishment 
to his disobedient children. Visions and premonitions of God’s ultimate sentence were made public during 
the reconstruction period. They were mainly use to regulate the moral of the population; yet they also 
served to question the conduct and legitimacy of the authorities. Charles Walker, “Great Balls of Fire. 
Premonitions and the Destruction of Lima, 1746,” Aftershocks: Earthquakes and Popular Politics in Latin 
America, edited by Jürgen Buchenau and Lyman L. Johnson (Albuquerque: University of New México 
Press, 2009): 18 – 42; Valenzuela, Jaime. “El Terremoto de 1647: Experiencia apocalíptica y 
representaciones religiosas en Santiago Colonial”. Historias Urbanas. Homenaje a Armando de Ramón, 
edited by Jaime Valenzuela (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 2007): 27 – 65.  
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 authorities prohibited the excessive performances in order to avoid the death of the 
penitents.247  
Regular clerics took a leading role in these spiritual activities, bringing both 
comfort and admonition to Lima’s residents. As soon as the first great quake ended, clerics 
such as Fray Joseph Buendía and Fray Pedro Medina left convents and other religious 
institutions where they lived in order to assist the hapless souls who were dying or looking 
for confession to relieve their conscience.248 Some religious ministers began to preach in 
the streets, and others went to minister in the churches. 249   
Those who sought protection at the temples had made a mistake. Two hours later, 
with the second tremor, almost all the churches that remained standing collapsed, burying 
alive the religious and lay people that were inside. A contemporary witness recalled that 
the soil “shook and shook in a way that it was the vivid representation of the Final 
Judgment.”250 A tower of Santo Domingo’s church and the upper part of the choir area 
247 Account of the City Council, by Diego Fernández Montaño, f. 5v. 
248 Buendía, Relación del temblor que arruinó a Lima el 20 de octubre de 1687, 24; Alexandre Coello de la 
Rosa, “La Destrucción de Ninive: Temblores, Políticas de Santidad y la Compañía de Jesús (1687 – 1692),” 
Boletín Americanista, LVIII, 58 (2008), 154. 
 
249 Luis Sifuentes de la Cruz, “Lima y los desastres sísmicos de 1687 y 1746”, Demiurgo, 2 (2004), 111. 
 
250 Relación del Temblor que sucedió en Lima lunes 20 de octubre de 1687, BNM, MS. 18760/36, f. 53 v. 
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 collapsed on the main aisle, killing those that had conglomerated inside looking for 
confession.251 San Francisco church’s dome and cross suffered great ruin, Nuestra Señora 
de las Mercedes temple’s structure fell to the ground, and San Agustin church’s main 
chapel and cruise collapsed.252 The extensive devastation of religious buildings 
accentuated the people’s concern because it reinforced their belief that the tremors were 
truly the result of God’s wrath.253 During the hours and days following the earthquake, 
Lima’s people paid close attention to the sermons and engaged in processions, contrition 
displays, and other demonstrations of devotion as people cried out for divine mercy.254  
 
251 Buendía, “Relación  del temblor que arruino a Lima el 20 de octubre de 1687,” 27. 
 
252 Ibid, 28,  the church of San Juan de Dios’ cruise and tower also collapsed, and many nave vaults of the 
cathedral suffered equal damage. 
 
253Ivan del Valle y Caviedes, Romance en que se Procura pintar, y no se consigue; la Violencia de dos 
terremotos, con que el Poder de Dios asolo esta Ciudad de Lima, Emporeo de las Indias Occidentales, y la 
mas rica del Mundo. BNM, VE 1478 – 4, provides a description of the churches, and convents that 
collapsed over people and served them as tombs.  
 
254 Alfredo Palacios Roa. “La Sensibilidad religiosa frente a las catástrofes naturales (1563 – 1730),” 347 – 
67; Charles Walker, “Great Balls of Fire. Premonitions and the Destruction of Lima, 1746,” Aftershocks, 18 
– 42; and Jaime Valenzuela, “El Terremoto de 1647: Experiencia apocalíptica y representaciones religiosas 
en Santiago Colonial”. Historias Urbanas, states that in pre –modern societies people understood natural 
hazards as merciful warnings of God to his disobedient children. 
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 The religious orders of La Merced, San Agustín, and Santo Domingo rapidly built 
provisional chapels on the Plaza Mayor from their own funds in order to continue 
officiating their daily religious services, confessing and absolving the many persons that 
arrived in quest of spiritual relief.255 At the same time, they diligently worked to repair 
their main churches, which were completely destroyed in the quake.  
The members of the ecclesiastical council also erected a provisional chapel in the 
Plaza Mayor, yet not as fast as the regular religious. More than one month after the quake, 
the prelates were still discussing the details about the new temporary chapel. They voted 
to assign 1000 pesos to build a place “to put the silver shrine with all the decoration of the 
best jewels of the church,” so they could “comply in it with the obligation of the divine 
offices, and assist to these the gentlemen of the council so it would appear a more decent 
place.”256 The meeting records of this institution reflect that the construction of the 
provisional chapel was more a temporal than an spiritual concern for the prelates. They 
planned a chapel that would represent their social prestige, and permit them  “to comply 
255 Account of the City Council, f. 11; Relación del Ejemplar Castigo. 
 
256 Actas del Cabildo Eclesiástico de Lima, Archivo Catedralicio de Lima (hereafter ACL), November 22, 
1687, f. 206v-207, “se ponga el [altar] de plata con todo el adorno nuestro de las mejores al[h]ajas de la 
iglesia (…) [y] se pueda cumplir en ella [la capilla] con la obligación de los oficios divinos y asistir a ellos 
los señores del cabildo por parecer lugar mas desente…” 
 141 
                                                     
 with its […] obligations.”257 These sources also remain silent about prelates’ concern about 
providing spiritual relief to the population. The members of the ecclesiastical council 
appear to have been mainly focused on building a chapel that would visually represent their 
social standing.  
Despite the prelates’ efforts to build a decent place, they had to conform with a less 
sumptuous chapel because the cost of the structure they envisioned reached 6000 pesos. 
Because of the limited budget they assigned for the provisional chapel, the prelates had to 
resume their obligations in a hut without walls, closing three sides with damask and velvet 
hangings to give some decency to the place.258 
While the members of the city council concentrated efforts on improving the 
appearance of their chapel, and the friars from different religious orders focused on both 
spiritual and temporal activities, the Archbishop was absent. When the earthquake hit, 
Archbishop Don Melchor de Liñán y Cisneros was in Callao. On the recommendation of 
257 Ibid, 208, in the meeting of the ecclesiastical council regarding the construction of the provisional 
chapel, there are no references to the spiritual assistance to Lima’s people. The prelates, many of whose 
names were recorded by the notary, describe the necessity of the chapel to comply with obligation and 
show the decency, through the exposition of jewels, of the council. 
 
258 Ibid, 209v. 
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 his physician, he had moved to the port to recover from choking attacks.259 He was sleeping 
when the first quake hit, and the roof of the bedroom collapsed on top of him. Fortunately, 
his steward Francisco de Jauregui and other servants were able to rescue him from the 
wreckage. The worst came a few hours later when a tsunami hit the port and flooded the 
entire town. The Archbishop narrowly escaped from the water’s power. A witness 
described his clothes as damp when four slaves carried him on their shoulders to take him 
from the port.  After his return to Lima, he retreated to a rural estate in Late, located two 
leagues from Lima.260 His absence became evident during the days of major spiritual 
commotion.  
259 Memorial of the merits of Dr. Don Melchor de Liñán y Cisneros, Archbishop of the Iglesia 
Metropolitana of Lima, n. d. AGI, Lima, 520, f. 2. 
260 Relación del Ejemplar Castigo. 
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Image 11: Location of Late.261 
Because of the Archbishop’s absence, the Viceroy himself became a central figure 
even in activities of religious character. Among his first instructions in religious matters, 
he ordered that the most venerable images in the city, the Virgins of Rosario, Merced, and 
Guía, be brought to the temporal chapels built in the Plaza Mayor by the religious orders. 
Three days after the quake, the Duke and his entire family even accompanied the Virgin of 
the Rosario as the image was carried at the Plaza Mayor from the church of Santo Domingo 
261 Map made by the author. 
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 in a procession.262 The Viceroy took special interest in bringing the Virgin of Tears (de la 
Lágrimas) and renaming it as the Virgen of Warning (Anuncio) because this image had 
miraculously started to cry a few months before the quake. The Duke designated October 
20 as the day of this image’s feast as a gesture of thanksgiving for forewarning the city 
from the punishment of Jesus Christ.263  
After the quake, limeños participated in diverse demonstrations of contrition along 
with the Duke, who even appeared with a rope around his neck as symbol of contrition in 
one of many processions he attended.264 Regular clergy collaborated in the penitent 
activities in the city, delivering sermons with messages of exhortation. The best preachers 
of the religious orders went to the streets to persuade Lima’s inhabitants to repent.265 The 
secular clergy, on the other hand, only tended to some chapels built by individuals around 
the city, without taking leading roles in the spiritual activities of the population. 
262 Relación del Temblor que sucedió en Lima lunes 20 de octubre de 1687. BNM, MS. 18760/36; Relación 
del Ejemplar Castigo que envió Dios. 
 
263Mendiburu, Diccionario Histórico – Biográfico del Perú, vol. 8, 109; Melchor de Navarra y Rocafull, 
“Memoria de Gobierno,” 115. 
 
264 Relación del Ejemplar Castigo que envió Dios. 
 
265 Alexandre Coello de la Rosa, “La Destrucción de Ninive: Temblores, Políticas de Santidad y la 
Compañía de Jesús (1687 – 1692),” 153. 
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 Different from Liñán y Cisneros, the Viceroy was present in processions and other 
religious activities that aimed to placate divine wrath. His performance contrasted with the 
nonappearance of the Archbishop in the following weeks after the quake. Contemporaries 
noticed that “he [the archbishop] was unable to return to this city, although he came injured 
and wounded to entrust his obligations to the general vicar.”266 The Viceroy emphasized, 
although with certain sarcasm, that it was not the Archbishop’s fault that “God intended to 
take away his health and energies” in a moment when his presence was indispensable 
among his spiritual flock.267 Certainly, Liñán y Cisneros had no control of the events that 
limited his active participation in the penitent activities that the whole population engaged 
in. Yet, his frail health did not preclude his defiance, along with the members of the 
ecclesiastical council, of the royal government’s rebuilding projects.   
 Temporal Obligations: Rebuilding the House of God 
According to contemporary witnesses, the earthquake inflicted the most damage on 
ecclesiastical properties. Almost all religious buildings, except the chapel of the Sagrario, 
266 Relación del Ejemplar Castigo. 
 
267 Letter from the Duke of the Palata to the King, December 8, 1987. BNM, MS.9375. 
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 located next to the Cathedral, had collapsed, killing many nuns and friars.268 The provincial 
head of Santo Domingo declared that, under his instructions, the clerics of his order 
recovered forty-two bodies from under the debris of their convent, which he considered 
just a fraction of the dead.269 The support to the religious population’s need and the 
reconstruction of their cloistered buildings required the attention of the highest colonial 
authorities, especially those of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. The evidence shows that the 
regular and diocesan clergy confronted the destruction of the earthquake differently. The 
distinct relationship between the religious orders and the secular clergy produced different 
perspectives regarding management of resources and spiritual functions. 
Most of the churches, convents, and monasteries of the city had interrupted the 
regular religious services in their chapels. Instead, friars and priests attended the 
provisional chapels people had erected in the various settlements they constructed after the 
268 Relación del Ejemplar Castigo que envió Dios a la ciudad de Lima, refers San Francisco Church’s dome 
and cruise suffered great ruin; Nuestra Señora de las Mercedes Church’s building fell to the ground; San 
Agustin Church’s cruise and main chapel collapsed; and San Juan de Dios Church also suffered on its 
cruise and tower. Many nave vaults of the Cathedral suffered equal disaster. 
 
269 Account of the City Council, f. 11.  
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 quake. Only at the Colegio de San Pablo, where Fray Buendía and Fray Medina were at 
the time of the first tremor, did Jesuits continue celebrating masses in the chapel.270  
 
Image 12: Map of principal religious buildings in Lima. 1. Plaza Mayor, 2. 
Cathedral, 3. Archbishop’s Palace, 4. Santo Domingo, 5. San Agustín, 6. La Merced, 7. 
San Francisco, 8. San Pablo School, 9. Concepción Monastery, 10. Inquisition, 11. 
University, 12. Trinitarian Convent, 13. Mercedes Church, 14. Santa Clara Convent, 15. 
Santa Ana Church, 16. Prado Monastery, 17. Santa Catalina Convent, 18. Guadalupe 
Church, 19. Huérfanos Church, 20. San Juan de Dios, 21. San Marcelo Church, and 22. 
San Sebastian Church.271 
270 Ibid, f. 5v. 
 
271 Map made by the author using Rolando Arciga. Plano de Lima donde se ve la ubicación de las puertas 
que tenía la muralla. 
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 Because of the destruction of their monasteries and convents, friars and nuns 
abandoned their seclusion to take refuge in open spaces. They had to compete with other 
residents for available spaces in the city and surrounding areas. Members of the female 
orders were among those who displayed the worst dispossession, and their presence 
underlined the social disorder and chaos in the city. The destruction of the Convent of La 
Purísima Concepción left dispossessed 310 nuns of “black veil,” many other nuns of “white 
veil,” servants, and lay women; the total surpassed 1500.272 The lack of a place to support 
this human contingent required that 162 black-veiled nuns from La Concepción be moved 
to the spacious garden of the Convent of Santa Catalina. These elite nuns escaped from 
their convent when it collapsed with the quake. Once at Santa Catalina’s yard, they found 
the same scenario of destruction. When inspecting the city, the notary of the city council, 
Diego Fernandez de Montaño, noticed a big hole in the wall of the convent that prevented 
the seclusion of these women, who became exposed to the threats of nature and the perils 
of secular life. 
The conditions of living outdoors took a toll on the dispossessed religious 
population. The arrival of the 162 nuns of velo negro from La Concepción Monastery, who 
272 Buendía, “Relación  del temblor que arruino a Lima el 20 de octubre de 1687,” 29.  
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 probably were accompanied by servants, to the yards of Santa Catalina monastery had also 
increased the pressures on resources available at the latter location. There were 300 women, 
among them nuns of white veil, secular women, donadas, and servants from Santa 
Catalina’s monastery living in the yards. The large number of newcomers accentuated the 
lack of food resources. According to the abbess, the nuns were dying of hunger. The abbess 
of the Monastery of Nuestra Señora del Prado described a similar scenery because the nuns 
of her monastery were exposed to inclement weather, without more protection than the one 
provided by the huts they built among the trees. The worst plight was that of the sisters of 
Santísima Trinidad, who abandoned their completely devastated monastery and moved to 
some corralones next to the church of Guadalupe. During the five months they remained 
there, so many of them died as a result of inclement weather that the Inquisitors, patrons 
of their monastery, opted to transfer them to some wood huts in a more adequate place.273 
The hardships of these religious women were not exclusive. Surely most of the 
population faced them. Yet, the presence of these women, customarily hidden by the high 
walls of convents, evidenced the social disorder that reigned in the city after the earthquake. 
These casualties probably concerned authorities that had long tried to limit the number of 
273 Ibid, f. 3v-8. Lay sisters of Santa Rosa de Viterbo and Santa Rosa de María had to settle in a barnyard 
and a dump, respectively. 
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 women in religious institutions. Yet, women increasingly preferred the life of seclusion 
because it offered refuge, virtue protections, and social promotion to some of them.274 
Similar to their female counterparts, male religious orders abandoned their convents and 
became exposed to material adversity. The earthquake, thus, unveiled the increasing 
economic difficulties of a portion of the city’s population who mainly lived from rents and 
other pious activities rather than other productive occupations.275  
 Although most of the ecclesiastical population was living in dire circumstances, 
there were also rapid improvements. The provincial of Santo Domingo, Fray Ignacio del 
Campo, led in person the reconstruction activities in the convent of this religious order. He 
ordered the destruction of all two-story structures and the church’s tower to avoid further 
collapses. He also rapidly initiated the repair and reinforcement of cloisters and other 
offices in the first story or ground level. In a few weeks, he was able to relocate most of 
the friars in these cells, which reduced the pressure on available resources and space. He 
also sent some clerics to convents and doctrines (missionary outposts) in the provinces to 
274 Nancy Van Deusen, Entre los sagrado y lo mundano. La práctica institucional y cultural del 
recogimiento en la Lima virreinal (Lima: Instituto Francés de Estudios Andinos, 2007), 219.  
 
275 Pérez Mallaína, Retrato de una Ciudad en Crisis, 313 -314; and Walker, Shaky Colonialism, 108, for 
impact of nuns and friars’ presence among secular population after the quake of 1746.  
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 decrease the number of clerics in the convent of Lima. 276 Because of theses advancements, 
the city authorities praised how fast the Dominicans were repairing their convent and 
church. 
The possession of extensive rural and urban estates, including monasteries or 
missions throughout the viceroyalty, offered religious orders alternatives, such as other 
sources of income or places to relocate members, to initiate recovery activities.277 For 
instance, Monastery of La Encarnación spent 20,707 pesos repairing the building 
structure of the convent and many other of the order’s properties around the city, 
including houses and stores.278  Even though this amount represented one quarter of the 
total income the monastery received in two years, the administrator’s account 
demonstrated that there was a surplus of 3,600 pesos in those years.279 Because the 
276 Ibid, 18v, 23.  
 
277 John Elliot, Empires of the Atlantic World. Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2006), 203. 
 
278 AAL, Encarnación, 16, f. 11-13. 
 
279 Ibíd, f. 26. The total income of the monastery between September 1687 and August 1689 was of 88,655 
pesos 3 reales. The expenses were 85,007 pesos. There was a positive balance of 3,648 pesos 3 reales.  
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 monastery had these resources available, it was able to rebuild and repair most of its 
urban real-estate in a couple of years.  
The proactive response of various religious orders and institutions during the 
following days, weeks, and months after the quake contrasted with the activity of the 
secular clergy. Royal administrators noticed that secular clergy were recalcitrant and 
reluctant to initiate repairs. Rather than supporting the reconstruction activities and 
spiritual services in the city, the secular clergy hardly cooperated with the colonial 
government at all.  
 Negotiating with Stubborn Prelates 
Like most of the religious buildings in the city, the Cathedral of Lima was 
extensively destroyed. The Viceroy’s apparent success of initiating the reconstruction of 
public buildings was challenged by the highest members of the secular clergy when he tried 
to organize the rebuilding of the Cathedral. The diverse means he proposed to raise funds 
for the rebuilding activities met the strong opposition of the ecclesiastical council. The long 
debates that placed the Viceroy in opposition with the Archbishop and the ecclesiastical 
council illustrates the mechanisms royal authorities employed in order to reach a 
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 compromise with the highest members of the secular clergy, and how both parties 
interpreted law and practices to support their demands. 
The Cathedral was so seriously damaged that construction masters had calculated 
reconstruction costs at 60,000 pesos. 280 The Viceroy recognized that the civil population 
of Lima, overburdened with the expenses of reconstructing their own properties, was 
unable to provide financial aid. He also knew that the royal treasury was in a terrible 
condition and could not afford the rebuilding of all the constructions that needed repairs. 
Estimates for rebuilding the more than fifty Indian village churches affected by the quake 
reached 200,000 pesos. Conscious of the importance and conspicuousness of rebuilding 
the cathedral, the Duke expected to receive financial support from the ecclesiastical 
council’s members, who would be the main beneficiaries. 
The Viceroy was confident that the ecclesiastical council’s members would accept 
his proposal to share the expenses of the Cathedral’s reconstruction as well as the method 
he proposed. Since the total project was estimated at 60,000 pesos, he offered to contribute 
with 20,000 pesos from the royal treasury to initiate the project. He expected the prelates 
to contribute the remaining amount of 40,000 pesos from the building and maintenance 
280 Ibid, 16. 
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 fund (fábrica) of the cathedral, and from individual donations from each of them. 
Nonetheless, he was greatly shocked by the reluctance of the Archbishop and the prelates 
to contribute.  
The colonial administration commissioned the magistrate (oidor) Don Juan 
Gonzales de Santiago to act as fiscal in order to inquire about the conditions of the 
cathedral’s fábrica. Gonzales requested that the steward of the fábrica funds, Don Gabriel 
of Sumiano, declare the rents and amounts available from this enterprise. Sumiano 
explained that this fund was divided into interior and exterior accounts. The exterior fábrica 
account comprised the funds to finance expenses related to the cathedral’s structure, such 
as carpentry, masonry, and similar services.281 The interior fábrica was used for the 
ornaments, music, salaries of some ministers, and some goods used for celebrations and 
masses, such as candles, wax, wine, bread, and oil.  
Sumiano also indicated that, during the four years he had exercised the stewardship 
of the interior fábrica, this fund provided 10,000 pesos yearly, even though many rents 
281 Testimony of Gabriel of Sumiano, steward of the metropolitan church, January 13, 1688. Autos que 
tratan de las diligencias hechas con el Venerable Dean y Cavildo desta Santa Iglesia de Lima para que entre 
en parte en la reedificación, Lima, May 31 1688. AGI, Lima 87. The Indian tributaries used to pay one 
tomin to fund these costs up to a few years before the quake, when a judicial order decreed its termination. 
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 were quite behind in payments.282 He calculated that debts to the church amounted to 
approximately 100,000 pesos, from which 60,000 were impossible to collect.283 He tried 
to emphasize the poor condition of the interior fábrica, indicating that he even had to 
reimburse the previous steward, Capitan Miguel de Medrano, 12,301 pesos that he had 
provided to cover expenses for masses during the time of his stewardship. Sumiano finally 
stated that it was not the obligation of the interior but of the exterior fábrica to finance the 
reconstruction of the cathedral.  
Rather than convincing fiscal Gonzales de Santiago of the poor state of the finances 
of the building fund, Sumiano’s declaration only ignited more questioning from the fiscal, 
who saw the division of the fábrica between interior and exterior funds to be an evasive 
pretext. Fiscal Gonzales demanded that the judge of the Real Acuerdo, an assembly 
appointed to serve as advisers of the viceroy, compel Sumiano to show the fábrica books 
282 Ibid. He specified that the noveno y medio, the casa excusada, and small censos provided, in theory, the 
funds to the interior fábrica, but most of them were behind on payments. Recopilación de las Leyes de los 
Reynos de Indias edited by Ignacio Boix (Madrid: 1841), 100, defines the novena y medio as one and a half 
ninths of a half of the tithes; and the casa escusada as the richest house in the parish, whose tithes went to 
the fabrica of the cathedral. 
 
283 Testimony of Gabriel of Sumiano, January 13, 1688. Autos que tratan de las diligencias hechas con el 
Venerable Dean y Cavildo. He indicated despite various diligences there were big debtors, such as the 
Maestre de Campo Don Fernando de Castro, who owed around 20,000 pesos.  
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 from his present administration and that of his predecessor Medrano.284 He was interested 
in knowing how the ecclesiastical council had disbursed 10,000 pesos each year, when 
other parochial churches, such as those of Callao, Santa Ana, San Marcelo, San Sebastian, 
and El Sagrario, had annually spent only 200 pesos each.285 He did not know that the 
interior fábrica was paying the salaries of sacristans and other posts that theoretically 
should have paid through other sources.286  
The steward Sumiano resisted showing the books, alleging that the church’s 
accountant had his predecessor’s records, and his own book had information about church’s 
matters that could not be exposed. In the face of this refusal, the fiscal tried to review the 
documents that were in possession of the accountant Juan Esteban de la Parra. The fiscal’s 
284 Herbert Ingram Priestley, José of Gálvez. Visitador General of New Spain (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1916), 59, 61, the Real Acuerdo was the meeting of the members of the Real Audiencia as 
body of consult to the viceroy gathered in special and grave circumstances. The Real Audiencia did not 
meet and function as a court in various months after the quake, yet continued providing advice to the king, 
and judging on very sensitive matters. 
 
285 Petition of the Fiscal, March 21 1688. Autos que tratan de las diligencias hechas con el Venerable Dean 
y Cavildo. 
 
286 Letter from the Duke of the Palata to his Majesty, December 8, 1687. AGI, Lima, 87, explain such 
salaries should have been paid from the gruesa, the total of the tithes, and not from the fábrica fund. 
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 attempts were unsuccessful because Parra continually declined to show the account records 
citing as pretext the infirmities of his age287 
 Doctors of canon law Don Melchor de la Nava and  Don Gregorio de Loayza, as 
representatives of the ecclesiastical council, along with the Archbishop (despite the 
enormous pain he was experiencing after almost dying during the quake) gathered with the 
members of the ecclesiastical chapter to discuss the reconstruction of the cathedral.288 They 
agreed that the only source they had on hand to rebuild the cathedral was the mercy of the 
king, as patron of the church, because the quake had greatly reduced their incomes from 
tithes in various parts of the episcopal jurisdiction.289 They defended their position arguing 
that, because of the Spanish king’s prerogative of royal patronage, the monarch was 
required to cover the entire cost of rebuilding the Cathedral.290 They enumerated previous 
287Memorial of Gabriel de Sumiano, January 29, 1688; and Petition of the Fiscal, March 21 1688. Autos 
que tratan de las diligencias hechas con el Venerable Dean y Cavildo.  
 
288 Actas del Cabildo Eclesiástico, ACL, f. 216v. On April 1, 1688, the members of the council named De 
la Nava and Loayza as Deputies to attend the negotiations regarding the cathedral’s reconstruction with the 
viceroy.  
 
289 Memorial of the Venerable Dean and Council. Autos que tratan de las diligencias hechas con el 
Venerable Dean y Cavildo. 
 
290Actas del Cabildo Eclesiástico, ACL, f. 210 
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 occasions in which the royal administration had contributed to reconstruction activities in 
conformity with royal patronage. On these occasions, they claimed, the royal treasury took 
care of all expenses without demanding any contribution from the prelates.291  
Facing stubborn resistance from the clerics, the Viceroy replied to their requests 
founding his argument on the Recopilacion de Leyes de Indias.292 He explained that 
according to one of laws in this corpus of royal legislation, the royal treasury must 
contribute with a third of the total cost of the construction of a new church. He argued that 
because of the extraordinary circumstances and the necessity of rebuilding the cathedral, 
the royal treasury would contribute only 20,000 pesos once the prelates secured the 
remaining 40,000 pesos. The Duke additionally offered two alternatives to obtain the 
needed funds. First, he suggested the reduction of expenses of the interior fábrica because 
10,000 pesos of expenses each year were excessive and unnecessary. He recommended 
reducing expenses to 5,000 pesos, and using the rest of the funds for reconstruction works. 
Second, he suggested that the prelates offer individual donations and surrender for a few 
291 Petition of the Fiscal, March 21, 1688. Autos que tratan de las diligencias hechas con el Venerable Dean 
y Cavildo. 
 
292Letter of the Viceroy Duke of Palata to the Dean and Ecclesiastical Council, April 6, 1688. Autos que 
tratan de las diligencias hechas con el Venerable Dean y Cavildo. The Viceroy specifically refered to the 
Ley 5, Titulo 2, Libro 1. 
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 years the salaries from vacant Church positions that they distributed among themselves to 
supplement to their own. In case the prelates were still unwilling to confirm their 
contribution of the 40,000 pesos, the Viceroy would then take the issue to the king.293  
The ecclesiastical council responded that notifying the king and waiting for his 
resolution would only increase the expenses of the reconstruction because another quake, 
even less severe than the previous one, could shatter the cathedral and increase the repair 
costs. They also rejected the Viceroy’s interpretation of the law in the Recopilación, stating 
that it was applicable only in case of new foundations. Even if the law made reference to 
repairs in case of expansion, the council argued that these were the product of human 
initiative while the cathedral’s condition was the product of divine intervention.  
Confronted with this legal impasse, the prelates offered a solution derived from 
local practice and custom, which were “the best interpreter of the laws.”294 They argued 
that previous viceroys had assigned financial support to the cathedral without informing 
the king in the first place. They considered any consultation with the monarch unnecessary 
because of the extraordinary circumstances the city. The renowned Catholic zeal of the 
293 Ibid. 
 
294 Response of the Cabildo to the Viceroy’s letter, April 22, 1688. Autos que tratan de las diligencias 
hechas con el Venerable Dean y Cavildo. 
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 king, who would not permit the cathedral to remain in disrepair, was enough justification 
to approve an immediate decision from the Viceroy. They again stated that the gobierno 
superior had supplied the repairs of the cathedral from the royal treasury at all times. In 
1596, the royal administrators assigned 12,000 pesos to the cathedral’s fábrica. In 1602, 
the government increased such amount to 18,000 pesos, which remained the allotted 
amount until 1626. The prelates also mentioned that the royal treasury assumed all 
expenses of repairing the cathedral after the earthquakes of 1655 and 1678.295 In addition 
to these practices, the religious ministers indicated that a royal decree of 1649 had 
instructed to Viceroy Conde de Salvatierra and the Archbishop Don Pedro de Villagómez 
to finish the construction of the cathedral’s tower and portals. They concluded that if the 
295 Lavalle, Juan Antonio de, Domingo de Vivero, and Evaristo San Cristóbal. Galería de Retratos de los 
Gobernadores y Virreyes del Perú (1532-1824) (Lima: Librería Clásica y Científica, 1891), n.p. The first of 
these earthquakes was in January 5th 1655, during the government of the Viceroy Conde de Alva de Liste 
(1655-1661); Baltazar de la Cueva, “Relación General que el Excelentísimo  Señor Conde de Castellar, 
Marques de Malagón, Gentil Hombre de la Cámara de su Majestad, de su Consejo, Cámara y Junta de 
Guerra de Indias, virrey, Governador y Capitán General que fué de estos reinos, hace del tiempo que los 
gobernó, estado en que los dejó, y lo obrado en las materias principals con toda distinction,” in Memorias 
de los Virreyes que han gobernado el Perú durante el tiempo del coloniaje español edited by Manuel 
Atanasio Fuentes (Lima: Librería Central de Felipe Bailly, 1859), 192. The second quake was on June 17, 
1678, during the administration of the Count of Castellar. 
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 king had financed aesthetic works during those times, he would be willing to cover the 
necessary repairs the cathedral required.296  
The ecclesiastical council’s members concluded that they had no obligation to 
contribute to the rebuilding of the cathedral and that the Recopilación was not applicable 
because the royal decree of 1649 had endorsed the customary practice of the royal treasury, 
showing that the Spanish monarch voluntarily wanted to take care of such expenses. They 
also supported their argument with other legislation compiled in the Recopilación.297 Such 
laws stipulated that one-third of the cost of the construction works of a church should be 
funded by the royal treasure and another third should come from the encomenderos of the 
archdiocese’s jurisdiction. With this argument, which combined practice and law, they 
concluded that the royal treasury was required to contribute two-thirds, or 40,000 pesos, of 
the total reconstruction costs.298 
296 Memorial of the Venerable Dean and Council; and Petition of the Fiscal, March 21 1688. Autos que 
tratan de las diligencias hechas con el Venerable Dean y Cavildo. The fiscal clarifies that the first royal 
concession was issued in 1598, to support the repairs the Cathedral needed after the earthquake of 1586. 
 
297 Memorial of the Venerable Dean and Council. Autos que tratan de las diligencias hechas con el 
Venerable Dean y Cavildo. indicates these laws were Leyes 2 and 3, Titulo 2, Libro 1. 
  
298Ibid, indicates that Leyes 2, 3, and 5, Titulo 2, Libro 1, stipulated the Indians should afford the remaining 
third of the cost. 
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 The ecclesiastical council and the Archbishop also argued against each of the 
Viceroy’s suggestions for financing the rebuilding works. First, they argued that reducing 
the expenses of the interior fábrica from 10,000 to 5,000 pesos each year would decrease 
the decency of the mass celebration. They imagined the demoralizing effect it would have 
if the cathedral’s interior looked the same as a poor parish. They suggested that the 
government should reinstitute a moribund tribute levied on natives because it was the “most 
natural” source of funds since the king originally instituted it.299 They also suggested that 
the espolios (estates of deceased prelates) of former Archbishop Don Pedro de Villagoméz, 
presently used for the assistance to convalescent priests and other pious works, should be 
appropriated.300 The prelates were not concerned that Indians, sick priests, and other needy 
individuals might suffer with the measures they proposed. They just wanted to erect the 
cathedral to its former grandeur and comply with their obligation of officiating the divine 
services. Nonetheless, even this was not important enough to deserve a sacrifice from their 
own funds. 
299 Ibid, the prelates were referring to the fee of one tomín (one real or one-eight of a peso) that Indian 
tributaries paid. Nonetheless, according to the Recopilación de Indias, Ley 7, Título 4, Libro 1, King Phillip 
IV instituted this fee in 1626 to provide funds for hospitals that would attend natives. 
 
300 Memorial of the Venerable Dean and Council, April 21, 1688. Autos que tratan de las diligencias hechas 
con el Venerable Dean y Cavildo. 
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  What is more, both the Archbishop and the members of the ecclesiastical council 
refused to give individual donations from their personal income. The prelates declared that 
the Archbishop was already burdened assisting the large number of poor people produced 
by the quake, that he was left with no funds to rebuild his own palace. The ecclesiastical 
counselors excused themselves arguing that the salaries they received were insufficient to 
afford the excessive cost of living in the city, and the assistance to their relatives and the 
poor. Even with the additional income they received from the vacant salaries, which they 
distributed by law and custom among the current prelates, they suffered the same 
“afflictions as the other needy persons in the city.’301 The dean argued that the condition 
of the ecclesiastical council’s treasury was defficient because the tithes in the archdiocese 
had fallen in after the earthquake.302 Thus, the prelates finally resorted to asking the 
Viceroy to collaborate with the rebuilding of the cathedral from his personal fortune.  
In order to initiate the rebuilding works of the cathedral, the Real Acuerdo ordered 
measures to obtain financial resources, taking into account the suggestions of the 
ecclesiastical council. They agreed to disburse from the royal treasury the 20,000 pesos 
301 Ibid. 
 
302 Actas del Cabildo Eclesiástico, ACL, f.  236, 236 v. 
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 belonging to the crown. They also accepted the plan to reinstitute the Indian tributaries’ 
payment of the tomín, and assigned 3 percent of the encomiendas’ rents that were not 
financing churches in their jurisdictions.303  
Facing the prelates’ refusal to contribute from their own incomes, the Duke decided 
to elevate the resolution of the matter to the King. He requested from steward Don Gabriel 
of Sumiano a report on the basic salary each of the prelates received.304 The steward’s 
report showed the quantities that each prelate received for the period of five years, from 
1683 to 1688. The archbishop had an annual income that exceeded 32,000 pesos.305  This 
salary alone would cover half of the repairs the cathedral needed. The dean received more 
than 6,000 pesos; the dignitaries over 5,000 pesos; the canons surpassed 4,000 pesos; other 
prelates received 2,000 and 1,000 pesos.306 In all of these amounts, the members of the 
303 Auto of the Real Acuerdo, May 6, 1688. Autos que tratan de las diligencias hechas con el Venerable 
Dean y Cavildo. 
 
304 Letter of the Viceroy to the King, Lima, May 31, 1688. AGI, Lima 87. 
 
305 Navarra y Rocafull, “Memoria de Gobierno,” 19, 20, refers the archbishop’s income exceeded the 
amount of 40,000 pesos. 
 
306 Certification of the annual income of the Archbishop, Dignities, Canons, Prebendaries, and Half-
Prebendaries, made by Don Gabriel Somiano, May 31, 1688. AGI, LIMA 87, did not include the amount 
the archbishop received from vacant salaries. 
 165 
                                                     
 ecclesiastical council received almost 60 percent more than their regular income because 
they distributed the salaries of unoccupied posts among themselves. Nonetheless, they felt 
they were as afflicted as the rest of the population and unable to offer personal 
contributions. 
On his report to the King, the Viceroy suggested that the crown seek a bull from 
the pope for the use of the ecclesiastical council’s vacant salaries towards the 
reconstruction of the Cathedral.  He proposed that the concession should be extended for a 
period of at least twenty years or in perpetuity because “earthquakes were ordinary” in the 
viceroyalty.307 If the Pope agreed to award those funds in perpetuity, they should provide 
enough reserves for another natural disaster. The Council of Indies accepted the suggestion 
and requested the use of the vacant posts’ funds from the Vatican. The Pope Innocent XI 
awarded to the royal administration the use for six years of the salaries of two vacant posts, 
which represented 36,000 pesos.308  
307  Letter of the Duke of Palata to the King, May 31, 1688. AGI, Lima, 87. The viceroy used this 
opportunity to suggest the King that the tercias vacantes, the third part of the vacant salaries, which the 
bishops received in addition to their regular congrua, should be dedicated to for the repair and ornament of 
provincial church, which were constantly claiming assistance for repairs.  
 
308 Letter of the Marquis of Copolludo to the King, Rome, January 23, 1689. AGI, Lima 87. The Pope also 
granted a forth part of the following post that would become vacant.  
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 By the time the bull authorizing the use of the vacant salaries in the reconstruction 
of the cathedral arrived in Lima, the Duke of Palata had already ceded power to the next 
viceroy, Count of Monclova. Nonetheless, his negotiations with the ecclesiastical council 
and the efforts by fiscal were noteworthy because they provided enough information to 
support his request to the King. If it is true that his success was only partial because he did 
not obtain the concession to secure funds for twenty years or in perpetuity, he was 
ultimately able to reduce the obligations of the royal treasury and compel the prelates to 
contribute to the reconstruction of the cathedral. 
The members of the ecclesiastical council finally had to financially support the 
rebuilding works in the cathedral. The expenses of the repairs surpassed the 60,000 pesos 
that were initially calculated, and the prelates had to provide additional funds from their 
own budgets in order to continue the construction project.309 Sources offer no information 
about the implementation of the fees the Royal Acuerdo had agreed to extend to Indians 
and encomenderos, yet they do corroborate that the salary of the vacant post were finally 
used to rebuild the cathedral.  
309 Actas del Cabildo Eclesiástico, ACL, f. 105. The archbishop provided 2,000 pesos, and all members of 
the ecclesiastical council 5,000. 
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 The prelates were so affected by the reduction of their income and the need to 
provide personal donations for the rebuilding works that they requested the King not repeat 
the measure. They argued that the vacant posts offered them a necessary supplement to 
their regular income because they were overburdened assisting their families and the poor. 
At the same time, they had the responsibility of living “with the decency that the post [of 
dignitaries] required” in a city that “was head of the kingdom.”310 In other words, they 
deemed their salaries inadequate to fulfill their charitable activities and live according to 
the standards of their positions.   
 The Head against the Body 
Despite the image of unity the ecclesiastical council and the Archbishop showed 
during the discussion about how to rebuild the cathedral, the highest echelons of the secular 
church’s hierarchy were far from homogeneous. Even though on some occasions they 
seemed to pursue similar interests--as when they resisted financially supporting the 
reconstruction of their church or when they repelled the Viceroy’s attempt against the 
ecclesiastical immunity--the Archbishop and members of the ecclesiastical community 
were far from a cohesive body. They certainly shared similar perceptions about the royal 
310 Ibid, f. 105v. 
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 government and its duties towards the church, yet the ecclesiastical council was a group 
with similar interests that usually intervened to moderate the archbishop’s antipathy 
towards the viceroy.311  
 
Image 13: Archbishop Don Melchor de Liñán y Cisneros312 
 During the weeks following the earthquake, the Archbishop became mainly 
concerned with the rebuilding of his palace, located in the same block as the cathedral. 
311 Crahan, “Clerical Immunity in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1684-1692.” Examining the viceroy’s attempts 
to limit the priests’ mistreatment of Indians through his decree of February 21, 1684, the author 
demonstrates how the council mediated a rapprochement between the viceroy and the archbishop. 
 
312 Lavalle, Vivero, and San Cristóbal. Galería de Retratos de los Gobernadores y Virreyes del Perú, n.p. 
 169 
                                                     
 When he refused to contribute to the reconstruction of the cathedral, he had declared he 
was willing to halt the reconstruction of his palace in order to financially assist the poor. 
Nonetheless, he diligently sought the initiation of the repairs of his residence. He sent his 
steward, Don Francisco de Jauregui, to request funds from the ecclesiastical council to the 
cover of the repairs of the archbishopric palace. The Archbishop claimed that he had 
already spent 20,000 pesos on his palace by the time he established residence in it, and an 
additional amount after the previous Earthquake of 1678.313  
Confronted with this demand, the members of the council protested the 
Archbishop’s actions. The Dean Don Luis José Merlo de la Fuente responded that the 
Archbishop’s request was contradictory because, as head of the Church, the Archbishop 
was the highest judge in the ecclesiastical court and could not be a petitioner at the same 
time. Merlo also emphasized that the archbishop had only complied with his duties when 
repairing his own palace. Additionally, he indicated that the treasury of the archbishopric 
and the ecclesiastical council were depleted because the earthquake had considerably 
reduced the tithes of the archdiocese. He argued that the Archbishop should pay for the 
reparations of his residence, as other prelates had traditionally done. Thus, the dean 
313 Actas del Cabildo Eclesiástico, ACL, f.  235. 
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 concluded that the church’s treasury required relief and assistance rather than more 
burdens. Merlo also enumerated some of the measures taken by the ecclesiastical council 
to reduce the cathedral’s expenses such as reducing the salary of the singers, and the 
amount of wax used commonly for the Virgen of the Candelaria festivity. The ecclesiastical 
council recommended that the Archbishop proceed similarly by tightening his belt and 
making reductions to his own budget.314 
In the following meetings of the ecclesiastical council, the dean openly criticized 
the Archbishop. He stated that it was a “monstrosity that the head [the archbishop] proceed 
against its members [the ecclesiastical council].”315 Despite these initial conflicts between 
the archbishop and the council, the repairs to the archbishopric palace began after a year 
and a half of negotiation.316 Liñán y Cisneros persisted in demanding his return to the 
palace so he could remain close to the cathedral, administer regular religious functions, and 
314Ibid, f. 236, 236 v. The archbishopric’s treasury had already disbursed 20,000 pesos to cover the repairs 
of the ecclesiastical palace. This amount includes 14,000 spent to make some repairs before the archbishop 
moved into the palace and 6,000 expended to fix some damages produced in this property by the 
earthquake. 
 
315Ibid, f. 239 v, “es monstruosidad que la cabeza proceda contra sus miembros.” 
 
316Memoria de los gastos que se ban haciendo en la obra del Palacio Arçobispal por Pedro de Guadalupe, 
January 7, 1690. ACL, Cuentas de Fabrica, Carpeta 14.  
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 maintain the government of religious matters.  The prelates finally agreed to sell the 
principal of some censos in order to obtain the 10,000 pesos necessary for the 
reconstruction of the archbishop’s palace.317Nonetheless, this amount was exhausted in a 
few months. The Archbishop had to request one more time that the ecclesiastical council 
impose in censo any principal it had in its power in order to to obtain the money to finance 
the remaining repairs in his palace.318  
When the Archbishop offered to give up his personal belongings to the poor rather 
than use them to finance the reconstruction of his palace, he was apparently attempting to 
avoid contributing financially in the cathedral’s rebuilding. The reconstruction of the 
archbishop’s palace was his main goal because he decided to demand that the ecclesiastical 
council provide funds for its reconstruction, without considering the economic condition 
of the council and the financial acrobatics its members would have to perform in order to 
obtain the needed resources.  
Conclusion 
317 Actas del Cabildo Eclesiástico, ACL, f. 74v.  
 
318 Ibid, f. 110. 
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 The evidence in this chapter shows that regular and the secular clergies had 
different reactions and interests at stake, and as a result performed differently in the 
aftermath of the earthquake. The religious orders diligently organized and participated in 
different activities of spiritual relief and exhortation. They also had an active role financing 
and organizing the reconstruction of their properties, which were among the most affected 
in the city. 
Some of the religious orders also joined the Viceroy in the penitence activities he 
organized and led. The Viceroy played a central role in these demonstrations of repentance. 
He took advantage of the absence of the Archbishop to appear as the leading figure of the 
reconstruction of Lima. The Archbishop was so weak after almost dying in the quake and 
tsunami that he was unable to participate in the construction activities of limeños, yet he 
was not sick enough to participate in the negotiations over the cathedral’s reconstruction. 
The actions of the Archbishop were incompatible with the role most religious and civil 
people expected him to play. It was evident that he was more concerned with preserving 
his personal interests than performing his duties as head of the colonial church. 
The members of ecclesiastical council were as stubborn as the Archbishop in 
refusing to cede part of their personal incomes for the reconstruction of their church. They 
 173 
 elaborated a counter-argument to the Viceroy’s use of a law in the Recopilación de Indias, 
and used written law to ratify a customary practice, where law merely ratified customary 
practice that would alleviate some of the burdens on their finances. Throughout the long 
debate regarding the reconstruction of the cathedral, they constantly emphasized the 
obligation of the Spanish monarch, as regal patron, to pay for the whole rebuilding of the 
church. Nonetheless, it is evident that their final objective was to keep the additional funds 
they received as salaries from the vacant posts. 
Even though they were a solid and unanimous faction when opposing the financial 
demands of the Viceroy, the conflicts between the Archbishop and the ecclesiastical 
council demonstrate the internal fractures of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Both the 
Archbishop and members of the ecclesiastical chapter fought against providing money 
from their own fortunes for the cathedral’s reconstruction. For this reason, the Archbishop 
tried to get the cathedral’s building fund to pay for the reconstruction of his palace, and he, 
along with the members of the council, tried to evade the obligation to rebuild and pass it 
on to the royal treasury. Temporal interests were apparently more important than the 
spiritual ones for most of the distinguished prelates in Lima. 
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 In the end, the colonial administration was able to overcome the obstinacy of the 
prelates and obtain the funds to rebuild the cathedral. Despite the lack of cooperation from 
high-ranking members of the secular church, most religious men and women contributed 
to the reconstruction of the city, willingly or unwillingly. Religious and administrative 
buildings were greatly damaged by the earthquake but these were not the only ones to 
suffer damage. Most of the properties affected housed ordinary inhabitants of the city, even 
many were owned by church clergy.  Therefore, the reconstruction of the city would require 
the extensive participation of ordinary people. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. CHAPTER 4: FROM THE BOTTOM UP: RECONSTRUCTING LIMA 
AFTER THE 1687 EARTHQUAKE 
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 In the wake of the 1687, Lima’s royal agents prioritized the reconstruction of 
administrative and religious buildings. In spite of the poor condition of the royal treasury 
and the secular clergy’s reluctance to collaborate with the repair project, colonial 
administrators successfully initiated a reconstruction project for Lima’s main buildings. 
But royal authorities were not the only ones working to rebuild the fallen city.  Lima’s 
residents– far from being passive observers-- participated actively in the reconstruction 
tasks. Through negotiation in both official and unofficial spheres, they recreated, 
reinforced, and legitimated the creative, contractual nature of the early modern state. 
Contrary to modern states, in which mandates tend to be given from a centralized 
locus of government, the Spanish empire instead featured multiple sites of authority and 
contention.319  The initiatives and practices the Spanish crown introduced in the New 
World developed into a collective set of values among its colonial subjects, who 
319 Alan Knight, “Weapons and Arches in the Mexican Revolutionary Landscape,” Everyday Forms of 
State Formation, 24-66; William Roseberry, “Hegemony and the Language of Contention,” Everyday 
Forms of State Formation, 355-366; Miguel Angel Centeno and Agustin E. Ferraro, State and Nation 
Making in Latin America and Spain: Republics of the Possible (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2013).  
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 reproduced colonial culture through specific practices that legitimated metropolitan 
authority. 320  
This chapter demonstrates that ordinary residents adapted and indeed recreated 
the Spanish colonial legal system through reconstruction initiatives. The examination of 
formal contracts and informal agreements shows the Spanish colonial regime penetrated 
the everyday lives of colonial subjects. Consciously or not, when subjects adopted 
colonial legal practices, they legitimized or confirmed the authority of the colonial 
government.  
They were not merely performers of these forms of rule, but also innovators, 
adapting them according to their needs and the circumstances of the city. Documentation 
produced inside and outside the courtroom reveals limeños’ use and adoption of the 
Spanish practices and rules around contract-making, and how important contracts were to 
their reconstruction efforts and everyday activities. Lima’s post-disaster contracts reveal 
how the city’s diverse population resorted to legal contracting, official negotiation, and 
unofficial agreements in order to rebuild their properties. These contracts, both official 
and extra-official, also show how people understood and applied ordinary precepts and 
320 Michael Foucault, “Govermentality,” 87 - 104; Corrigan and Sayer, The Great Arch, 4, 9; Braddick, 
State Formation in Early Modern England, 9. 
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 practices of the Spanish legal system in an unexpected and extraordinary post-disaster 
context. 
Even though the 1687 earthquake interrupted most of the daily political, social, 
cultural and economic activities, the authority of the Spanish colonial administration 
in Lima remained virtually unopposed. In fact, through their reconstruction initiatives, 
Lima’s inhabitants reinforced the authority of the Spanish administration.  
The participation of people of different social status and their use of state institutions, 
rituals, and rules were essential components of an ongoing process of configuring and 
legitimizing the colonial project.321 
Renters and Owners 
With the daylight that broke hours after the quake, residents recognized the 
magnitude of the destruction. Convents, monasteries, and churches were most damaged. 
Governmental buildings, too, required repairs or even complete reconstruction.322 Not 
321 Bianca Premo, Children of the Father King. Youth, Authority and Legal Minority in Colonial Lima 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 44. Tamar Herzog, Upholding Justice: 
society, state, and the penal system in Quito (1650-1750) (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004), 
9. 
 
322 Manuel de Mendiburu. Diccionario Histórico – Biográfico del Perú, vol. 8, 102; Account of the City 
Council, by Diego Fernández Montaño, 9v. Many religious men and women died in their cloisters, under 
the debris of the building structures. Only the Chapel of El Sagrario remained standing, although nobody 
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 even homes and commercial spaces were spared. Proprietors had the onerous task of 
covering the high cost of repairs. The Viceroy reported that while most private residences 
remained standing, they were drastically affected and required extensive repairs.323 
In the weeks and months following the destructive event, government activities 
increased. Royal authorities supervised food distribution, implemented social control 
measures, and planned reconstruction projects.  They decreed price controls on building 
supplies and construction wages.324 Recognizing that residents would face high repair 
costs, the Viceroy attempted to regulate those products to safeguard the interests of 
private parties, both corporations and individuals. Nevertheless, constructions costs were 
not the only problems private interests faced. 
dared to enter inside. Judith Mansilla, “Poder y prestigio social en las cofradías de españoles, siglos XVII y 
XVIII,” in Corporaciones religiosas y Evangelización en Ibero – América. Siglos XVI – XVII,  edited by 
Diego Lévano and Kelly Montoya(Lima, Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, 2001), 114 – 116. 
The Cathedral, and the archbishop’s palace, and the City Hall were greatly damaged. The viceregal palace 
was completely shattered that royal administrators decided to rebuild it completely. Both royal and the 
religious authorities of the Lima had to confront with the onerous reconstructions of their headquarters, 
rebuilding tasks that were not exempted of difficulties. 
 
323 Letter of the Duque of Palata to the King, Lima, December 8, 1987. BNM, MS 9375. 
 
324Actas del Cabildo de Lima, f. 161 v, 170 v, 173. 
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 The destruction of buildings halted the colonial economy since so many of these 
structures provided rents to owners or other beneficiaries. In the destruction of any given 
residential space, owners saw a reduction in income: occupants either refused to pay rent 
for the damaged quarters or even abandoned these spaces. For proprietors relying heavily 
on rent proceeds, raising money to pay for reconstruction became a real challenge. In 
order to resolve the conflicts resulting from these conditions, people in Lima made 
various types of contracts. These demonstrate the extent to which the Spanish legal 
system penetrated various levels of colonial society. 
The Spanish colonial legal system had an extensive bureaucracy and overlapping 
jurisdictions that operated cohesively during the earthquake’s aftermath.325 The broad 
destruction of the city put this bureaucratic machinery in Lima into motion. In the months 
after the quake, high-level officials such as cabildo members, the Viceroy, judges, and 
325 It is not the purpose of this dissertation to discuss the extension and complexity of the Spanish legal 
system, but to show that this machinery offered Lima’s royal officers and population the means to rebuild 
the city and the political system. Treatments of the legal system abound. See, for example, Tamar Herzog, 
Upholding Justice; Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures. Legal Regimes in World History, 1400 – 
1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 33-45; John Leddy Phelan, “Authority and 
Flexibility in the Spanish Imperial Bureaucracy,” Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 5, No.1 (Jun., 
1960), 47-65; Víctor Gayol, Laberintos de justicia: Procuradores, escribanos, y oficiales de la Real 
Audiencia de México (1750-1812), Vol. I (Zamora: El Colegio de Michoacán, 2007), illustrate the 
complexity of the Spanish legal system. 
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 notaries also came to assist in the reconstruction effort.  The resulting legal transactions 
left diverse documentation showing how limeños sought the intervention of these colonial 
authorities in order to settle conflicts, validate agreements, and tend to other specific 
needs. 
A large part of Lima’s residents paid for the spaces they used for housing and 
working, even if they owned such places. Many of the properties in Lima had different 
economic burdens such as liens (censos)  and future religious obligations placed on 
property  (capellanía).326 Censos were the most frequent economic impositions on real 
estate. They were disguised forms of money loans secured against real estate. The 
censatario (censo borrower)  had to annually pay a small percentage of the principal to 
the censualista (loan lender).327 A capellanía was a perpetual bequest instituted when 
326 Alfonso Quiroz, “Reassessing the Role of Credit in Late Colonial Peru: Censos, Escrituras, and 
Imposiciones,” Hispanic American Historical Review 74, 2 (May, 1994), 196, defines censos as one of the 
main sources of credit in the colonial period.  They were a type of mortgage loans that looked as sale or 
lease contracts of properties. The owners received monetary advancements from a person or institution that 
had currency at hand, and secured such loans with their real state properties. For more information about 
census refer to Javier Augusto Espinoza Ríos, “Las Finanzas el Fervor. Las Prácticas económicas en el 
Monasterio de Santa Clara de Lima, 1621-1682” (MA Thesis, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 
2012). 
 
327 Censos were not a single mechanism of economic obligation. Quiroz, “Reassessing the Role of Credit in 
Late Colonial Peru,” 197, states that there were three common types of censos: enfitéutico, reservativo, and 
consignativo. The first of them was a kind of loan-lease where the borrower or censatario paid some réditos 
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 landowners commanded their heirs to pay for religious services to save their souls.328 
Together, censos and capellanías represented a heavy toll on tenants and property owners 
whose economic capacity became limited after the earthquake’s assault. 
The principal censualistas were religious institutions including monasteries and 
convents. Religious corporations were the largest real estate holders and had access to 
currency from the laity’s various bequests.329  They rented real estate properties or 
advanced cash through censo contracts.  In both cases, they received a fixed annuity 
(interests or annuity) to the borrower or censualista.  Because it could last a lifetime, the censo enfitéutico 
was also known as perpetuo or irredimible. The second type, the censo reservativo, was a loan-sale contract 
that specified a fixed rent to the lender or censatario.  The last one, the consignativo was more specifically a 
loan that the debtor could redeem. In the meantime, he must pay to the lender some interests or réditos. 
Because of its repayable nature, this kind of censo was also known as al quitar or redimibles. 
 
328 Gisela Von Wobeser, “La Función Social y Económica de las Capellanías de Misas en la Nueva España 
del siglo XVIII,” Cofradías, Capellanías y Obras Pías en la América Colonial, edited by Pilar Martínez 
López-Cano, Gisela Von Wobeser, and Juan Guillermo Muñóz, 119-138 (Mexico: Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México, 1998).  
 
329 Elliot, Empires of the Atlantic World. Britain and Spain in America, 202, states the Church owed 
massive extensions of properties.  The various branches of the church possessed around 47 percent of urban 
property in Mexico City by the end of the colonial period. In Peru, during the seventeenth century, the 
church was the major proprietor and credit supplier. 
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 secured on real estate. Censos were profitable and secure investments of capital, for that 
reason they became common in the colonial economy.330  
Confraternities were another important group among the beneficiaries of censos 
because they had access to both property and specie. These religious brotherhoods 
gathered laypeople together to venerate Christ, the Virgin, and other saints. Although 
religious in their objectives, the confraternities also played an economic role in the 
community, thanks to cash gathered from alms, donations, and membership fees.331  
330 Asunción Lavrin, “El Capital Eclesiástico y Las Elites Sociales en Nueva España a fines del XVIII,” 
Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 1, N° 1 (Winter, 1985), 2. 
331 Inmaculada, Arias de Saavedra, Miguel Luis López, and Guadalupe Muñoz, “Las cofradías y su 
dimensión social en la España del Antiguo Régimen,” Cuadernos de Historia Moderna, 25, (2000): 189–
232, argue that state confraternities gave their members a social space in which to establish bonds of 
friendship, comradeship and even kinship. For more information about the various activities confraternities 
developed see Diego Lévano, “Organización y Funcionalidad de las Cofradías Urbanas. Limas siglo 
XVIII,” Revista del Archivo general de la Nación, 22 (2001): 77-118; Guillermo Lohmann Villena, “La 
Ilustre Hermandad de Nuestra Señora de Aranzazu de Lima,” in Los vascos y América. Ideas, hechos, 
hombres. Actas de las Jornadas sobre el comercio vasco con América en el siglo XVIII, y la Real 
Compañía Guipuzcoana de Caracas en el II Centenario de Carlos III, 203-213.  Madrid: Fundación Banco 
de Bilbao y Vizcaya, 1990; Jesús Paniagua, “Cofradías Limeñas: San Eloy y la Misericordia (1597-1733),” 
Anuario de Estudios Americanos, LII-1 (1995): 13-35. Albert, Meyers, “Religious Brotherhoods in Latin 
America,” Manipulating the Saints: Religious Brotherhoods and Social Integration in Postcolonial Latin 
America edited by Albert Meyer and Diane Hopkins, 1-21 (Hamburg: Wayasbah, 1988); Joaquín 
Rodríguez, “Las cofradías de Perú en la modernidad y el espíritu de la Contrarreforma”, Anuario de 
Estudios Americanos, LII-2, Sevilla, 1995, 15 – 43; Walter Vega, “Manifestaciones religiosas tempranas: 
cofradías de negros en Lima. S. XVI”, Historia y Cultura, n° 24, Lima, 2001; “Cofradías Limeñas”, en 
Laura Gutiérrez (ed.): Lima en el siglo XVI (Lima: PUCP/ IRA, 2005). 
 183 
                                                     
 The destruction of private buildings affected both censualistas and censatarios, 
many of whom faced repair costs without the means to cover sudden expenses. Although 
some religious institutions had currency to pay for the reconstruction of properties, most 
proprietors-- both corporate bodies and individuals-- lacked the necessary resources.  
Some cases aired before Lima’s courts show that conflicts originated between two or 
more parties when properties lost value because of the extensive damage after the 
earthquake. Many censatarios abandoned the properties and stopped the payments of 
censos’ interests and other rents the properties held. In other cases, censatarios tried to get 
a reduction of the periodical rents, either the principal or the interests, they paid to the 
owners or administrators of the properties they occupied.  
The destruction of building properties in the city not only affected tenants and 
owners, but also capellanes or beneficiaries of capellanías. In exchange for delivering 
masses for the soul of the capellania’s founder and immediate relatives, these priests 
received a fixed rent. Various capellanes saw part of their income reduced because many 
buildings were often burdened with capellanías.332  
332 Capellanías were legacies that have the main objective of maintaining religious services to redeem the 
founder’s soul. Secondarily, they also provided a regular rent or income to the priest in charge of 
celebrating such services, who was commonly a close relative of the founder. 
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 In the two following cases, administrators of damaged properties requested the 
Judge of Legados, Testamentos y Obras Pías to authorize reconstruction projects that 
would economically affect the beneficiaries of capellanías, who had a claim on the 
income from these properties.  A few months after the quake, Don Francisco de Velasco, 
steward of the confraternity of the Santísimo Sacramento and administrator of the 
chaplaincies founded by Juan Domínguez de Esquivel, presented a petition before the 
judge Don Juan de Mansilla. Velasco explained that the properties that provided the rent 
for the capellanías he administered were so greatly damaged that they were 
uninhabitable. He was concerned that, because of the lack of rent, the chaplain might 
discontinue the masses imposed by the pious foundation. The steward requested license 
to lease the properties on censo in order to obtain the funds to cover the repairs. He 
specifically demanded that the chaplain should not receive any rent until the properties 
were restored.333 In this case, both the confraternity, as owner of the properties, and the 
capellán, who benefited from the rents, were directly affected by the damage to those 
estates. The administrator asked that the judge compel the chaplain to share the 
temporary loss of income with the property owner. 
333 AAL, Cofradías, LII: 27, 1688, f. 1v – 3 v. 
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 In a similar case, the administrators of the confraternity of Nuestra Señora de la 
Limpia Concepción, Alonso Pérez Campos and Pedro de Larreta, presented a request 
before the same judge. They indicated that the Licenciado Juan Reales had bestowed on 
the confraternity a house burdened with two capellanías, one for the benefit of Fray 
Joseph Buendía, and the other for Fray Nicolás de la Cerva. The earthquake had inflicted 
so much damage to the property that it became unoccupied, thus ceasing to produce the 
rent that paid the chaplains. They asked permission to repair the house, specifying the 
friars might abstain from receiving any rent during the time of the property 
reconstruction.334 Once both chaplains consented to the petition of the administrators, the 
judge issued the license to proceed with the repairs.335  
The difference in the two cases just discussed is notable. In the first case, the 
administrator had asked the judge to compel the chaplain to accept his reconstruction 
project.  In the second, the judge required the chaplains’ consent. Three administrators 
presented their projects before the judge in order to obtain permission to implement them. 
Yet, unlike Velasco, who showed no interest in knowing the chaplain’s opinion, Perez 
334 AAL, Cofradía, IV: 19, 1688, f. 1. 
 
335 Ibid, f. 6 v. 
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 and Larreta asked the judge to endorse their project in order to present it to the chaplains 
for consideration. It seems Perez and Larreta’s legal move, which demonstrated they 
were willing to negotiate and settle a “conveniente” agreement with the chaplains who 
were most effected by the earthquake, was positive. The repair works began a couple of 
weeks after Larreta and Perez presented their request, and the judge finally confirmed 
their project.   
 Taking Plans to Court 
 The two previous cases illustrate strategies proprietors and administrators used to 
hasten the rebuilding of damaged properties. In the months following the earthquake, 
residents of Lima from diverse social backgrounds came before the judicial forums to 
request permission to implement their own reconstruction plans. Petitioners designed 
their own rebuilding schemes and presented them before judges, who intermediated in the 
process of reaching a final agreement and getting the city up and running again.  
 Negotiation before the courts was expensive and usually a long process, which 
frequently did not result in a final sentence. Yet, if the parties collaborated in the 
negotiation process, they could avoid large expenses and waste of time. Ten months after 
the earthquake destroyed his home, Licenciado Don Juan de Villena proposed before Don 
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 Juan de Mansilla, Juez de Testamentos, Legados y Obras Pías, a series of changes to the 
censo contract on the house where he lived in.336 Villena explained that the house 
belonged to the confraternity of the Limpia Concepción, but he had been granted lifelong 
possession.337 The house was so badly damaged that he had to spend 700 pesos in various 
urgent repairs. In his petition, Villena offered to cover the works the property still needed 
if the administrators of the Limpia Concepción granted him the tenancy in the house for 
“three lives”-- meaning his own and two subsequent generations of his heirs.338 The 
administrators, Alonso Pérez Campos and Pedro de Larreta accepted the offer to avoid 
the time and expenses of a legal suit. They additionally demanded that Villena should 
rebuild the house according to the conditions stated in the original contract, which he 
signed at the time of receiving the house. The tenant would also need to continue paying 
the same annual rent without receiving any reduction, even though he had already spent a 
considerable amount of money in repairs.339  
336 AAL, Series Cofradías, IV: 18, 1688, f. 1. 
337 This was a case of censo enfitéutico where Villena leased the property for ‘una vida’ (his timelife). In 
other words, the current contract will end at the time of his death.  
 
338 With this request, Villena was trying to extend the period of time their descendants would usufruct the 
property. AAL, Cofradías IV: 18, 1688, f. 1v. 
 
339 AAL, Cofradías IV: 18, 1688, f. 4. 
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 The back-and-forth interchange of conditions demonstrates both parties actively 
contributed to shape the final outcome of the process. Even when the administrators were 
willing to negotiate with the tenant, they tried to add to the contract provisions that were 
beneficial for the institution they represented. Villena accepted the extra conditions 
demanded by the administrators only if they agreed to consider his wife’s life and his 
own as a single one because he was already 50 years old. Once the administrators 
consented to Villena’s new petition, judge Mansilla ordered the petitioner to present three 
witnesses that would declare the agreement benefits for both parties.340  The three 
witnesses were Juan Ramírez de Vergara, Pedro de Elzagaza, and Lieutenant Don Alonso 
de los Cameros. They testified that the house that Villena had in possession belonged to 
the confraternity, and ratified that Villena’s proposal was beneficial in that it spared the 
congregation of having to pay for the repairs or forgo annual rent. Two months after 
receiving the petition, Mansilla licensed the confraternity administrators to renew the 
written concession of residence according to the agreed-upon conditions.341 Here, the 
340 With this move, Villena was ensuring their children and grandchildren could continue living in the 
property, benefitting from the repairs and improvement in the house AAL, Cofradía IV: 18 (12f.), 1688, f.  
6v – 7. 
341 AAL, Cofradías IV: 18, 1688, f.  8v- 11. 
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 cooperation of both parties enabled a quick agreement. Likewise, the judge’s assistance 
hastened a judicial process that could otherwise take several month or even years.  
Similar negotiations greatly helped cases of multiple parties affected by the 
destruction of a single property. Agreements circumvented protracted disputes, cut court 
costs, and, in catalyzing reconstruction, avoided additional economic detriment to the 
damaged property. In such occasions, court procedures led to the ratification of the 
parties’ final arrangement and, most important, facilitated resident’s own efforts to share 
the burden of reconstruction.  
Of course, not everyone negotiated cooperatively. In many cases, opponents 
disputed the legitimacy of contracts, citing the extraordinary conditions in which the city 
was living. This occurred in the case of Captain Don Gonzalo Andrés de Meneses against 
the Monasterio de la Concepción. 342 Nine months after the calamity, the captain 
presented a petition before the Licenciado Francisco de Cisnero, Provisor and Vicario 
General of the Archbishopric, requesting a discount in the annual rent he paid to the 
monastery of Concepción for one of its houses, located in the Pescadería Street, which he 
had on lien. Meneses explained that the earthquake had affected both stories of the two-
342 AAL, Cofradías, XXV: 38, 1688, f. 1 
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 level property and some rooms collapsed. He spent 500 pesos to pay the wages of the 
laborers that removed the debris and secured both floors. He asked the judge to appoint a 
construction master who could verify that such works had been made on the property. 
Because of these costs and the additional repairs that the property needed, Meneses 
attempted to obtain a reduction of the rent he paid by the property he occupied. 
The monastery rejected Meneses’ request even though he demonstrated the 
ruinous condition of the property and the large expenses he had already incurred in fixing 
it and would have to incur in the future to prevent further damage in the property. By 
order of the judge, father Fray Diego Maroto of the order of Santo Domingo, maestro 
mayor de fábrica (construction master), visited the property and assessed the expenses of 
the works made in the monastery’s house at 3,572 pesos. This amount represented the 
repairs the property still needed, so they were additional to the 500 pesos that Meneses 
declared he had already spent in some essential repairs.343 The representative of the 
monastery, Don Francisco Gomes de Ortiz, replied that Meneses was responsible for 
“maintaining the property [in good condition] regardless of any tremor” according to the 
343 Meneses declared he spent such 500 pesos on paying daily wages to the laborers that secured the roof 
and some walls that were prone to collapse in any moment. AAL, Cofradías, XXV: 38, 1688, f. 2 – 4. 
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 notarial contract .344 The censatario claimed that the property was so damaged that he had 
to rebuild it almost entirely, and that the contract did not stipulate he must “rebuild it [the 
house] from its foundations.”345 He offered to cover up to 4,000 pesos of expenses in 
exchange of a reduction of 50 percent of the annual rent. If the opponent part rejected his 
proposal, he requested permission to dissolve the contract so the monastery could rent it 
to someone willing to pay the entire annual rent of 1,200 demanded by the owner.346 The 
monastery refused to accept any of these options, arguing that Meneses would  just be 
fulfilling his responsibility according to the contract.347 There was not a final resolution 
in this case; at least, it was not registered in the court record. It is possible that both 
parties were unable to reach a formal resolution. Meneses could either desist from 
fighting against the monastery, which had probably more resources at court, or look for 
alternative jurisdictional venues to challenge the stubbornness of his opponent. There was 
also the possibility that both parties reached an agreement outside the courtroom.  
344 Ibíd, f. 10. 
 
345 Ibíd, f. 11. 
 
346 AAL, Cofradías, XXV: 38, 1688, f. 10 – 12. 
 
347 AAL, Cofradías, XXV: 38, 1688, f. 27 v. 
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Image 14: Approximate location of some of the private properties. 1. Pescadería 
Street, 2. Mármol de Bronce Street, 3. Mantas Street, 4. Aldabas Street, and 5. Espaderos 
Street.348 
Along with official resolutions, there were out-of-court agreements that mirrored 
the official ones. An illustration of this type of settlement was the one between the 
Colegio de Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe, of the order of San Francisco, and the heirs of 
348 Location of these properties has been reconstructed by the author from descriptions available in the 
documents. 1. The houses that Gonzálo Andrés de Meneses had in possesion were located at the Pescadería 
Street. 2. Juan de Villena’s home was “next to the marmol de bronce.” 3 The properties of Doña María de 
Monterrey y Castro and Doña Juana de Orduña were located at Mantas Street. 4. Luis Alfonso de Rojas y 
Mendoza’s house was located at Aldabas Streets. 5. The house Don Cristóbal Gutiérrez Galán rented from 
La Merced Monastery was located at Espaderos Street, just in front the monastery.  
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 Don Juan Suarez Dionis, vecino of Callao and owner of three stores in that port-town. 
The receptor of the Colegio had filed a suit before the Real Audiencia against Don 
Alonso Dies Fernandez,and his wife, Doña Petronila Maria de Leon y Suárez, heiress of 
Juan Suárez Dionis, because they owed some interests of a principal of 1,510 pesos that 
burdened the above mentioned stores. The rent of 75 pesos, 4 reales of principal paid for 
a capellanía that the priests of the school served.  
Nevertheless, the earthquake destroyed all three stores that supported the 
capellanía. For that reason, the receptor of the school, Eulogio del Salto y Arriaza, 
offered to condone the interests that Don Alonso and Doña Petronila owned up to 
September 11, 1687, if they accepted to cover the reconstruction of the three stores and to 
pay the interests posterior to that date. Del Salto underlined he offered that option 
“considering some reasons of equity, and also [the effects of] the earthquake.”349 Three 
weeks after the catastrophic event, both parties signed a notarial contract that detailed the 
clauses of this agreement.350 With this legal but out-of-court resolution, both parts ended 
with the judicial process that placated them.  
349 AGN, PN Siglo XVII, 1059, f. 1221v. 
 
350 Ibid, f. 1222.  
 194 
                                                     
 Fighting against a powerful colonial institution was not easy, as the case of 
Meneses illustrated, yet such battles were not uncommon. Nor was his argument – to take 
into consideration the extraordinary damage produced by the quake. Doña Mencia de 
Cáceres y Ulloa, another censataria, requested a discount on the rent she paid for a house 
and two adjacent stores, which belonged to the Monastery of La Concepción. She 
explained that they were in ruins and the necessary repairs were very expensive. She 
explained that when she received those properties in censo, in 1659, she had to spend 
around 4,000 pesos repairing the damages they suffered by the earthquake of 1655. 
Nonetheless, the Earthquake of 1687 had left the house and stores in such terrible 
condition that she was unable to rent the stores and live in the house. She argued that, 
although the ninth clause of the contract stated she could not request discount because of 
any misfortune or tremor, the clause should not rule in that occasion because the 
Earthquake of 1687 had produced a total ruin.351 Both Gonzalo de Meneses and Mencia 
de Ulloa demanded that the clauses obligating the censuatarios to refurbish the properties 
be made ineffective in critical occasions of total devastation such as the one they were 
experiencing.   
351 AAL, Series Cofradías, XXV: 37, 1688. 
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 Even though proposals as those of Meneses and Ulloa cited the critical conditions 
of the city, opposing parties did not automatically accept them. Negotiation occurred in 
different ways in judicial processes involving reconstruction. People used legal spheres 
and adopted legal forms to legitimize reconstruction projects; and they recreated or 
adapted such legal forms as they did so. Meneses and Ulloa confronted powerful 
religious institutions that had personnel overseeing judicial and administrative matters. 
The monasteries kept attorneys, accountants, and similar professionals on retainer to 
manage and protect their properties. Individuals such as Meneses, himself a clerk at the 
Real Audiencia, probably had certain knowledge of laws or legal procedures and 
arguments. Yet other petitioners, such as Doña Mencia de Ulloa, were unfamiliar with the 
intricacies of the judicial apparatuses. Nonetheless, in both processes the plaintiffs based 
their requests on the presumed inapplicability of the contracts’ clauses obligating them to 
rebuild the properties, claiming the extraordinary conditions made it impossible to fulfill 
them. Nor were tenants the only ones citing the extraordinary conditions in claims for 
their reconstruction projects. Similar claims reveal how the inhabitants of Lima advanced 
legal arguments that extraordinary situations could trump ordinary agreements. 
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 A similar reference, though focused on the capriciousness of nature in Lima, 
appeared in another reconstruction plan-- this one devised by the administrators Alonso 
Perez Campos and Pedro de Larreta who, as discussed above, presented a plan before the 
judge Mansilla a year after the quake. They explained that the earthquake had damaged 
most of the confraternity of the Limpia Concepción’s properties, which were burdened by 
censos, capellanías, and other pious works. They proposed that, as an “accidental event,” 
both owners and tenants together should cover the expenses of the repairs. The 
administrators even offered to grant a “legitimate reduction” of the annuities to the 
censuatarios in order to compensate them for the expenses they had to incur repairing the 
confraternity’s properties.352 In all the three cases, the petitioners mentioned the 
extraordinary circumstances of the city required exceptional measures to reconstruct a great 
quantity of properties that needed expensive repairs that most proprietors or tenants were 
unable to afford. Even the receptor Del Salto claimed that his offer to tenants was motivated 
by the earthquake and reasons of equity. It seems most limeños were attempting to reach 
fair and reasonable settlements. 
352 AAL, Series Cofradías, IV: 21, f. 1 v. 
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 Even though the results of these judicial processes differed, petitioners used these 
and similar arguments to obtain a legitimate authorization from the ruling judge to 
implement their projects of reconstruction. But plaintiffs did not always obtain the 
recognition or authorization to the rebuilding plans they pursued. In the suit that Meneses 
filed against the monastery of the Concepción, this institution used conventional legal 
arguments to defend its interests and to reject its tenant’s proposal. There is no evidence 
on file in the judicial process to know if Meneses finally abandoned the property, even 
though he was contractually obligated to repair the property that legally remained under 
his stewardship.  
Certainly, many tenants simply abandoned the properties they held on censo. 
Almost four months after the earthquake hit Lima, the abbess of the Monastery of Santa 
Clara requested from the Vicario General of the Archbishopric of Lima license to sell “for 
lives” some ruined properties.353 In this instance, the term “for lives” (por vidas) refers to 
a lien held in emphateusis. The monastery would lease some properties for a determined 
period of time, which was counted in tenants and their heirs’ lives. In her petition, she 
explained that the earthquake destroyed all the houses and other buildings that belonged to 
353 In this instance, the term ‘for lives’ (por vidas) refers to a censo enfitéutico. The monastery would lease 
some properties for a determined period of time, which was counted in tenants and their heirs’ lives. 
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 the monastery. Because of these unexpected damages, the monastery did not have enough 
funds to cover the repairs of such properties. She asked for permission to lease “for lives” 
those properties that were in need of more repairs. Because there were people willing to 
contract censos on favorable terms, the abbess argued that these contracts would keep these 
properties producing rent, and transfer the responsibility to reconstruct them to the 
tenants.354 
Unlike the authorities of the Monasterio de la Concepción, who refused to concede 
discounts on either principal or rents to their tenants, the Monasterio de Santa Clara 
accepted the renunciations of possession from some of its censatarios. Concepción’s 
administrators supported their position on contract’s clauses that obligated tenants to 
rebuild the properties they occupied and forbid them to cancel the agreement. Nonetheless, 
institutions had the option to accept tenant’s renunciation. For instance, the city council, as 
explained in chapter 2, accepted the request from the tenants of the alhóndiga (city 
warehouse) to cancel their possession.  Similar to Santa Clara’s abbess, city counselors 
understood it was practical to find tenants willing to afford the reconstruction of property 
in exchange of fair condition rather than force them to hold unproductive useless buildings.  
354 AAL, Serie Santa Clara, XIX, 6, f. 1 – 3. 
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 As property owners, female religious orders and its members, individually, became 
highly involved in reconstruction activities after the quake. Women living in convents and 
other spiritual institutions represented 20 percent of the whole female population in 
Lima.355  They were an important population of limeños who helped rebuild the city. In 
her petition before the ecclesiastical court, the abbess of Santa Clara, Doña Luisiana 
Mesia—head of the monastery and responsible for its possessions—was not negotiating 
with other opponent parties, but requesting a license to implement a rebuilding plan. 
Similar to the abbess, many other petitioners came before the ecclesiastical court requesting 
permission to execute their own reconstruction plans. The most frequent of these requests 
came from nuns whose cells had collapsed during the quake.  Doña Beatriz de Torres 
Solano, one of the oldest velo negro (elite) nuns in the Monasterio de la Concepción, 
requested a license that may grant to her brother, chaplain at the same monastery, and other 
construction laborers access to come inside the cloister to repair her cell.356 Doña Maria 
Franco, another black-veiled (elite) nun from the same institution, also asked permission 
for her nephew, Licenciado Don Fernando de Aller y Franco, to come inside the monastery 
355 Van Deusen, Entre los sagrado y lo mundano, 203.  
 
356 AAL, Section Monasterio de la Pura y Limpia Concepción, XXV: 51, f. 1. 
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 with the purpose of recognizing the repairs her cell needed. 357 The two petitioners claimed 
the earthquake had damaged their cells so badly that they had to sleep outdoors. In both 
cases, the abbess Doña Petronila de Jesús y Salazar certified that the earthquake had 
destroyed all the cells in the monastery. The sisters could not even enter them.  Some nuns, 
such as Doña María and Doña Beatriz had male relatives willing to cover rebuilding 
expenses. Yet even these close relatives required a special license to enter the monastery.  
Since nuns also required permission from the ecclesiastical court to perform 
temporal activities, nuns left valuable testimonies of their reconstruction activities. Doña 
Aldonsa de Mora, black-veiled nun in the Monasterio de Santa Clara, solicited 
permission from the Provisor y Vicario General to sell (transfer) a censo of 250 pesos she 
had imposed on a house. She explained in her request that she received only 12 pesos 4 
reales of interest every year. Since such amount was insufficient to support her, she 
wanted to “sell” the censo to have enough currency from the principal to repair another 
house ruined by the earthquake that she possessed on lien.358 Another black-veiled nun of 
Santa Clara, Doña Ana de Pereira, requested the license to use 2,000 out of 3,728 pesos 
357 AAL, Section Monasterio de la Pura y Limpia Concepción, XXV: 62, f. 1 
 
358 AAL, Section Santa Clara, XIX: 7, f. 1. 
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 that she inherited from her aunt and her father for repairing some properties. She 
explained that that amount was in power of the executor of the belongings of her uncle, 
Licenciado Martín Dominguez Zambrano. She planned to use such 2,000 pesos to repair 
two houses of her property that were damaged in the seismic event. She needed to rebuild 
those buildings in order to lease them.359 With these strategies, Doña Aldonsa and Doña 
Ana attempted to obtain the economic means to put in repair and make functional 
properties that they could lease to receive regular income.  
In all the cases seen in this section, the petitioners brought their plans of 
reconstruction before court to get the judge’s license or order to implement their projects. 
Some of the petitioners requested licenses to put forward their plans, specifically, when 
these did not affect third parties. Other plaintiffs brought their projects before the judge in 
order to reach a settlement with opponent parties. Even though some of the cases had a 
negative or inconclusive outcomes, they illustrate the quest for legal authorization or 
legitimization of a plan, or help in compelling the opposing parties to negotiate or 
consent to a final project of reconstruction. But the courtroom was not the only place 
limeños had to legitimize their rebuilding plans.  
359 AAL, Section Santa Clara XIX: 12, f. 1 – 2, 21 – 22. 
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 Contracting Before Notaries 
The destruction of such a large part of the city represented a critical moment for 
many estate holders unable to afford the unexpected costs of reconstruction. Such large 
expenses motivated limeños to validate their rebuilding plans before implementing them. 
Instead of bringing their proposals of reconstruction to magistrates, proprietors negotiated 
rebuilding agreements with contractors and tenants. The Spanish legal system offered 
their subjects other official alternatives to legitimatize these agreements: the notarial 
contracts. The various parties involved in a negotiation signed a written agreement before 
a notary, who certified the veracity of the contract’s content. 
 Certainly not all property owners were economically limited to afford 
reconstruction activities. As seen in chapter 3, large property owners, such as some of the 
religious orders, had the economic means to reconstruct their properties. Nonetheless, 
even those individuals who had some capital to use in rebuilding works had to make 
special arrangements with contractors. Just a few weeks after the quake, Maestre de 
Campo Don Luis Alfonso de Rojas y Mendoza contracted with the carpenter Juan 
Eugenio and the Lieutenant Cristobal Perez to reconstruct his house. He would pay 200 
pesos to Eugenio and Pérez, who agreed to complete the rebuilding works within six 
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 weeks.360 The contract specified that the said 200 pesos were for Eugenio and Perez’s 
labor because, in order to reduce expenses, Rojas would provide the materials of 
construction and directly hire the black peones (laborers) to assist with the demolition 
and rebuilding of the ceiling, and the removal of the debris.361Even if Rojas had enough 
money to initiate the repairs on his home, he carefully arranged with the construction 
masters the responsibilities of each party in the contract, in order to save time and money 
in the reconstruction activities. 
Even though some of Lima’s estate-owners had the means to rebuild their 
damaged properties in such a short period, many had to bargain or negotiate their plans of 
reconstruction with tenants. Lease contracts offer illustrative information on strategies of 
cooperation and concession that limeños, both proprietors and tenants, developed with 
the purpose of rebuilding their city.  
A couple of weeks after the earthquake, a property owner and a capellanía 
beneficiary signed a lease contract with a prospective tenant before a notary. According 
to this contract, Doña María Monterrey y Castro, widow of Sebastian Gutiérrez, executor 
360 AGN, siglo XVII, PN 1634, Mateo de Rivera, f. 115 – 115 v. 
 
361 Ibid. 
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 of his will, and guardian of their minor children, rented to Sebastian de San Miguel a 
house and an adjacent store, located on Mantas Street, for a period of six years. Mantas 
was one of the main commercial streets in Lima, located next to the city hall. It received 
this name from the various stores that initially sold blankets of the land or mantas. Large 
two-story residences hosted various ground-level stores, where proprietors had their own 
business or which they rented for extra income.  
Because the quake extensively damaged Doña María’s property, she decided to 
rent it to someone willing to cover the repair expenses. The parties set the amount of the 
annual rent on 300 pesos. From this total, they agreed to discount the tenant’s expenses 
for demolishing the second story and rebuilding the property as new, following the 
alarife or construction master’s instructions. In case the cost of repairs exceeded the 
amount the tenant must pay, the Lic. Don Luis de Avalos, beneficiary of the capellanía on 
the house and store, would cover the additional expenses.362 They also agreed that the 
contract would start to run from the day the constructor master certified that the property 
was habitable. A year later, Doña María Monterrey, one of her children, and the heirs of 
San Miguel, appeared before the notary to insert an addendum to the contract. They 
362 AGN, siglo XVII, PN 202, Don Juan de Beltrán f. 602 v.  
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 declared the reconstruction of the house and adjacent store ended on April 1, 1688, date 
from which the lease started to run as indicated in the original contract. The cost of 
materials and salaries reached almost 2,000 pesos, which the proprietor accepted as 
payment of the lease.363 Thus, not only did the proprietor and tenant agree to share the 
expenses of the necessary repairs in the property; the chaplain, who also received profits 
from the property, also had to participate in sharing the costs.  
In another contract, Doña Juana de Orduña, the former abbess of the monastery of 
Santísima Trinidad, with license of the current abbess, granted possession of a store 
located also at Mantas street to the Lieutenant Mateo de Arzave. The contract, which both 
parties signed before a notary, indicated that the store was in such bad condition that both 
parties agreed the tenant would pay for the repairs the store needed. In exchange, the nun 
ceded the possession of the store for six years, and discounted all tenant’s expenses from 
the monthly rent.364 Similar to the previous case, the lease period would begin from the 
date all repairs of the stores were concluded.  
363 The tenant expended 1949 pesos ½ real. Ibid, f. 601 – 604, at the margin.  
 
364 AGN, siglo XVII, PN 1059, Diego Marquez de Guzman, f. 1225v-1226. 
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 As these two cases illustrate, some leaseholders agreed to pay the costs of 
repairing damaged properties in exchange for obtaining possession or usufruct for certain 
period of time. Real estate owners had to agree to reduced rent payments for their 
property, as in the case of Doña Juana de Orduña, or even lost such income altogether 
temporally when the tenant used the money to pay the properties’ repairs, as it happened 
to Doña María de Monterrey. In both cases, the owners also agreed to consider the 
beginning of the contracts by the date the properties were in good condition. This clause 
could motivate tenants to delay repairs in the properties, yet its repetition in many other 
contracts seems to show it became a common concession by owners to motivate tenants 
into contracts. 
Another frequent arrangement between owners and tenants was to share the costs 
of rebuilding. Almost a month after the quake, Fray Pedro Gudiño, as Prior of the 
Monasterio de la Merced, and the Lieutenant Don Cristóbal Gutiérrez Galán signed a 
lease contract before the notary Don Francisco Sanchez Becerra. Gudiño ceded 
possession to Gutiérrez for nine years of a one-story house with two adjacent stores for 
450 pesos. In this case, Gudiño, as representative of the monastery, declared the 
earthquake left the property uninhabitable, so it required several repairs. He did not grant 
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 a delay in the beginning of the lease, as the other proprietors did in the previous cases; yet 
he did discount 150 pesos from the total amount of 450 pesos. The tenant would use 
those 150 pesos to pay for the repairs of the entire property. Nonetheless, the monastery 
offered to contribute all the necessary materials of constructions such as bricks, adobes, 
quicklime, and wood.365  
These kinds of agreements, which show proprietors’ and tenants’ interest on 
reaching fair settlements, were not uncommon in the notarial records. In another contract, 
the proprietor, Dona Catalina Montero, also offered materials of construction to the 
leaseholders Lorenzo de Alvarado and Juan de Albornoz. She rented them some storages 
with a house located in the port of Callao for six years at the price of 1,100 pesos each 
year. She would receive only 300 pesos, and would provide wood to assist in the repairs. 
The tenants would use the remaining 800 pesos to rebuild the warehouses in the first year 
of the lease, and the house in the following years.366 In this case, the proprietor not only 
agreed to provide construction materials, but also ceded part of the rent income to be used 
for the rebuilding works. 
365 AGN, siglo XVII, PN 1698, Don Francisco Sánchez Becerra, f. 1223-1224. 
 
366 AGN, siglo XVII, PN 1674, Juan Romero de Arnero, f. 79v – 80v. 
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 Even though these contracts represent just a portion of those preserved in the 
notarial records at the Archivo General del Perú, they illustrate both the strategies 
limeños adopted to rebuild private property and their efforts to legitimize their agreement 
to put the city back together after the earthquake. These documents also testify to 
limeños’ interest in recording their agreements in written format. The practice of writing 
usually protected the parties involved, even though some agreements were not literally 
fulfilled. In other words, the documents provided the individuals legal protection more 
apparent than real. Even so, they valued the notarial record enough to regularly seek it. 
The notarial records were formal resolutions that the parties in the contracts reached after 
some sort of negotiation and bargaining.  
These contracts were the result of limeños’ negotiation according to their own 
understanding of equity, their will of cooperation, and their needs to rebuild property. 
Unlike judges that mediated negotiations and settlements, notaries mainly recorded what 
contracting parts had already negotiated. Scribes and notaries could certainly clean-up the 
wording in the contracts, making it clear and intelligible according to notarial standards. 
But post-earthquake contracts contained specific details in the clauses that exclusively fit 
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 the needs of each case.367 Certainly these documents followed customary notarial 
formulas similar to other contractual documents, yet each contract provided particular 
strategies of reconstruction that were selected according to each case. The value of these 
notarial records is that the casuistic   and flexible Spanish system allowed limeños to 
negotiate and implement “conveniente” agreements for the parties involved. 
 Informal Valid Agreements  
The importance of written resolutions, obtained either in court or before a public 
notary,  did not overshadow the value of informal oral contracts. These kinds of 
agreements are difficult to access because, by their very nature, they were unwritten or 
informally registered and thus were not well preserved. For that reason, references to 
such informal agreements usually are left out of courts and notaries’ records. But when 
we can catch sight of them, we learn that, despite their extralegal nature, these 
arrangements were valid, since they had the validity that the parties involved tacitly or 
symbolically conferred them. The use of these extra-official contracts shows people’s 
desire to reach fair resolutions through application of casuistic jurisprudence and 
negotiation.  
367 Kathryn Burns, Into the Archive. Writing and Power in Colonial Peru (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2010), 93. 
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 The analysis of a series of these unofficial contracts, which the steward of a 
religious corporation arranged, reveals the flexibility they afforded the people. In 1692, 
the Captain Don Agustín de Castro, steward of the confraternity of the Santísimo 
Sacramento, located at the Cathedral of Lima, presented the account of the six years of 
his administration before Don Juan de Mansilla, Judge of Testamento, Legados y Obras 
Pías.368 His detailed account of 125 pages with more than 500 entries provides revealing 
data about the impact of the earthquake on the confraternity’s properties and how he 
managed to repair and maintain the rents of those most damaged.  
The Santísimo Sacramento confraternity had around 30 real-estate properties 
among houses, stores, and small second-story rooms (altillos) spread throughout the city. 
It also collected the fees of provisional stalls or spots in a commercial alley where 
merchants sold diverse menial products such as clothes, fabric and other goods. Of these 
properties, the earthquake damaged seriously at least 11, which required several repairs 
that the congregation could not afford directly. For that reason, Castro set informal 
368 José Manuel Bermúdez, Anales de la Catedral de Lima, 1534 a 1824 (Lima: Imprenta del Estado, 
1903), 118, 128. The confraternity of the Santísimo Sacramento appears in the records of the Cathedral 
since 1663. The edification of its chapel began in 1668. 
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 agreements with some of the tenants to jointly pay for the rebuilding of these 
properties.369 
Castro’s first measure was to exonerate from payment those tenants who, because 
of fear, abandoned the properties in good condition for a few days. He discounted Juan 
Bautista Bentin the five days he abandoned the altillo he occupied.370 Castro also 
discounted from rent some of the expenses the tenants made on the properties or 
communal areas. For instance, Castro discounted tenant Juan de Mena 9 pesos of his 
monthly payments for cleaning the ditch that ran next to the property. Castro also 
exonerated Mena from the payment of 2 months and 19 days out of 24 months that he 
lived in the property because he lost all his personal belongings with the earthquake.371  
In another case, instead of using the limited funds of the confraternity to pay for 
repairs, Castro informally rented damaged property to people who were willing to rebuild 
it in exchange of free occupancy. He rented a store to the Captain Antonio de Herrera, 
who took possession on November 28, 1687, one month after the quake. Since Herrera 
369 Archivo Historico de la Beneficencia Publica de Lima (herafter AHBPL), COF-SS-10, 125fs. 
 
370 AHBPL, COF-SS-10, entry 45. 
 
371 AHBPL, COF-SS-10, entry 47. 
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 expended 113 pesos in repairing the store, Castro established April 10, 1688, as the 
starting date of the lease agreement. In other words, Castro granted four and a half 
months of free occupancy to Herrera in exchange for repairing the store.372  This was a 
smart and extra-official strategy to prevent extraordinary costs to his congregation and 
transfer them to a tenant that had the capital to restore the property.   
Like other bodies whose properties were greatly damaged, the confraternity’s 
administrator had to look for available means to rebuild real estate. In June 17, 1687, 
Castro rented to Bartolomé de Arcos, silver master, a house for 240 pesos annually. 
Arcos paid 80 pesos for the four months (20 pesos each) he occupied the house until the 
earthquake hit. Because the house was so seriously deteriorated when Arcos returned to 
it, on March of next year 1688, Castro reduced Arcos’ monthly payments from 20 to 8 
pesos. This was a reduction of 60 percent of the original price.373 In this case, it is evident 
the earthquake caused such severe damage to the property that the administrator had to 
reduce the rent with the purpose of keeping the tenant, who would probably make 
372 AHBPL, COF-SS-10, entry 60. 
 
373 AHBPL, COF-SS-10, entry 104. 
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 improvements or repairs. Reducing the price of a lease payment was more effective than 
losing the total rent and having to cope with the repairs on one’s own. 
Castro’s recording of his different tactics to reconstruct the property of the 
confraternity demonstrates that people commonly set unofficial agreements. These were 
practical in terms of costs of money and time. They also reflected official agreements 
because they specified the obligations of each part, and were valid and recognized by the 
parties involved. In the case of Castro’s ledger, the annotations of all these simple 
settlements did pass before the ecclesiastical judge’s eyes at the end of his term as 
steward. Nonetheless, they were legitimate long before the judge certified their validity. 
Even if the ledger and the arrangements it contained had never reached the ecclesiastical 
court, the agreements were deemed binding from the moment the tenants and the 
administrator established them, shook hands, and respected them.  
 Conclusion 
 Although colonial authorities took measures to initiate reconstruction, ordinary 
people had to partake in rebuilding activities of their city. They developed diverse 
reconstruction plans according to their own needs. Implementing these projects required 
the participation of various individuals, such as colonial authorities, property owners, 
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 tenants, and contractors, willing to negotiate and accept part of the economic burden of 
rebuilding. These reconstruction projects were validated through written contracts, 
notarized verbal contracts, and even informal verbal agreements.  The Spanish legal 
system recognized all three kinds of agreements as legitimate and binding. The abundant 
cases referring to each type highlights the value legal negotiations had to colonial 
subjects and the extent to which subjects were familiar with early modern processes of 
law.  
The main difference between official and extra-official contracts is the amount of 
money and property involved in each case. Parties fighting over a censo of 1,000 pesos 
typically had the means to pay court costs. They invested time and money in hopes of a 
sizeable gain. In contrast, the administrator of a small room, providing a monthly rent of 
20 pesos, typically preferred to make an informal agreement with the tenant to avoid the 
cost of official validation. While weighty disputes moved some parties to negotiate or 
confirm agreements in official spheres, the desire to validate contracts was present at both 
levels.  
Resolutions not only helped rebuild Lima’s physical surroundings, but also 
politically contributed to the refortification of the colonial state. Both the colonial ruling 
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 elite and the colonial subject participated in the process of reconstructing the city. 
Colonial subjects engaged the Spanish legal system, both officially and informally. In 
doing so, they used and reproduced the forms of the legal cultures according to their own 
necessities. Flexibility and compromise permitted the colonial subjects to design their 
projects of reconstruction in terms they considered fair and “conveniente” for the parties 
involved. Rather than negative characteristics, flexibility and “conveniencia” made the 
Spanish colonial state sturdy enough to resist the threat not only of natural disasters but 
also of the empire’s political and economic challenges. 
Certainly, flexibility and “conveniencia” made room for corrupt administrators 
and loose centralization. Royal officers and authorities were not all loyal administrators 
of the king’s patrimony. Some of them set their own interests above those of the 
monarch. The Archbishop Liñán y Cisneros and the members of the ecclesiastical 
council, who received their appointments from the king, provide a clear example of 
authorities, in this case religious ones, primarily concerned with securing their material 
wellbeing. Indeed, the next chapter demonstrates that flexibility had its limits, and the 
king and his peninsular ministers asserted power of colonial administration, and set limits 
to self-interested behavior of colonial agents.   
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 VI. CHAPTER 5: SERVING THE KING: CONTROL AND 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE ROYAL TREASURY OF LIMA IN THE 
LATE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY. 
The destruction produced by the earthquake demanded costly repairs of most of 
buildings in the city. The Viceroy attempted to initiate rebuilding activities in the main 
public buildings without burdening the royal treasury, which for an extended period had 
maintained a negative balance. The Earthquake of 1687 increased the hardships of a 
government, which nevertheless was able to manage the critical post-disaster period. Even 
though the colonial administration in Lima was unable to perform its normal activities for 
several months after the disastrous event, the royal treasury of Lima drastically increased 
its remittances to Castile when the next armada departed from the port of Callao in 1690.374 
This seemingly contradictory fact raises an important question: How, precisely,  was Peru 
able to send such large sums to the metropolis in the middle of social, economical, and 
political strife?  
374 TePaske, John and Herbert S. Klein, The royal treasuries of the Spanish Empire in America, vol. 1 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1982): 337, 338. Comparing the coffers for periods 1681-1685 and 1685-
1690, the amount sent in the 1690 armada was 225 percent higher than the one sent in 1685. The amount 
collected by the royal treasury rose by 65 percent. 
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 Because the earthquake affected mainly Lima and its port, one explanation for the 
rise in remittances was that most of sub-treasuries at the viceroyalty’s interior continued 
operating normally, compensating to some extent for the interruption of royal officers’ 
ordinary activities in Lima. However, data shows that the condition of the royal treasury in 
the entire viceroyalty was precarious. It carried a large amount of debt accumulated as the 
result of decades’ worth of loose book-keeping and mismanagement. Somehow, viceroys 
had continued to fulfill the obligation of sending money periodically to the peninsula. As 
the capital of the viceroyalty of Peru, Lima directed politics and commerce for all of 
Spanish South America. Similarly, Lima’s caja real served as its main treasury. The 
treasury collected the capital’s royal revenue and received the surplus of sub-treasuries 
from the viceroyalty’s interior.375 In theory, Lima’s royal administrators had to send the 
surplus to the metropolis; and, for a long time, royal officers fulfilled such obligation 
despite the depleted condition of the caja real.  
When the quake hit in 1687, in a matter of a few hours, the city was in ruins and its 
administration halted. Despite the financial burden created by new expenditures related to 
the devastation, the Duke of Palata recognized that the King had other priorities that did 
375 Andrien, Crisis and decadencia, 43. 
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 not allow him to financially assist his loyal subjects in Lima.376 The Viceroy’s 
achievement of realizing several of the rebuilding projects he envisioned is evident when 
examining the condition of the royal treasury. By the time the quake hit Lima, the 
condition of the caja real was bad, yet it had been worse. Actually, it was showing some 
signs of improvement because of a reformist phase that brought positive results that the 
natural disaster buried in historical memory. 
This chapter explores the government’s attempts to improve the administration of 
the viceroyalty’s cajas reales, and the results of such reformist efforts, vis-à-vis the 
effects of the 1687 earthquake. It specifically looks at Lima’s general inspection (visita 
general) ordered by the crown with the purpose of improving the condition of the royal 
treasury and tightening the control over its royal administrators. Even though the visita 
began in 1664, two decades before the natural disaster, its results became more evident 
during the administration of Duke of Palata, who actively promoted its activities and 
supported the visitor (visitador). Overall, a close look at the visita process provides a 
376 Navarra y Rocaful, “Memoria de Gobierno,” 367, “aunque en defensa y seguridad de la vida, honor y 
hacienda de tan Buenos vasallos emplearia Su Magestad todos sus tesoros con mucho gusto, no puedo 
ofrecerlo en los tiempos presentes, porque los aprietos de la Monarchia en las partes mas cercanas al 
Corazon [the peninsula], necesitan de todo el Socorro y asistencias de su Real hacienda, sin poderlas 
divertir a otra parte [Lima].” 
 220 
                                                     
 deeper understanding of how the colonial government dealt with bankruptcy and 
mismanagement during the late Hapsburg Spanish administration. 
The Economic and Political Black Legend of Spain 
Interpretations of Spanish decline trace their origins to political and economic 
decisions that monarchs made in the early decades of the seventeenth century, such as the 
excessive sale of juros (state bonds) and of public posts. The first of these practices, 
which started in the metropolis and expanded later to the colonies, generated an excessive 
public debt by the monarchy. In turn, that resulted in specie being passed to foreigners, a 
reduction of national capital, and privileged groups’ rising dependence on rentas. 
According to this interpretation, Spain became a victim of its own debts, unable to 
implement a far-reaching program to alleviate and improve its condition.377 The “sale” of 
public offices had the similar effect of dispossessing the Crown of its capacity to control 
the administration of the empire. As most of the posts passed to colonies’ native sons 
(Creoles) or peninsular residents in Indies, the royal government in the colonies became 
unable to rule for its own benefit because most functionaries profited from some 
377 Alberto Marcos Martín, “¿Fue la fiscalidad regia un factor de crisis den la Castilla del siglo XVII?” in 
La crisis de la Monarquía de Felipe IV, coordinated by Geoffrey Parker (Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 
2006), 250 – 253. Geoffrey Parker, ‘Epilogue,’ in La crisis de la Monarquía de Felipe IV (Barcelona: 
Editorial Crítica  2006), 401, 402. 
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 illegitimate practices their posts permitted.378 Both practices had strong impact on the 
politics of the empire during the rest of the seventeenth century, as they not only persisted 
but also expanded.379  
Nonetheless, the Spanish empire in the seventeenth century was not a monolithic 
administration condemned by the policies of previous rulers, waiting to be saved only by 
the coming of a new dynastic house and its new kind of government. Despite the various 
problems the Spanish empire had to deal with, Charles II’s administration had 
378 Ángel Sanz Tapia, “Cargos politicos beneficiados en Hispanoamérica bajo Carlos II,” in Ciencia, 
Economía y Política en Hispanoamérica Colonial, coordinated by Antonio Gutiérrez Escudero (Sevilla: 
Escuela de Estudios Hispanoaméricanos 2000), 176 – 179. 
 
379 Mark A. Burkholder and D.S. Chandler, From Impotence to Authority. The Spanish Crown and the 
American Audiencies, 1687 – 1808 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1977): 16. Margarita Suárez, 
Desafíos transatlánticos, 256, 257, also argues that the Spanish government suffered serious limitations. 
She views the royal administration in Spanish America as precarious and corrupt, and emphasized how 
each viceroy had to constantly renew the political pacts and arrangements with colonial subjects. The 
Spanish government’s control over its colonial domain only weakened under Charles II. Sanz Tapia, 
“Cargos politicos beneficiados en Hispanoamérica bajo Carlos II,” 162; Corrupcion o necesidad?: la venta 
de cargos de gobierno americano bajo Carlos II (1674-1700) (Madrid: Consejo Superior de 
Investigaciones Científicas, 2009), 371-373, who argues that the Spanish administration continued to 
manage the concession of ruling positions. Even though he calculates that around 65 percent of the 1032 
posts granted during the last quarter of the seventeenth century were beneficios or appointments given in 
exchange of monetary contributions or loans to the crown, these donations were considered services to the 
king. Even when the crown granted a large portion of royal posts to persons that offered economic 
donatives, 70 percent of these recipients also listed traditional service in their personal records. Moreover, 
the regime continued granting posts based only on traditional services, not pecuniary contributions. 
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 characteristics that show it was not as incompetent as scholars have traditionally argued. 
Throughout the periods of war, natural disaster, and economic bankruptcy, the Hapsburg 
administration developed certain innovations and strategies that have inadvertently been 
erased in historiography. 380  Analysis of the viceroyalty of Peru in the last decades of 
Hapsburg rule demonstrates that the government increased control of the colonial 
treasury, its royal officials, and the remittances of bullion to the peninsula. It was the 
Earthquake of 1687 that interrupted the reform and obscured its dividends. 
The General Visita to the Cajas Reales 
When Duke of Palata arrived in Peru, he attempted to implement various changes in 
the viceroyalty’s administration. Some of his measures aimed to improve the fiscal 
administration. Yet, they were part of a larger reforming process that the Spanish crown 
380 Luis Ribot, El Arte de Gobernar, 14, 151, 152, 267 – 272, indicates that some administrative measures 
were the creation of the first Junta de Gobierno, and the replacement of the valido for the post of the prime 
minister.  There was also an improvement on the diplomatic capacity of the Spanish officers to compensate 
the lack of military force, which was unable to resist the greater military power of Spain’s enemies. Even 
the election of a Bourbon prince as the heir to the Spanish throne responded also to the political 
circumstances of the monarchy. Facing the menace of repartition among the European powers, the best 
option to preserve the monarchy was to choose a ruler the king of France would endorse. 
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 had initiated decades earlier with the purpose of regulating and supervising the personnel 
and administrative system in its colonial domains.381  
The last decades of the seventeenth century (1664-1690) witnessed a long audit, 
through which metropolitan officials assessed the condition of Lima’s caja real and the 
performance of its administrators. Because of the visita’s duration, there were various 
visitadores, or auditors, that assumed the post consecutively. It is also possible to 
distinguish at least three phases of the visita, because there were some intervals in which 
inspections halted, such as when the visitor died or was recalled by the Crown (See Table 
1). 
The first of these stages witnessed the antagonism between the two visitadores, Juan 
de Cornejo and Francisco Antonio de Manzolo, who initiated their activities in 1664. 
Rather than fulfilling the expectations of the peninsular government, this initial phase of 
the visita fueled the factionalism within the political elite of the viceregal capital.382 
Cornejo turned some royal officers into sympathizers, who benefited politically in 
exchange for loyalty and obstruction of Manzolos’s activities. When news of the power 
381 Andrien, Crisis and decadencia, 241, 242. 
 
382 Ibid, 211-221. 
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 and authority he displayed in Lima reached the court, peninsular authorities recalled 
Cornejo in 1666. Manzolo continued inspecting the account of the royal treasury, without 
any formal accusation against the royal officers, until he left Lima in 1670. Conflicts 
between royal agents were not uncommon and even generated factions within the colonial 
administration. Just like the deep-seated ill-will between Manzolo and Cornejo, there was 
an evident antagonism between the Duke of Palata and the Archbishop Liñán y Cisneros, 
and between the latter and the Count of Castellar. These political, and sometimes personal, 
rivalries frequently obstructed the regular performance of the government, as some officers 
blocked the activities of their opponents. 
The second phase of the visita initiated with the queen mother’s appointment of Don 
Alvaro de Ybarra, the most senior oidor (judge) of the Real Audiencia, as visitor in 1673. 
The progress of the inspection was limited because one ally of former visitor Cornejo, Don 
Sebastián de Navarrete, administrator of Lima’s caja real protested the bias of Ybarra’s 
procedures.383 In 1675, the Council of Indies finally rejected Navarrete’s appeal, and 
ordered Ybarra to resume the visita. Nonetheless, Ybarra died before the decree arrived in 
Lima. The next year, after receiving the news of visitor Ybarra’s death, the king appointed 
383 Herzog, Upholding Justice, 33, describes recusación as a legal mechanism a party involved in a legal 
case or process could request the dismissal of the judge, court notary or court clerk because of impartiality. 
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 Don Agustín Mauricio de Villavicencio, the most senior oidor of the Real Audiencia, as 
new visitador by royal decree of June 1, 1676.384  
Years Inspectors (visitadores) Royal Treasury’s Administrators 
1664-1670 -Francisco Antonio Manzolo. 
 
-Juan de Cornejo (Recalled in 
1666). 
-Sebastian de Navarrete (Controller 
imprisoned in 1681). 
 
-Francisco de Colmenares (Treasurer) 
 
-Cristobal de Llanos Jaraba (Business 
manager). 
 
-Francisco Antonio de los Santos 
(Interim controller). 
1673-1680 -Alvaro de Ybarra (Died in 
1675) 
 -Agustin Mauricio de 
Villavicencio (Died in 1680) 
 
-Juan de Saiceta y Chucho 
(Secretary). 
1680-1696 -Juan de Penalosa. 
Table 1: List of inspectors and administrators of the Caja Real (1664-1696) 
384 Translation of the Royal decree that commissioned the Audit. Lima, March 3,1683. Archivo General de 
Indias (hereafter AGI), Lima, 289, f. 1 – 7v. Ismael Jímenez, “Don Alvaro de Ybarra: el Criollo más 
poderoso de su tiempo (1621-1675),” América en la memoria : conmemoraciones y reencuentros / Begoña 
Cava Mesa, Coordinación y edición (Bilbao: Universidad de Deusto, Asociación Española de 
Americanistas, 2013), 324. 
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 Even though the visita progressed relatively slowly in this second phase, 
Villavicencio performed important tasks that would be useful for his successor in the 
inspection. His activities as visitor were in part obstructed by the unavailability of the 
records left by Ybarra. Visitor Villavicencio had to file a suit against the executor of 
Ybarra’s will, who had sent Ybarra’s documents concerning the visita, to Spain in the 
armada of 1675. It was not until March of 1679 that Villavicencio had access to such 
records. Nonetheless, he was disappointed to find out that most of Ybarra’s papers 
contained information related to the recusal of Navarrete.385   
 Despite these initial setbacks, Villavicencio worked hard to fulfill the royal order 
to inspect Lima’s treasury. Evidence shows that this royal official was determined to 
comply with royal instructions in every detail. Beginning in 1676, when he received his 
appointment, Villavicencio moved the investigations of Lima’s treasury and its 
administrators’ performance forward, until his death in 1679. Assisted by Don Juan de 
Sayceta y Cucho, Senior Accountant (Contador Mayor) of the Tribunal de Cuentas, 
Villavicencio’s detailed investigation led to a long judicial process against the 
385 Letter of Villavicencio to the King. Lima, August 4, 1678. AGI, Contaduría, 1780B, f. 1 v.; Documents 
followed by the Visitador Don Agustin de Villavicencio against Don Lucas de Segura y Lara as executor of 
the Visitador Don Alvaro de Ybarra. Order of the Viceroy-archbishop about the papers of Ybarra. Lima, 
March 20, 1679, f.  77v. 
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 administrators of the caja real of Lima, the comptroller (contador y veedor) Sebastián de 
Navarrete, the business manager (factor), and the treasurer (tesorero), who were charged 
with suspicious practices and omissions.  A few months after taking his new post, 
Villavicencio requested a sworn statement (relación jurada) from the officers of the caja 
real, detailing the debts owed to the treasury.386  
 Clear omissions in this account motivated secretary Sayceta and visitor 
Villavicencio to increase their scrutiny of the treasury’s accounts. The officers of the caja 
real delayed presenting the documents that might corroborate their declaration for several 
months. The statement they submitted by the end of 1677 contained 755 entries that 
enumerated the uncollected amounts accumulated since the creation of the caja real of Lima 
in 1607.387 The total of debts owed to the caja real reached 232,967 pesos.388 Once Sayceta 
386 Letter of Villavicencio to the King. Lima, August 4, 1678. AGI, Contaduría, 1780B, f. 1. 
 
387 Sworn statement of the debts of the Treasury. Lima, November 6th 1677. AGI, Lima, 290, f. 168v – 
247v. 
 
388  Letter of Sayceta to Villavicencio. Lima, June 20, 1678. AGI, Lima, 290, f. 250. Unless otherwise 
specified, all quantities in this chapters are expressed in pesos de a 8 reales. Caja Real’s royal 
administrators keep account records in both pesos de a 8 reales and pesos ensayados. In order to clarify the 
value of the debts by the royal treasury, I have converted pesos ensayados, tomines, and granos, to pesos de 
a 8 reales. Eight tomines were equivalent to one peso ensayado and twelve granos was equivalent to one 
tomin. Once pesos ensayados, tomines, and granos were expressed in pesos ensayados with decimals, by 
dividing pesos ensayados by one, tomines by eight, granos by 96, and adding the previous three products, I 
 228 
                                                     
 reviewed this first account, he realized that there were 218 entries that lacked certain 
information such as the amount and the object of the debt.389 Therefore, he asked 
administrators to submit documents that could be used to verify each entry. Visitor 
Villavicencio compelled the administrators to provide the papers asked by Sayceta three 
times without success.390 Facing new obstruction of his activities, Villavicencio began to 
send notifications to the debtors compelling them to pay, and supervising the activities of 
royal administrators. He also recorded all new deposits to the royal treasury. In only five 
months, from December 10, 1677 until May 28, 1678 -- when the Viceroy Count of 
Castellar ordered Villavicencio to submit an account of the available money to send to the 
converted pesos ensayados to maravedíes, at the exchanged rate of 450 maravedíes per peso ensayado, and 
from maravedíes to pesos de a 8 reales, at the exchange rate of 272 maravedíes  per peso de a 8 reales. For 
instance, after we convert pesos ensayados, tomines, and granos to pesos ensayados with decimals by 
following the calculation performed previously, we multiply the pesos ensayados with decimals figure by 
450and divide by 272. I have also rounded up the figures as necessary. For instance, in this particular 
statement, they royal officers declared a debt of   224,584 pesos 2 reales de a 8 pesos, and 5,067 pesos 4 
granos ensayados. I converted the 5,067 pesos 4 granos ensayados to pesos de a 8 reales. Using the above 
mentioned formula, I obtained 8,382.97 pesos de a 8 reales which was rounded to 8,383. Then, I added this 
amount of 8,383 pesos de a 8 reales to 224,584 pesos de a 8 reales and arrived at 232,967 pesos 2 reales.  
 
389 Ibid, 250, 250v. 
 
390 Inquire of Sayceta to Villavicencio. Lima, March 2, 1679. AGI, Lima, 290, f. 249v.; Letter of 
Villavicencio to the King. Lima, August 4, 1678. AGI, Contaduria 1780B, f. 1r.  
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 metropolis -- the visitador had collected 54,476 pesos, nearly a quarter of the treasury’s 
outstanding debts.391 
 
Image 15: The Count of Castellar392 
A few months later, the appointment of a new viceroy and the death of Villavicencio 
brought another twist to the inspection of Lima’s treasury. The King removed the Count of 
Castellar from his post of viceroy in July 7, 1678, and appointed the new archbishop of 
Lima, Don Melchor de Liñan y Cisneros, as interim-viceroy. The new representative of the 
391 Letter of Villavicencio to the King, Lima, August 4 1678. AGI, Contaduria, 1780B, f. 2; Letter of the 
royal officers sent with the galleons of 1686. Lima, Noviembre 12, 1683. AGI, Contaduria, 1780B, f. 2. 
 
392 Lavalle, Vivero, and San Cristóbal. Galería de Retratos de los Gobernadores y Virreyes del Perú, n.p. 
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 king spent the first months of his administration reviewing the various treasuries of the 
viceroyalty.  He reported to the King that he found a debt of almost 4 million pesos.393 The 
caja real of Lima alone had a debt of 254,785 pesos 6 reales, accumulated as of December 
19, 1679.394 Villavicencio had continued working until the first months of 1679 when his 
health decayed. His death in September of that year represented another halt to the 
inspection process.  
Ultimately, this second phase of the visita revealed royal officials’ fraud and shady 
book-keeping. But Villavicencio was unable to levy any harsh punishment on the royal 
officers because he lacked the authority to do so. His interrogations revealed that some 
officers, like Sebastián de Navarrete and Cristobal de Llanos Jaraba, lived ostentatiously, 
spending more than what their salaries could allow.395 The end of this phase also marked 
393 The Archbishop-viceroy of Peru provides news to His Majesty. Lima, June 7, 1680. AGI, Lima, 288, f. 
2v. The account listed only the debts of 16 cajas reales because the Archbishop-viceroy considered those of 
Loja and Guayaquil of little consideration, Huancavelica’s and Huamanga’s cajas reales did not report to 
Lima, and Quito’s supported the Situado of Cartagena. The Archbishop-viceroy reported a debt of 
3,806,623 pesos 7 reales. He stated that 2,167,439 pesos 1 real were debts from the Count of Castellar’s 
administration, f. 4v – 5. 
 
394 Idem, f. 7. The Archbishop-viceroy reported a debt of 246,119 pesos 6 reales, and 5,238 pesos 1 tomin 3 
granos ensayados 
 
395 Copies of the testimonies collected by Alvaro de Ybarra’s visita, Lima, 1677-1679. AGI, Lima, 289. 
 
 231 
                                                     
 the change in accountant Navarrete’s position. It is uncertain what caused his fall from 
royal grace. It is possible that his activities of recusing Ybarra changed the king’s 
perception of the accountant.  
 The third phase of the visita began a year after Villavicencio’s death, in 1680, when 
the King ordered Don Juan de Peñalosa, judge of the Real Audiencia, to continue the 
investigation of Lima’s treasure. Yet, in practice, it took more than appointing a new 
visitador to resume the inspection of the caja real of Lima. By the royal decree of October 
23, 1680, the king named Peñalosa auditor of the cajas reales and ordered him to resume 
the inspection along with Don Juan de Sayceta, who remained as secretary of the visita. 396 
Charles II also entrusted the imprisonment of the Don Sebastian de Navarrete and his 
banishment to New Spain to the new visitador. He specifically instructed Peñalosa to 
carefully inquire about the excesses and procedures of Navarrete and sequestrate his estate 
and personal belongings. The royal officer was imprisoned. Apart from this, there was no 
substantial progress in the visita during the administration of the Archbishop-viceroy.397   
396 Copy of the Royal Decree of October 23, 1680. Lima, March 3, 1683. AGI, Lima, 289, f. 11-12. 
 
397 Letter of Navarrete to the Viceroy, August 5, 1682. AGI, Lima, 288. 
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 After his arrival in late 1681, the recently installed Duke of La Palata reactivated the 
audit process which yielded positive effects. Without noticing any progress in the visita, 
the Viceroy commanded the Audiencia minister Peñalosa to begin his activities as 
visitador.398 Peñalosa requested an exemption to take his new post. This was a normal 
procedure since inspecting Lima’s treasury earned visitors the animosity of most fellow 
royal officers.399 Even though Peñalosa provided reasons for his request, the Duke 
compelled him to formally take his new post and resume the visita.  
Once the minister began his activities as visitador, his main goal was to send 
controller Sebastian de Navarrete, who along with two officers had been accused of fraud, 
to New Spain, place where he would wait for the sentence by the Tribunal de Cuentas, or 
the comptroller’s court, as the royal decree of 1680 ordered.400 Once Navarrete embarked 
on a ship to Acapulco at the end of 1682, the new visitador was able to concentrate on the 
inspection of the treasury and the collection of debts.  
398 Auto of the Viceroy Duke of Palata to Juan de Peñalosa. Lima, February 18, 1683. AGI, Lima, 288. 
 
399 Letter of Peñalosa to the Viceroy Duque de la Palata. Lima, February 14, 1683. AGI, Lima, 288, N.2. 
 
400 Letter of Juan de Peñalosa oidor of Lima to His Majesty about the condition of the visita. Lima, 
November 4, 1683. AGI, Lima, 288, f. 2. 
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  According to the royal treasury administrators’ sworn statement presented on 
March 31, 1683, at Peñalosa’s request, the uncollected debts dating from the creation of 
the caja real in 1607 reached 255,472 pesos 7 reales.401 From 1683 until 1690, when the 
process against the royal treasury officers ended in a sentence, Peñalosa requested 
periodical reports from the administrators disclosing the progress on the collection of debts. 
He used the statement of 1683 to measure any progress in the collection activities.402 
These reports demonstrate an increased effort by the royal officers to collect the 
delayed obligations to the Crown. According to the periodical reports presented by the 
royal officers, the debts in favor of the treasury decreased consistently. Using the report of 
1683, Peñalosa sent a detailed account to the King, indicating that because of his efforts 
Lima’s treasury had gathered 120,528 pesos 2 reales, representing almost half of the debt, 
in a period of eight months.403 Nonetheless, in a letter dated a few days later, the royal 
401 This was a third declaration presented by the royal officers stating that the debt owed to the caja real was 
of 234, 380 pesos 2 reales and 12,749 pesos 2 tomines 5 granos ensayados. They submitted the first 
statement at Villavicencio’s request in 1679, and the second statement at Archbishop-viceroy’s request in 
1681. Letter of Villavicencio to the King. Lima, August 4, 1678. AGI, Contaduria 1780B.  
 
402 These certifications are available in AGI, Lima, 290, and 291. 
403 Letter from Oidor Juan de Peñalosa of Lima to His Majesty about the condition of the visita. Lima, 
November 4, 1683. AGI, Lima, 288, f. 2. This letter stated that he had specifically collected 234, 380 pesos 
2 reales, and 12,749 pesos 2 tomines 5 granos ensayados. 
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 administrators indicated that the large amount presented in the auditor’s account contained 
quantities collected after the remittance of bullion in 1678 by the former Visitor 
Villavicencio.404 It is probable that Peñalosa intentionally failed to mention that the amount 
reported at the end of 1683 included amounts collected by his predecessor. Even though he 
used the material (testimonies, inventory, etc.) gathered by Villavicencio, Peñalosa never 
complimented the activities or procedures of the previous visitor.  
The amounts reported in subsequent reports offer a more credible record of the royal 
officers’ collecting capacity. Efforts by administrators Francisco de Colmenares, Cristobal 
De Llanos, and Francisco Antonio de los Santos, who replaced to Navarrete as interim-
comptroller, reduced progressively the debts shown on their declaration. 405 In 1686, 
Peñalosa ordered these royal officers to provide another sworn statement including debts 
incurred until April 8 of that year.406 This new account represented a considerable increase 
404 Letter of the royal officers sent with the galleons of 1686. Lima, November 12, 1683. AGI, Contaduria 
1780B, f. 1v-2. 
 
405 Memory and account of the debts owned to the Royal Treasury of Lima until March 31, 1683. Lima, 
March 31st 1683. AGI, Lima, 290, f. 1v. 
406 Notification of Peñalosa to the royal officers of the Real Hacienda, Lima, April 6, 1686. AGI, Lima,290. 
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 of debts the administrators were responsible for because it included the uncollected 
amounts of three additional years.  
This new statement was split in three categories, one including debts since the 
creation of the treasury in 1607 until 1659, another that comprised debts from 1659 to 1679, 
and the last one that contained the most current debts (See Table 2). According to the new 
sworn statement of 1686, the first group of debts reached 12,315 pesos, the second 20,090 
pesos 2 reales, and the third to 67,584 pesos 6 reales (See Table 2 ).407 The total debt  of 
255,472 pesos 7 reales, shown in the statement of 1683, had decreased to 99,999 pesos by 
1686. 
 
 
Statement of 
1686 
1607408-
1659 
1659-1679 1679-1686 Total Debt 
407 Certification of the Officers of the Royal Treasury, Lima, August 4, 1686, AGI, Lima,290. The exact 
amount provided were 18,843 pesos 1 real and 753 pesoss 6 tomines 5 granos ensayados for the second 
period, and 65,606 pesos 3 reales de a 8 and 1,195 pesos 6 tomines 6 granos ensayados for the third period. 
408 Andrien, Crisis and decadencia, 114, states that the administration of the royal treasury was 
responsibility of the Real Audiencia until 1607, when the government created the Tribunal de Cuentas to 
supervise and control the viceroyalty’s cajas reales.  
 
 236 
                                                     
 Debt 12,315 pesos 20,090 pesos 2 
reales 
 67,584 pesos 6 reales 99,990 
pesos 
Table 2: Debt of the Caja Real de Lima by 1686 
 Despite adding previously uncollected funds to their accounts, the royal officers 
continued collecting debts and maintaining their accounts up-to-date. The report presented 
ten days before the Earthquake of 1687 shows the debts to the royal treasury had 
diminished, in all the three categories, within a period of 18 months.409 Even though the 
earthquake obstructed the work of the royal officials, it would only do so for a surprisingly 
short period of time. The report of 1690 shows they were unable to collect any quantity 
until September of 1688, almost a whole year after the natural disaster.410  
Nonetheless, peninsular authorities kept pressuring on the administrators of Lima’s 
caja real. In a royal decree, dated February 5, 1688, they expanded again the obligations of 
the royal officers, ordering the judges of the Tribunal de Cuentas to consider all obligations 
that were six months old as debts.411 As a result, colonial officials arduously aimed to 
collect debts before the six-month period. In 1690, the Tribunal sentenced the officers of 
409 Letter of Peñalosa to the King, Lima, October 15, 1687, AGI, Lima 288. 
 
410 Certification of the Officers of the Royal Treasury, Lima, June 20, 1690, AGI, Lima,290. 
411 Translation of the royal decree of February 5th 1688. Lima, September 12, 1688. AGI, Lima, 291. 
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 Lima’s caja real responsible for a debt of 16,245 pesos.412 This amount was considerably 
smaller than the debt of 255,472 pesos 7 reales the caja real had in 1683 (See Table 3).413 
Year Debt 
1683 255,472 pesos 7 reales 
1686 99,990 pesos 
1690 16,245 pesos 
Table 3: Decline of the debt in the Caja Real de Lima from 1683 - 1690 
Contrasting the amount of the 1683 and 1690 reports, it is evident that the inspection 
of Lima’s treasury generated, although to different extents, certain pressure on colonial 
administrators. They cleaned up their books and began collecting the extensive debts the 
treasury had incurred over decades. If they had previously committed fraud on purpose, the 
increased scrutiny surely stopped or reduced such behavior. By 1690, the royal fleet 
departed from Callao with a shipment of bullion that was three times bigger than the 
previous one.  
The Duke’s Fiscal Reforms 
412 Sentence on an appeal that the fiscal followed in the Tribunal de Cuentas against the royal officers of 
this city. Lima, June 10, 1690. AGI, Lima, 291, f. 553 r. The exact quantities were 15,693 pesos 5 reales 
and 333 pesos 2 tomines 6 granos ensayados. 
 
413 Letter of Villavicencio to the King. Lima, August 4, 1678. AGI, Contaduria 1780B. 
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 When promoting the visita’s activities, Duke of Palata was mainly following 
instructions carefully detailed in various royal decrees signed by the monarch. Yet, he did 
not limit himself to merely implementing orders, but also designed and implemented some 
ideas of his own. His fiscal measures targeted to reform the inefficiency of the Tribunal de 
Cuentas by reviewing the viceroyalty’s cajas reales and end the chronic scarcity of currency 
in the capital. 
The Duke was concerned about maintaining an updated account record of the various 
cajas reales in the viceroyalty. The task was difficult for the royal officers working at the 
Tribunal de Cuentas, who supervised the activities of all the cajas reales. The accumulation 
of the unrecorded debts obstructed collection activities, which in turn increased the 
amounts due.414 The Viceroy appointed two auxiliary auditors (ordenadores) to support 
the Tribunal de Cuentas’ senior accountants to organize the delinquent accounts. The 
Viceroy also decided that these new officers’ salaries would derived from future debts 
collected in order to avoid burdening the royal treasury with more remunerations.415 
414 Copy of the Inquire to the Tribunal de Cuentas made by the Duke of the Palata. Lima, October 26, 1682. 
AGI, Lima, 288, f. 5v. 
415 Copy of the paper where the viceroy indicates the best manner of collecting of the royal treasury. Lima, 
December 8, 1682. AGI, Lima, 288, f. 2v. 
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 Additionally, he reorganized the duties of all five senior accountants and eight Tribunal de 
Cuentas’ ordenadores by assigning specific provincial treasuries to each accountant and 
his assistants.416  
In this manner, the Duke promoted order within the Tribunal de Cuentas, making 
each senior accountant responsible for inspecting specific cajas reales. Before this reform, 
accountants indiscriminately selected the accounts they wanted to review, alternating 
between various cajas reales and without following any chronological order. As a result of 
this practice, none of the cajas reales at the interior regions of the viceroyalty had its 
accounts up-to-date. 
The Duke also promoted and realized the creation of a Royal Mint in Lima with the 
purpose of solving the continuous lack of coinage in the capital. Beginning in 1650, royal 
officers usually received their remunerations in bars of silver because pesos of 8 reales 
were scarce.417 In order to pay officers’ salaries, fixed at pesos of 8 reales, royal treasury 
416 Distribution of the Cajas Reales by the Duke of the Palata. Lima, December 17, 1682. AGI, Lima, 288, 
f. 1 v. 
417 Juvenal Luque, Funcionarios y remuneraciones. Salarios de la Caja Real de Lima en los siglos XVII y 
XVIII (Lima: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2011), 172-175, states that 
in the period from 1650 to 1675, payments in silver bars represented 91% of the total. Between 1675 and 
1684, this percentage fell to 60%. 
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 administrators had introduced the flawed practice of exchanging a silver bar at the rate of 
142 pesos of 9 reales, when the value of each bar was actually higher, at  147 pesos of 9 
reales.418   
Visitor Villavicencio had previously noticed this practice, and realized its negative 
effects on the royal treasury. He notified the King that this procedure represented a loss of 
5 pesos in each silver bar, and recommended a fine of 500 pesos to each senior officer of 
the caja real who made the exchange.419 The officers attempted to defend this practice by 
arguing the value of the silver bars constantly fluctuated on the market. They argued a 
silver bar only reached its nominal value of 147 pesos in the months preceding the 
departure of a royal fleet, yet it remained mainly between 135 and 140 pesos. They argued 
that the former Viceroy Count of Castellar had endorsed the customary rate of 142 pesos, 
after he verified the lesser value of the bars in the market.  
Despite the attempt to defend the exchange practices, the royal officers had to pay 
the fine for contravening the legal value and exchanging of the silver bars at unfavorable 
418 Ibid, 226, describes the peso of 9 reales as a salary currency because it was mainly used to convert 
ensayados to pesos with the purpose of paying salaries. 
 
419 Letter of Villavicencio to the King, Lima, August 18, 1678, AGI, Contaduria,1780B. 
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 rates for the royal treasury.420 The production of coinage at Lima’s Mint House 
progressively eliminated the payments of salaries in pesos ensayados, whose official value 
was fixed at 143 pesos of 9 reales, in 1685.421 When the Casa de la Moneda began to 
operate in 1683, the royal treasury entered a new stage where the peso of 8 reales became 
the standard coinage used to pay royal officers’ salaries.422 The new institution also 
provided the much-needed currency for the diverse fiscal, commercial, and private 
transactions in the capital. 
The Danger of Living on the King’s Peso 
A careful review of the Comptroller Sebastián de Navarrete’s case reveals how the 
revival of Hapsburg governance impacted mid-level colonial administrators in Indies. He 
was a creole from Lima who forged a respectable career in royal service, yet his fate 
changed according to royal will. As the comptroller and his defenders tried to demonstrate 
his loyalty to the crown, they left behind material that provides a window to early modern 
notions of justice, law and custom, and colonial subjects’ appreciation for written 
420 Letter of the royal administrators to the King, Lima, August 15, 1978. AGI, Contaduria, 1780B. 
 
421 Luque, Funcionarios y remuneraciones, 178. 
 
422 Ibid, 179. 
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 documents. Ultimately, Navarrete’s career and life illustrates that flexibility and emphasis 
on “conveniencia” in the Spanish system had its limits. Royal officers could not hide 
behind claims of customary law and decentralized practices to justify personal gain. His 
prosecution and final outcome of his trial demonstrates that metropolitan authorities did 
not interpret flexibility as corruption.  
Navarrete’s father planned his young son’s career well before he was able to take a 
position in the royal administration. He bought him a post in the royal treasury when the 
future comptroller was only 15 years old. 423  He purchased this office in futura, which 
meant Navarrete would occupy one of the senior posts that might become available in 
Lima’s caja real. Nonetheless, this meant that Navarrete would have to wait at least until 
he was 25 years old to enter in royal service.  
Navarrete’s opportunity came in 1651 when he replaced royal officer Bartolome de 
Astete, who was suspended from his office for a few years. Navarrete served as futurario 
comptroller until 1654. There were rumors that Don Sebastian was behind the suspension 
of Astete and another royal administrator, because he was the main beneficiary from such 
423 Kenneth Andrien, “The Sale of Fiscal Offices and the Decline of Royal Authority in the Viceroyalty of 
Peru, 1633 - 1700,” Hispanic American Historical Review 62, 1 (1982), 63. 
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 punishment. 424 Navarrete received other appointment in the royal administration until he 
obtained full possession of the post of comptroller in Lima’s royal treasury in 1663.425 
Nonetheless, his ascending career hid a convulsive personal life. There were rumors that 
he had an affair with the wife of a Basque merchant. In an attempt to kill his opponent one 
night, Navarrete attacked him with the assistance of one of his slaves. Instead, he murdered 
a cleric, Fray Juan de Carbonero, by mistake.426 There seemed to be no long-lasting 
repercussions for this criminal act.  In 1662, he was elected alcalde ordinario of the city, 
even though the Holy Office of the Inquisition excommunicated him because of his 
immoral acts in an attempt to obstruct his admission to the post. Navarrete’s political power 
was evidenced by his ability to overcome the greatest condemnation that the Church could 
inflict on a person with the payment of a fee. He had to pay a fine of 1,000 pesos before 
assuming the post of alcalde ordinario.427 
424 Andrien, Crisis and decadencia, 216. 
 
425 Certification by notary Jimenez Navarrete of a document made at Lima, in December 2, 1982. Mexico, 
August 12, 1683. AGI, Lima,288. 
 
426 Instruction to those in charge of the visita of the Cajas Reales and Caja of Lima, Madrid, Septembre 
30,1680. AGI, Lima,288; Andrien, Crisis and decadencia, 236. 
 
427 Andrien, Crisis and decadencia, 216. 
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 Despite his tumultuous personal life, Navarrete’s career continued ascending. He 
established strong connections with important families and other royal officers in the city. 
He married the daughter of Bartolome de Salazar, minister of the Real Audiencia, and 
became an open ally of visitador Cornejo.428 After his affair with the Basque merchant’s 
wife, the Viceroy Count of Santisteban banished Navarrete to the coastal town of  Pisco, 
where he remained for a few months. Yet, after the death of the Viceroy in 1664, Visitador 
Cornejo took control of the Real Audiencia, recalled Don Sebastian from exile, and 
appointed him as supervisor of the royal fleet and galleys.429 
Even after Navarrete’s protector, Visitor Cornejo, left the city in 1666, he did not lose 
his social standing. He actually improved his status by getting a promotion. By then, he 
had formally assumed the post of comptroller, and was a knight of the order of Calatrava.430  
When Don Alvaro de Ybarra, minister of the Real Audiencia, resumed the activities of the 
428 Testimony of Sebastian de Arteaga, accountant of the Tribunal de Cuentas. Lima, June 28, 1677. AGI, 
Lima, 289. 
 
429 Account of Sebastian de Navarrete’s services. AGI, Lima,288. 
 
430 Testimony of Andres de Alseda Caro, clerk at the Tribunal del Consulado. Lima, July 19th, 1677. AGI, 
Lima, 289. 
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 visita in 1673, Don Sebastián resisted the activities of the new visitor, who was enemy of 
his former protector Cornejo.  
In an attempt to stop Ybarra’s investigation of Francisco de Colmenares, a colleague 
in the administration of the caja real and a relative, Navarrete resorted to a legal resource 
known as recusación, or recusal.431 This mechanism allowed a plaintiff to put into question 
the capacity of an authority to properly perform his duties, without biases. Navarrete’s legal 
move had the effect of delaying the inspection of the royal treasury, yet in the end the 
Council of Indies rejected his demand against Ybarra, and corroborated the authority of the 
visitador.  Even though Ybarra, who died in 1675, was unable to receive the news of the 
Council of Indies’ decision, his successor, Don Agustin de Villavicencio, initiated 
interrogation about the activities of the royal administration’s officers.432 He questioned 
various witnesses about the royal officer’s performance of duties, suspicious activities, and 
public life.  
431 Jímenez, “Don Alvaro de Ybarra,” 317. 
 
432 Copies of the testimonies collected by Alvaro de Ybarra’s visita, Lima, 1677-1679. AGI, Lima, 289. 
There were 62 witnesses that answered the 80 questions that Ybarra designed. 
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 During Villavicencio’s investigation, witnesses’ most salient observation against the 
administrators of the royal treasury was their excessive living expenses. Contemporaries 
agreed that the officers were living with the decency that their post demanded. Yet they 
identified Sebastian de Navarrete and Cristobal de Llanos as the royal administrators that 
had the most ostentatious expenses. In contrast to Francisco de Colmenares, the third senior 
administrator of the caja real, who had a more frugal life, Navarrete and Llanos participated 
in ostentatious events reserved for elite gentlemen, dressed in livery and surrounded by a 
retinue.433 
When Villavicencio asked witnesses if they knew how Navarrete and Llanos could 
afford lifestyles that exceeded their income as royal officers, witnesses simply answered 
they believed both administrators had the wealth to live in such luxury.434 Only one 
witness, Don Diego de Segura y Lara declared, when interrogated about the expenses of 
433 Testimony of Don Diego de Segura y Lara, Lawyer of the Real Audiencia. Lima, March 9, 1677; 
Testimony of Andres de Alseda Caro, clerk at the Tribunal del Consulado. Lima, July 19, 1677. AGI, 
Lima, 289. 
 
434 Testimony of Captain Pedro Luque Cosar, consul of the Tribunal del Consulado, Lima, July 8, 1677; 
Testimony of Sebastian de Arteaga, accountant of the Tribunal de Cuentas. Lima, June 28, 1677.  AGI, 
Lima,289. These witnesses indicated Navarrete had received a dowry of 30000 pesos and a ranch when he 
married his wife, and a large inheritance of his aunt.  
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 the two officers, that visitor Ybarra told him several times that the royal treasury had been 
defrauded.435 
It is unclear whether Villavicencio continued this investigation or sent a report of the 
interrogations to the King, yet news of Navarrete’s overindulgences circulated through the 
court in Madrid.  By 1679, the members of the Council of Indies knew about Navarrete’s 
constant excesses and obstructions of the visita. Navarrete’s denouncers claimed the 
comptroller spent wantonly, spoke with arrogance, and made threats to peers.436  Because 
news about Navarrete had circulate, when Charles II appointed oidor Juan de Peñalosa as 
visitor of the cajas reales, he ordered the imprisonment of Navarrete, the confiscation of 
his belongings, and his exile to New Spain.437 Even if they had not received an official 
denunciation against Navarrete, peninsular authorities ordered the visitor to investigate 
Navarrete’s excesses. 
435 Testimony of Don Diego de Segura y Lara, Lawyer of the Real Audiencia. Lima, March 9, 1679 . AGI, 
Lima,289. 
 
436 Instruction to those in charge of the visita of the Cajas Reales and Caja of Lima, Madrid, September 30, 
1689. AGI, Lima,288. 
 
437 Copy of the Royal Decree of October 23rd, 1680. Lima, March 3, 1683. AGI, Lima, 289. 
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 The Archbishop-viceroy and the Real Audiencia rapidly implemented the first two 
orders of the decree. During the night of June 7, 1681, the Alcalde del Crimen, the Alguacil 
de Corte, and 30 soldiers arrived at Navarrete’s home to detain him and confiscate his 
goods. The alcalde took the comptroller to the court jail, where Navarrete remained for 2 
months until he commuted jail for house arrest.438 Like many elite prisoners, Navarrete 
spent the following months enjoying certain freedom to move around the city, under a 
soldier’s guard.439 When the new viceroy of Peru, the Duke of Palata, arrived at the end of 
that year, he was surprised to find out that Navarrete was still in Lima, contravening royal 
orders.  
The new viceroy was determined to fulfill all the instructions of the royal decree, 
including the banishment of Navarrete. In 1682, the Duke attempted to send Navarrete to 
New Spain on a ship that would sail to Realejo. The officer tried to convince the Viceroy 
to concede him permission to remain in Lima, where he would be capable of preparing and 
conducting his own defense.  In a final attempt to delay his departure, Navarrete indicated 
that Realejo was very distant from Acapulco, which was his official final destination. He 
438 Letter of Navarrete to the Duke of Palata, Lima, August 1682. AGI, Lima,288. 
 
439 Decree of the Virrey of New Spain, Marques de la Laguna, Mexico City, June 16, 1683. AGI, Lima,289. 
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 explained that he lacked the economic means to afford the trip by land from one port to 
another, because his salary was sequestrated.440 Finally, the Viceroy found the opportunity 
to send Navarrete in the ships that were set to sail to Acapulco carrying 3000 quintals of 
quicksilver.441  
Soon after Navarrete arrived to Acapulco in early 1683, he claimed that the local 
weather took a toll on his health.  He requested permission from the viceroy of New Spain, 
the Marques of Laguna, to travel to Mexico City. The Marquis accepted Navarrete’s 
request with the condition that he would travel guarded by four soldiers paid from the 
prisoner’s own belongings.442 Don Sebastian had to sell a slave and his clothes to cover the 
expenses of his move to New Spain’s capital.443 The once powerful officer arrived in 
Mexico City on the night of August 5, 1683. He made his entrance to this city not with a 
retinue, as he was accustomed in Lima, but with the soldiers in charge of his custody. He 
440 Letter of Navarrete to the Duke of Palata, Lima, August 1682. AGI, Lima,288. 
 
441 Letter of Navarrete to the Duke of Palata, Lima, November 1682. AGI, Lima,288. 
 
442 Decree of the Virrey of New Spain, Marques de la Laguna, Mexico City, June 16, 1683. AGi, Lima,289. 
 
443 Letter of Navarrete to the King, August 10, 1683. AGI, Lima, 289. 
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 immediately was put in the city hall jail, where he would spend the remaining months of 
his life.444 
Determined to reverse his situation, Navarrete prepared a detailed record of his 
services and attached it to a letter sent to the King, requesting permission to either return 
to Lima, where he could better defend himself, or appear before a Madrid court to 
demonstrate his innocence in person before the monarch. In the letter, he indicated that his 
unfair exile to New Spain was promoted by the animosity of his enemies who hated him 
for his loyal service to the crown. He argued that his loyalty to the crown was evidenced 
by the result of his activities as administrators, which increased the royal treasury of Peru 
by 3 millions pesos.445 The King did not agree with his strongly documented request. He 
simply ordered royal officials in Lima to move forward with the investigation of 
Navarrete’s case. A second attempt by Navarrete to persuade the king was also 
444 Certification of the notary Juan Jimenez Navarrete, Mexico, August 12, 1683. AGI, Lima,288. 
 
445 Letter of Navarrete to the King, August 10th 1683. AHI, Lima, 288. He gathered several transcripts that 
certified the time he served as futurario and proprietor of the comptroller post, the confiscation he 
effectuated of various unregistered goods and silver in the port of Callao, his supervision of the armada of 
1660, his administration of the stamped paper, and other services he performed for the Crown. 
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 unsuccessful.446 Finally, Navarrete died a few months later, on August 24, 1684, in a city 
hall cell in Mexico City.447 
Navarrete’s unsuccessful attempts to leave New Spain demonstrate that the crown 
had set certain limits on the behaviors of their royal officers’ behavior. The King and the 
Council of Indies were unwilling to hear the claims by the royal officer. In other words, 
the number of charges against Navarrete had exceeded the parameters of his flexible 
authority as a loyal administrator. For that reason, they entrusted the visitor and the viceroy 
to perform a careful and detailed investigation to uncover Navarrete’s faults. At the end, 
the comptroller had fallen out favor with the King. 
The Fighting Wife 
After Navarrete departed from Peru, his second wife, Doña Constanza de Loaisa y 
Mogrovejo, niece of late Archbishop Jeronimo de Mogrovejo, became his main advocate 
and legal representative. As soon as he received notification of his trip to Acapulco, 
Navarrete granted legal power to her to represent him in the visita process.448 She left 
446 Letter of Navarrete to the King, Mexico City, April 15th, 1684. AGI, Lima, 288 
 
447 Testimony of notary Juan Jímenez Navarrete, August 25th, 1684. AGI, Lima, 288. 
448 Request of Doña Constanza to the Visita’s judge demanding her husband’s salaries. Lima, May 4, 1683. 
AGI, Lima,288. It includes a copy of the power Navarrete granted to her before departing to New Spain. 
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 abundant legal material from the multiple request, letters, and appeals she presented before 
the visitor. These documents offer elaborate arguments that unveil the early modern 
political elite’s notions of justice and loyalty. 
After the imprisonment of Naverrete in June of 1681, he continued to receive a 
customary payment of 2 pesos for each receipt (certificación) issued to any individual that 
made a deposit in the treasury. In 1683, the new assistant comptroller, Francisco Antonio 
de Los Santos, claimed the rights to collect the fee.449 However, Navarrete’s wife argued 
that her husband was still the proprietor of the post because a condemnatory sentence had 
not been issued against him.450 Nonetheless, visitador Peñalosa ruled to suspend the 
collection of the fee because he considered that the royal officers’ salaries covered their 
administrative activities and the fee “ was an abuse introduced in common damage” of 
particulars.451 Both parties agreed that practice confirmed the comptroller’s right to collect 
the fee. What was at issue was which of the two comptrollers should receive it. The visitor 
449 Letter of Francisco Antonio de Los Santos, Lima, January 3, 1683. AGI, Lima,288. The comptroller and 
the clerk that prepared the receipt shared the proceeds of the two pesos fee in equal proportions. 
 
450 Letter of Doña Constanza de Loayza y Mogrovejo, responding to Los Santos’ request, S/f. AGI, 
Lima,288. 
 
451 Decree of Juan de Peñalosa, Lima, July 28, 1683. AGI, Lima,288. 
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 decided to overrule the customary fee on grounds that it was not a prerogative of the post 
and it overburdened individuals with an extraordinary charge.452 In other words, the 
visitador decided to end a practice that was not legally contemplated in the office’s 
privileges and was “inconveniente” to the large number of individuals that requested 
receipts for payments to the royal treasury. 
When the news of Navarrete’s death reached Lima, his wife was in midst of another 
legal battle to lift the embargo of her husband’s salary and her dowry, which she claimed 
amounted to 30,000 pesos. Even though the royal decree that ordered the detention of 
Navarrete also commanded the embargo of his salary, the royal treasury’s officers had paid 
a salary to their old peer until he sailed to New Spain at the end of 1682. When Visitor 
Peñalosa discovered this loophole for paying the royal administrator, he moved to seize 
Navarrete’s salary, but the administrators had already disbursed it to him for the eighteenth 
month after his imprisonment.453 This irregularity also demonstrated that Navarrete was 
overstating his poverty when he requested permission from the King to return to Lima or 
appear before a Madrid court. 
452 Letter of Juan de Peñalosa to the Viceroy, Lima, November 4, 1683. AGI, Lima,288. 
 
453 Testimony of notary Gabriel Perez del Castillo, Lima, March 5, 1683. AGI, Lima, 288. 
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 The most disturbing fact is that Doña Constanza, knowing about the salary 
disbursement, continued demanding Navarrete’s remuneration from the day of his 
detention in June 1681 until the day of his death in 1684. She supported her demand on 
three clear points. First, she stated that, even though the royal decree ordered her husband’s 
detention and instructed the confiscation of his salaries, it was Navarrete’s “divine, natural, 
and positive right” to make his defense, and that the king had provided that in such 
circumstances his royal orders “were obeyed, but not executed.”454 Second, she claimed 
that the accusations against Don Sebastian were defamations manufactured by the enemies 
he gained through his loyal services to the king. Third, he had the right to receive his salary 
until a sentence of culpability was given against him. Finally, she added that her condition 
of a royal officer’s consort and a former archbishop’s niece made her incapable of asking 
for charity or live in need.  
This argument clearly demonstrates that people elaborated their demands based on 
notions of what they deserved according to their social standing. Doña Constanza 
demanded preferential treatment as both the wife, and later widow, of a royal officer and 
niece of a former archbishop. She highlighted that her social status did not permit her to 
454 Request of Doña Constanza to the Visitador to receiving the salaries of her husband, Lima, March 5, 
1683. AGI, Lima, 288.  
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 live from charity. She was appealing to caustic jurisprudence, which ruled according to the 
specificities and statuses of the people involved in the case. 
In her petition, she combined notions of law and custom. She argued that her husband 
had not lost rights over his salaries because a final sentence on his functions as royal officer 
was still pending. This was an argument based on law, which required a final sentence to 
apply the punishment. She attempted to devalue accusations against her husband, arguing 
that they were crafted based on enmity and animosity. It was customary practice, and 
legally accepted, that a defendant could undermine adversary testimonies on the grounds 
that they were provided by personal enemies.  
Finally, Doña Contanza’s request appealed to the preeminence that divine and natural 
law had over the king’s individual order in her husband’s case. Her arguments did not deny 
her loyalty to the king or challenge his authority. When she highlighted the legal recourse 
of “Obedezco, pero no cumplo,” she pointed out that the king himself recognized divine 
and natural right as prevalent. According to Doña Constanza’s legal elaboration, the king 
himself had crafted a legal mechanism that both validated supreme law and his authority.  
Visitador Peñalosa, however, rejected all of these arguments and ruled against all of 
the various requests Doña Constanza presented, even after years her husband had died. He 
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 argued that evidence confirmed Navarrete’s faults during his administration, so it was 
imperative to sequester his salary because it came “from the king’s purse.” 455 Doña 
Constanza had to wait many more years to get the results of the visita and a resolution to 
her requests.  
In 1693, when the visitor had the final report listing the amounts owed by the caja 
reales’ royal officers from 1620 to 1685, Navarrete was responsible for a debt of 30,590 
pesos 5 reales.456 This was a substantial amount considering that the senior officers of the 
caja real earned annual salaries ranging between 3000 and 3500 pesos.457 One more time, 
Navarrete’s family demanded the restitution of the salaries, which they argued belonged to 
Don Sebastian until his death, to pay part of the debt.458 Yet the demands by Navarrete’s 
family became fruitless when the visitor discovered that Navarrete had hidden from 
455 Decree of the Fiscal of the Real Audiencia, Lima, April 13, 1683. AGI, Lima, 288.  
 
456 Copy of the general report of the amounts owed by the officers according to the declaration of debts 
from 1620 to 1685. May 20th, 1693. AGI, Lima, 288. Navarrete was responsible for a debt of 22,819 pesos 
y 4 reales of pesos of 8 reales, and 4697 pesos two tomines one cuartillo of pesos ensayados. 
 
457 Luque, Funcionarios y remuneraciones, 94. 
 
458 Request of Don Fernando de Castro, husband of Doña Leonor Silvestra de Navarrete, s/f. AGI, 
Lima,291. 
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 inspectors a rural estate, which he entrusted to the Maestre de Campo Don Fernando Nuñez 
de Sanabria.459 When Peñalosa found this property, it undermined the comptroller’s claims 
of loyal service to the king and confirmed the multiple accusations against him.  
Conclusion 
Certainly, the visita did not meet the expectations of the peninsular ministers and the 
King because it was unable to completely resolve the chaotic condition of the Peruvian 
treasury. There were various obstacles to the activities and improvements that a handful of 
officers could make, such as collecting large and old debts, factionalism between royal 
officers, ties to local interests, and more. The colonial government of Lima, as in other 
parts of the Spanish empire, had several royal officers who failed to accomplish the duties 
of their posts or committed excesses while they generated certain benefits to the crown. 
Navarrete was a clear example of the latter; however, there were other ministers that 
behaved similarly yet never received the same punishment.  
Nonetheless, the late Hapsburg administration did not passively accept the 
misconduct or errors of representatives in the colonies. The visita to the Cajas Reales of 
Lima in the late seventeenth century demonstrates that the Spanish government had not 
459 Letter of Juan de Peñalosa to the King, Lima, September 15th, 1696. AGI, Lima,288. 
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 lost its capacity to bring officers, and institutions under control and order. The notable 
decrease of the total debts of the caja real of Lima, the imprisonment of Navarrete, and the 
final sentence against the royal officers demonstrate that the visita gained some centralized 
control and, most importantly, increased some of the productive capacity of the colony.  
The prosecution of Navarrete demonstrates that the Spanish administration was not 
impotent or unable to control its royal representatives. This early modern system permitted 
flexibility of governance to officeholders. Nonetheless, flexibility had limits that officers 
could not breach without risking punishment or even their lives. Officeholders, as well as 
other royal subjects, developed their own notions of justice and legitimacy. They enjoyed 
the privileges of their post and demanded specific treatment according to their position. 
Nonetheless, in their quest to prove loyalty to the crown, they ultimately understood that 
their authority came from the king. Even if they were thousands of miles away from the 
monarch, he was the source that legitimated their authority.  
Navarrete and his wife, as well as many other corporative bodies and individuals seen 
in the previous chapters, expected a certain type of treatment from authorities based on 
their social standing. They understood that authorities should impart justice according to 
people’s social standing after a careful analysis of law and custom.  If people effectively 
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 contributed to new notions of justice when crafting their own legal arguments, it was the 
state apparatus and its representatives that ultimately set and applied justice in the end. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The concepts of crisis and decline have pervaded the history of Spain since the 
sixteenth century. Studies by foreign and Spanish intellectuals, particularly since the 
eighteenth century, have reduced Spain’s seventeenth century to a tale of crises, 
associating the destiny of its empire with the destiny of the ruling Hapsburg dynasty. 
More recent scholarship, employing new approaches and examining new research topics 
about the seventeenth century, have not completely dispelled the specter of Spanish 
 260 
 crisis. What is more, the specter of a weak or deficient Spanish Hapsburg state also lives 
on in popular intellectuals’ writings.460  
Yet, within these new waves of scholarship lie clues that suggest that the time has 
come for scholars to reappraise the Hapsburg decline narrative. According to the “crisis” 
theorists, one of the main signs of crisis was in Spain’s government and administrative 
structure and political culture, which have been defined as inept, inefficient, and unable 
to impose central authority on the extensive domains of the Spanish empire. But this 
representation of Spanish administration, in both the metropolis and its colonies, comes 
from comparing the Spanish state not to contemporary early modern governments but to 
modern nation-states.  
When placed in its proper context, it is clear that the Spanish imperial state was a 
patrimonial system well aligned with its times. Governmental practices and rules, 
however flexible in practice, were ultimately legitimated by the monarch’s royal power, 
and in turn contributed to the legitimacy of Spanish imperial rule. Even when 
bureaucrats’ authority emanated from the king, their performance was limited by local 
interests and ordinary subjects’ perceptions of justice. The overlapping jurisdictions of 
460 John Elliot, “The Decline of Spain,” Past & Present 20 (Nov., 1961), 73.  
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 bureaucrats and institutions, extensive corpuses of laws, and the value of the customary 
practices required constant negotiation and compromise from royal agents and colonial 
subjects. Other early modern states, such France and English, also relied on continual 
negotiation because it was necessary to obtain the support of local elites to implement the 
central government’s new policies. Negotiation allowed the inhabitants of early modern 
societies—and particularly the heterogeneous inhabitants of Spain’s colonies--  to defend 
their purported privileges or seek protections according to the role they played in the 
socio-political body. 
Since the ultimate objective of early modern administration did not aim to fulfill 
the common good but provide to each part of society with what was “conveniente,” or 
appropriate, the application of laws was not universal but applied on a case-by-case basis. 
Judges sought to reach mutually beneficial sentences for the parties involved in a suit, 
requesting determined procedures according to each case.  
When rules contradicted practice, solutions were reached and legitimated 
following the same objective of “conveniencia”. “Conveniencia” was not dictated by the 
interest of powerful figures alone but by reference to a greater sense of fairness for all 
actors involved. For instance, when the interim comptroller De los Santos demanded 
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 rights over the fees that Navarrete traditionally collected when expediting royal treasury’s 
receipts, the visitador rejected the idea, concerned that it was not just. In spite of the fact 
that both parties recognized the customary collection of such fees as valid, the visitador 
denied its legitimacy because those fees unfairly burdened the large number of 
individuals that requested receipts from the royal treasury to confirm payments.  
Understanding the Spanish empire within the paradigm of the patrimonial state 
offers new perspectives on the performance of the royal administrators and the political 
system implemented by the Spanish Hapsburgs in the New World, particularly in a 
moment of intense crisis. The performance of royal agents after the earthquake was 
dynamic and the capacity of the crown to impose control and authority was substantial, 
even after the destruction of the capital by the severest earthquake up to that moment in 
the colonial life of the city. 
The ability to respond dynamically and with flexibility might have been 
showcased after the earthquake, but it was not new. The presence of pirates on the coast 
of the viceroyalty of Peru had for a century been a crisis that popped up from time to 
time, beginning with the first English corsairs circumnavigated the Straits of Magellan. 
Most of the planning and construction of the series of defensive structures along the 
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 coastline of the main port Callao resulted from the imminent threat of pirates on the 
viceroyalty’s capital.  Despite of the importance of this port for the colonial 
administration and economy, viceroys hesitated to build these structures because of the 
economic burden they represented for the royal treasury. The royal authorities 
demonstrated more concern on sending bullion remittances to the metropolis than on 
improving the defenses of the viceroyalty’s main port.   
The wall of Lima finally was constructed in the seventeenth century after a new 
wave of pirate raids in the South Sea and the entrance of one of the principal actors in this 
dissertation, Viceroy Duke of Palata. He had to design a new plan not only for the 
construction of the structure but also the cost of future repairs. In order to reduce the 
costs of the wall, he obtained economic and personal contributions from the different 
members of Lima’s corporate groups. With the creation of new taxes, the Duke attempted 
to relieve financial pressure on Peru’s royal treasury.  
Similar to his predecessors, the Duke’s main responsibility was to send periodical 
remittances of bullion to the King. His performance during the reconstruction of Lima 
after the quake of 1687 demonstrated the continued concern in protecting the royal 
finances above all else. Like other early modern officeholders, the Viceroy was in charge 
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 of implementing the crown’s instructions; yet he realized that, in order to protect the 
royal treasury, he had to negotiate the expenses related to construction projects with the 
colonial population that they directly benefited. Negotiation was an effective tool for the 
Viceroy to obtain economic support from corporative groups to build the devastated city 
wall and consent from royal officers to construct a smaller viceregal palace. 
The wall of Lima did little to protect the capital against the attacks of nature. 
Some sections crumbled on top of adjacent properties when the Earthquake of 1687 hit, 
and there was damaged property and dispossession all over the city. Amid the disorder 
and destruction of the city, the Duke rapidly ordered the other royal officers to deal with 
critical matters such as the dispersion of the population, distribution of food, and the 
clearing of dead bodies and rubble. The Viceroy and the city counselors met in a 
provisional cabin built in the Plaza Mayor, and planned and promulgated the essential 
measures to respond to the immediate needs of the population. The colonial 
administration in Lima was both primed for the event and flexible enough to react to the 
new circumstances they faced. 
Because of the destruction of the viceregal palace, which was headquarters of the 
main branches of the colonial administration, most government institutions suspended 
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 their activities for some months. For this reason, the Viceroy organized the recovery and 
reconstruction of the city by enlisting the members of the city council. The viceroy-
cabildo alliance implemented new measures to deal with the new needs of the 
populations, such as the provision of good, fair food prices, and access to affordable labor 
force and materials to rebuild properties.  
 Once the Viceroy organized the immediate response to the critical situation of the 
city, he focused on the activities of reconstructing those buildings that embodied the 
authority of the crown, including the viceregal palace, the city council, and the cathedral, 
among others. Once again, he had to undertake his tasks while causing the minimum 
burden on the royal treasury.  
The earthquake interrupted the plans the Duke had made to support the council’s 
long-term finances. In order to create new income to pay off the rebuilding of the city 
council, the Viceroy conferred it another land grant. Meanwhile, the counselors tried to 
raise more funds through the penalties imposed on the food suppliers, construction 
laborers, and suppliers of construction materials that did not follow the new regulations 
of the council. These attempts to reduce the cost of constructing the viceregal palace and 
improve the city council’s budget demonstrate that royal administrators were judicious, 
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 innovative and not inept. They recognized the colonial institutions’ problems and 
developed new means to deal with them. In order to implement these innovations, royal 
officers carefully weighed both benefits and risks of potential measures. 
 The rebuilding of the cathedral represented not only another challenge to the 
Viceroy, but uncovered cracks within the highest echelons of the secular religious 
hierarchy. The performance of the prelates during weeks and months after the quake 
paled against the active participation of the members of the regular clergy. Members of 
the different religious orders actively participated in the spiritual assistance of people as 
soon as the first quake passed. Meanwhile, the members of the ecclesiastical council 
spent months discussing the construction of a decent provisional chapel at the Plaza 
Mayor, where they would be able to perform their regular duties. They seemed more 
concerned about building a decent chapel in accordance with their social condition than 
with fulfilling their spiritual obligations.  The Archbishop of Lima remained absent for 
several weeks after the quake, recovering from injuries sustained when the earthquake 
hit. In his absence, the Viceroy assumed religious functions such as organizing 
processions, performing penitence acts, and attending sermons.  
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 When the Viceroy assembled the Archbishop and members of the ecclesiastical 
council to discuss the reconstruction of the cathedral, they refused to accept any of his 
suggestions to raise funds for the rebuilding activities. The Viceroy’s first step was to 
deliberate, determine what was most suitable for the Church, and reach consensus. When 
no agreement was reached, the colonial administration resorted to other available 
mechanism to persuade stubborn opponents to comply. Since the Viceroy initially was 
unable to reach his objectives through negotiation, he finally escalated the issue to the 
highest level of ecclesiastical authority that granted a positive resolution for the royal 
treasury. In other words, despite the inflexible resistance from the ecclesiastical ministers, 
the colonial administration was able to compel them to contribute to the cathedral’s 
reconstruction through effective means.  
The reconstruction of Lima’s private property also reveals a customary practice of 
negotiation among ordinary people, as well as the adoption and adaptation of official and 
unofficially forms of the Spanish legal system. People from different social conditions 
negotiated and set formal and informal contracts to rebuild property. In court, individuals 
elaborated and set reconstruction plans with the mediation of judges, while notaries 
mainly validated agreements previously negotiated by the parties. Courts and notaries 
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 were the official spaces the colonial subjects used to legitimate agreements. The 
rebuilding projects contained in these official contracts are similar in that they all dealt 
with reconstruction of property, yet each case proposed specific solutions or plans 
according to its own particularities, replicating the larger casuistic culture of law. 
 Alongside these official contracts, colonial subjects also reached and 
implemented informal agreements. Unlike the cases presented before judges and notaries, 
which usually involved large sums of money in properties, unofficial contracts dealt with 
smaller sums of money and were resolved between the parties involved without an 
overseeing authority; yet they pursued the same objectives of rebuilding a property in that 
they benefited or satisfied both the owner and the tenant. A judge or notary did not 
legitimize these informal contracts, yet they were valid for the parties involved.  
The different cases presented show that ordinary people in Lima, standing in the 
destroyed rubble of their city, actively rebuilt not only buildings but also the colonial 
state using the cultural materials they had on hand—namely legal negotiation. They 
adopted the formal forms the Spanish legal system had implemented in the New World 
and also adapted them to fit their own needs. The unofficial contracts mirrored the 
official ones in both the objectives pursued and the flexibility they provided to 
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 individuals to elaborate their own rebuilding projects. These contracts also demonstrate 
how limeños engaged broader discourses before colonial authorities about what was fair 
or unfair in terms of fulfilling certain contractual obligations amid the critical conditions 
of the city, while devising “conveniente” resolutions to the parts involved.  
Finally, by moving backward in time, to the visita general to the cajas reales of 
Lima during the reign of Charles II, the dissertation reveals that, while the contours of 
patrimonialism fit colonial society well, not everything was always perfect.  The crown 
and its agents recognized the necessity of reforming and improving the performance of 
various institutions and officers of royal administration.  The inspection of Lima’s 
treasury lasted several years, and various inspectors took the responsibility of scrutinizing 
the institution and its officials. Until now, the accomplishments of this visita have been 
lost in history. The Earthquake of 1687 halted fiscal reform plans Duke of Palata first 
introduced in the city, and brought an end to the increased collecting activities of the 
royal administrators. But in the short period of the Duke’s tenure as viceroy, the 
condition of the viceroyalty royal treasury was significantly improved, and Lima’s 
treasury debt was considerably reduced.  
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 Although the crown granted local administrators flexibility, negotiation also had 
its limits. The Spanish early modern state had the tools necessary to impose control and 
authority when officeholders exceeded their power. For instance, Sebastian de Navarre 
was imprisoned, his belongings confiscated, and finally exiled to New Spain, where he 
died without defending his case after he fell from royal grace.  But Navarrete’s response 
also reveals that crown subjects believed that their social status—so important in a 
patrimonial state—might provide relief from royal scrutiny. Before departing to 
Acapulco, he had collected abundant certifications of the various services he had 
performed for the king. He did not attempt to disprove negligence in the performance of 
his post’s duties, but constantly stressed that his administrative activities, although 
questionable, generated benefits for the royal treasury. After Navarrete left Lima, and 
even after he finally died in Mexico, his wife, Doña Constanza de Navarrete, continued 
disputing the confiscation of his salaries and her dowry. She based her demands on legal 
and customary practices and argued that her husband had not been found guilty or 
sentenced yet; therefore, he was entitled to his salaries in order to support his family.  
Just as the members of the ecclesiastical council that claimed it was impossible to 
contribute to the cathedral’s rebuilding because their social status did not allow them to 
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 live decently with reduced incomes, Don Sebastián and Doña Constanza elaborated their 
requests for royal favor according to the social “quality.”  If read carefully, the arguments 
by the prelates, and Don Sebastian and Doña Constanza, together demonstrate that 
members of the colonial society shared a common framework in which law and custom 
had to conform to the demands of social class and status. The validity of both law and 
custom permitted individuals to build their own discourses of justice, which captured 
their understanding of the privileges they deserved according to their station in the socio-
political body.  Even those individuals that appeared before judges and notaries in order 
to obtain legitimate resolutions to their building needs developed discursive assertions of 
fairness and “conveniencia.” 
Colonial subjects’ use of broader patrimonial practices and values, including 
discourses of law, and extralegal contracts and practices, reveals a dynamic, open and 
strong colonial system. The lack of a rigid centralization allowed flexibility, and thus 
royal administrators and ordinary people could creatively contend with crisis, innovating 
during times of hardship by combining legal and extralegal practices to rebuild. Contrary 
to the image of decadence or incapacity, the Hapsburg colonial state in Lima responded 
effectively to the earthquake, sustained various fiscal reforms, and improved the critical 
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 condition of the royal treasury.  Ultimately, the flexibility of the system bolstered the 
common framework of colonial rule so that it was able to withstand even a devastating 
event.  
Rather than halting the Hapsburg reforms, the earthquake simply temporarily 
suspended them. Royal agents redirected their attention to the immediate needs of the 
population, and the reorganization of the capital’s administration and reconstruction. 
Lima was able to recover as everyone, colonial authorities and colonial subjects, tacitly 
put themselves in a fast-forward mode to cope with the new circumstances of the city. 
The earthquake did not undermine the colonial state but instead strengthened it. When the 
ground shifted under their feet, Lima’s residents kept themselves steady by leaning on the 
practices and discourses of the Spanish colonial system in order to rebuild their city. 
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